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THE SITUATION IN LEBANON

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 31, 1983

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THE SITUATION IN LEBANON

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, East, Wilson, Evans, Trible, Nunn, Stennis, Hart, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, and Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Louis W. Arny III, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, José E. Martinez, Bruce D. Porter, Patrick L. Renehan, Carl M. Smith, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, Tamara L. Farnsworth, Mary Kampo, Kathy L. Keys, Karen A. Love, Kathleen L. McGuire, Jacquie S. O'Grady, Patricia Watson, and Toni D. White, staff assistants; Drew A. Harker, Mark B. Robinson, Judith A. Freedman, and Douglas R. Graham, research assistants; Suzanne Bantz, receptionist.

Also present: John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Ron Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, and Robert Savitt, assistants to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Samuel T. Francis, assistant to Senator East; Frank Sullivan, and Mary A. Shields, assistants to Senator Stennis; Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter D. Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin; Matthew Murray, assistant to Senator Kennedy; and Ed McGaffigan, assistant to Senator Bingaman.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

This past Sunday the U.S. Marine Corps contingent serving as part of the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon suffered a brutal terrorist attack. This despicable act was perpetrated with one end in mind—to force a withdrawal of the U.S. presence from Lebanon.

In my view, the United States must not rush to precipitous conclusions or judgments concerning her presence in Lebanon. At a time when emotions are high, it is incumbent on the United States to avoid premature conclusions or hastily considered courses of actions.

In reaction to this tragedy, some are calling for a removal of the U.S. forces participating in the multinational peacekeeping force. I believe such a move by the United States would be a major mistake for our long-term interests, not only in the Middle East but also in other world areas where U.S. vital interests are being threatened.

A precipitous U.S. withdrawal would certainly lead the other Western nations contributing troops to the force to reconsider their involvement. A withdrawal of the peacekeeping force would lead to a vacuum inside Lebanon which Syria and the Soviet Union would only be too willing to fill.

A U.S. departure from Lebanon in the face of this provocation would also place in jeopardy the American presence in other parts of the world. Withdrawal in the face of terrorist activity in Lebanon would almost certainly encourage such acts against the United States elsewhere.

Many critics of our peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon have argued that our Marine force does not have a clear mission. This criticism is ill-founded. It is true that the mission cannot be articulated in the precise objectives that normally characterize military operations. But it is clear that the multinational forces' presence is designed to try to create a climate in which a political settlement is possible. This is an objective shared and clearly understood by the other members of the multinational force, Great Britain, France, and Italy.

Today the committee has an opportunity to review U.S. policy in Lebanon in the aftermath of this tragedy with witnesses from the administration.

May I say that we have some questions that concern us very deeply about the type of security arrangements that have been made for our forces there, and what steps are to be taken in the future to minimize the possibility of a repetition, in an attempt to prevent another event of this kind.

We have many questions to which we want straight answers. It is our responsibility to the Senate to raise these questions. Our primary concern, of course, is our military posture in that country and what that involves.

Now, we have with us today Secretary Weinberger, Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations.

I have also asked for an officer from the Naval Medical Corps. I believe we have one here today.

Will you introduce him, Mr. Secretary?

Admiral **Wilson**. I am Rear Adm. Almon C. Wilson, Deputy Surgeon General of the Navy.

Chairman **Tower**. Before proceeding with the discussion of Lebanon, I understand that the Secretary is prepared to brief the committee on the invasion of Grenada.

Before I yield to the Secretary, I will defer to Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I won't take any time this morning except to thank you for having a prompt hearing on this subject. There was great interest in having a hearing at the earliest possible time and we requested it yesterday.

I thank you for responding to that. I thank the general and admiral for being here.

I see we have a vote up there if that bell is working. We have a caucus, you have a caucus. I believe both the subjects of Lebanon and Grenada are very much on our minds. I would hope we could have a schedule that will permit us to go into as much detail as we feel we need which may necessitate an afternoon hearing.

May I ask, is there an allocation of time between Grenada and Lebanon? Each one, I am sure, will consume the rest of the morning.

Chairman TOWER. I believe we would like Grenada to be relatively short because our prime interest is Lebanon. It was my intention to continue the committee meeting on through the scheduled caucuses. I happen to be the chairman of ours, but I have yielded the Chair to someone else, since I believe this is my primary responsibility.

I would hope, unless you expect the next Presidential nominee in your caucus to be chosen today, someone could absolve you from being present there.

Senator EXON. You mean the next President?

Chairman TOWER. Well, that remains to be seen.

Let me advise you that the Secretary must leave around 12:30. You must understand, of course, that he is very much in demand at the moment.

I would like to make the best use of his time as possible. I will probably miss this vote, myself, but I would suggest that Members, if they want to, can proceed to vote. There is a motion on Metzenbaum's amendment on Buy-America.

Senator NUNN. I would hope that we could get the general back plus other military witnesses this afternoon, perhaps break at quarter to 1 or 1 o'clock for a few minutes and come back in the afternoon for more detail by the military.

Chairman TOWER. We will give consideration to that request. A great deal depends on the availability of our witnesses.

Mr. Secretary, would you proceed.

STATEMENT OF CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman and members, I am at your service. I don't have a prepared statement. I will be glad to discuss any subject and try to answer any questions you want to put to me.

Chairman TOWER. Could you give us a brief summary of the action in Grenada this morning?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir, the reason, of course, was twofold.

We had an urgent request from the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States [OECS], the organization of island nations of which Grenada is also a member.

They were joined by Barbados and Jamaica who are not part of that organization, but who joined in the request and certainly concurred in its urgency. The request was based on the fact that the Bishop government in Grenada had been very violently overthrown and when Maurice Bishop himself was released from house arrest, he and his supporters—numbering about 10,000 people, of an island population of 100,000—were moving toward the Government buildings, Government troops fired into the crowd, killed over 18 people and then took Bishop and 5 of his Cabinet Ministers into a building and gunned them all down.

There has been no effective Government on the island since then, and the chairman of the OECS, Miss Eugenia Charles, who is the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica, and who was with us this morning, joined in that urgent unanimous request that we intervene and restore government to the Island of Grenada.

We had been working in the Department on the possibility of the need to evacuate American citizens, which is, of course, always a fairly difficult problem whenever any thing of that kind occurs.

We were asked to expand these evacuation plans and to respond to the request of the OECS nations, and we did that. Our troops landed this morning.

I don't have a map with me, but the island of Grenada is roughly pear shaped, and on the northeastern side is the regular commercial airport of the island called Pearls.

This is where the marines landed. There are now, as of 10 o'clock, 400 marines on the ground. The airport has been secured.

The small town to the south, Grenville, was also taken, and the marines have secured all roads into the airport, while opening the main road to the southwest where the main town of Saint George's and the other population centers of the island are located.

There was light resistance which was overcome. At Point Salines, which is the southwestern point of Grenada and where the new international 10,000-foot runway is being constructed we inserted a ranger force. The rangers went in about 5:30 this morning.

They encountered some antiaircraft fire, but the helicopter gunships suppressed it. They dropped the troops in and 500 rangers are on the ground now. Support equipment is being air delivered and obstacles on the airport runway, consisting of barbed wire, barrels and drums, things of that kind, have been removed and the runway area is secured.

The St. George's medical school is just off the east end of the airport runway. That was secured.

We have no reports as to any injuries or problems with any of the American medical students. There were about 800 American students at the St. George's medical school, not only that campus facility at the east end of the runway, but also at a new campus under construction about a mile northeast of that area. We have also secured the new campus.

That was a campus more or less under construction. There we encountered some resistance, even stronger resistance at Point Salines, but the airfield was secured.

There were two groups of prisoners taken at that time, 20 Grenadians who insisted they were not really fighting against us, but just happend to be there, and 20 Cubans who were part of a construction group that had been working on the airfield.

About 500 or 600 Cuban construction workers were working on the airfield, and 20 of those apparently were offering resistance and were taken prisoner.

In addition to the construction workers, the Cuban Government and the Soviet Union have about 20 people on the island, most of them consular employees and KGB personnel and others. Both governments have been notified that we will take all precautions and all steps to protect their civilians and their citizens.

Another group moved into the west of the town on a small point of the harbor, called Fort Ruppert, which was also secured. They are encountering heavier resistance in the areas near the prison, at a place called Richmond Hill.

There is a resident Governor General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, who was stripped of all his power when Maurice Bishop took over in 1979.

The other elements of the multinational force, that is the representatives, the Armed Forces from the other islands in this chain, St. Kitts, Barbados, and so on, were scheduled to go in at 10:10. I believe they are in.

There was a delay. The Jamaicans were scheduled to go in at 9:30, but there was a delay because one of the Jamaican airline planes we were using to transport the Jamaican contingent of about 120 had maintenance problems. We substituted a plane and they are now ready to go in.

Eventually, all the elements from these other eastern Caribbean nations will go in.

That is about the latest information I have on Grenada, Mr. Chairman. We had a Cabinet meeting at 10 this morning and I have just come from there. There may be some later reports, but I have not received any additional reports by phone.

Chairman **Tower**. You have no casualty report right now?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No sir, there was one marine who broke a leg on the landing at the Pearls Airport.

I don't have any other reports of casualties confirmed at this time, but there are casualties reported in the area where the resistence is stiff, around the prison and the Governor General's residence.

Chairman **Tower**. Is there any evidence that the Cuban construction workers also double as a military unit?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We don't have that confirmed yet, Mr. Chairman, but it would not be unusual. Either that or they have had reserve training and had some arms, but we don't have information about that.

Chairman **Tower**. What type of fire are we encountering?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Small arms.

Chairman **Tower**. All small arms?

Secretary **Weinberger**. So far, that is the only report we have. There could be some mortar fire. The only confirmation I have so far is small arms.

Senator **Levin**. Could I ask one quick question before I vote?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Of course, there was some antiaircraft fire.

Chairman TOWER. That was suppressed?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Have you taken any Soviet prisoners?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No.

Senator LEVIN. What, again, is our purpose in going in?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Our purpose was to protect American citizens. There was a curfew in effect, a 24-hour curfew had been put into effect, and the new regime announced that anybody seen in the streets outside their homes would be shot. American citizens in Grenada number about 1,000, Senator, and about 800 of them are students in the school.

The other purpose was to respond to the urgent request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, joined by Barbados and Jamaica.

Senator LEVIN. Did you misspeak yesterday when you said there was no occasion of any danger to Americans?

Secretary WEINBERGER. There was one spokesman on Barbados who made that statement.

Senator LEVIN. Larry Speakes was quoted as saying that in the Post.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I didn't hear Mr. Speakes say that. There was a statement made by one of the consular officials in Barbados, which, I have to say, was based on information certainly different from ours.

When you say no danger, that can have different interpretations.

On the one hand, you can say that because everybody remained in their homes and didn't go out in the streets and therefore weren't shot, that they weren't in danger. But if you have to stay under house arrest, and if you are living under fear of being shot if you leave your house, I wouldn't call it safety.

Senator LEVIN. I will reserve the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. I think perhaps we ought to suspend our discussion on Lebanon until more Senators return.

Let me pursue further the matter of Grenada.

You assumed there was some danger to the Americans virtually by the shoot-on-sight notification during the curfew. In any case, it was not possible for them to leave the island?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct. There were two or three conflicting reports.

One report was that the 24-hour curfew was going to be lifted yesterday. One of the problems with the conflicting reports is that there is no organized government. There is a man named Hudson Austin, who seems to be in charge of the Grenadian Armed Forces, but there does not seem to be any established governmental authority.

Another of the reports we had was that when the new regime had meetings with some of our consular officials they had no offices, or buildings, or anything.

The report was, of course, that there was an announcement that they would allow a Canadian plane to land and that the Canadian plane could take various people out if they had extra seats.

Our information was that the offer was later rescinded and the plane did not get in.

So, there are a lot of conflicting reports. The curfew, so far as we know, was still in effect when our forces landed.

Chairman **Tower**. Have we identified the people in Grenada that are friendly to our multinational efforts that can be used to form some kind of provisional ad hoc government?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, OECS, is pursuing that line and has reported to us that they have identified people.

They have also reported to us that there are people in the United States, including, I think, two people at Howard University, who are considered to be very influential and important in this area.

You have to bear in mind, Mr. Chairman, that over 25,000 Grenadians have left the country since the Maurice Bishop regime took over in 1979.

Among this group are people at the OECS who have advised us they would be the ones who would work in helping to identify and establish some governmental structure that would then allow the Grenadian people to participate in free elections after some kind of stability is restored.

Chairman **Tower**. Since the Governor General is the ultimate constitutional head on the island, will he be utilized in any way to form a provisional government?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes; he would be recognized by them as sort of a last-surviving bit of constitutional government. His powers under the existing constitution that Grenada had when the island achieved independence from the Commonwealth were suspended when Prime Minister Bishop took over.

We believe the legal situation is that the Governor General is the remaining vestige or holder of constitutional authority, but he has been unable to act, of course.

Chairman **Tower**. Any political action we take will be taken in concert with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Entirely. Not only in concert with, but at their specific request.

Chairman **Tower**. We will not act independently of them?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, sir.

Chairman **Tower**. I understand it will be a collective decision process.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Indeed. That is my understanding.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Hart?

Senator **Hart**. Mr. Secretary, to make sure I have the facts straight, the makeup of the contingent which has landed is composed of what elements?

Secretary **Weinberger**. There is a Marine unit that went in. The Marine unit landed by helicopter because of the condition of the beaches in the Pearls Airport area.

The Army Ranger battalion went in at Port Salines.

Senator **Hart**. And was anyone else in the region?

Secretary **Weinberger**. As I mentioned, they are meeting resistance from groups identified as Cubans. The Cubans that we knew of were Cuban construction workers working on the airport.

Senator **Hart**. I meant of the OECS.

Secretary **Weinberger**. The Marines went in by helicopter. The Rangers went in by parachute.

Senator **Hart**. The Eastern Caribbean States provided some forces?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes. They will all contribute, I believe, except St. Kitts, which does not have any military force. The others have either small military forces or police units. They will all contribute, and Jamaica will contribute the largest number.

Senator **Hart**. What concerns me is the "will." They are not contributing now?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, they have probably been inserted by now.

Senator **Hart**. What type of forces?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The Jamaican defense force is an army unit. The others are small infantry squads, and in some cases the police constabulary, which are the only security forces that some of the other islands have.

Senator **Hart**. Your information is that there is exchange of fire between this multinational force——

Secretary **Weinberger**. Not yet. The resistance that I mentioned to you that they were encountering was encountered by our forces before this other group had gone in.

Senator **Hart**. Did any resistance come from the Cubans?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Some of the Cubans were reported taken prisoner at Port Salines Airport where they had been working as construction workers. I don't know the nature of the hostile fire we are receiving from the Government House or in the Richmond Hill Prison area yet.

Senator **Hart**. Were there Cuban combatants there?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Not that we knew of, but in response to the chairman's question, it is fair to assume that the Cubans who were working on construction had had military training and may have had reserve status.

We have not identified, do not know of any Cuban units that may be there.

Senator **Hart**. Do you presently or does the administration presently have a projection as to how long the American forces will be on the island?

Secretary **Weinberger**. That is always a difficult thing. The sooner we can get them out, the happier we will all be.

If all goes well and this resistance I mentioned to you is overcome and these various points are secured—again, two airports, Fort Ruppert, and the medical school have been secured already—then I would very much hope in a matter of a few days we could leave and leave the island in the hands of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the multinational group that has gone in, too.

That is our hope and we will certainly try out best to realize it. Of course, obviously, we can't guarantee that.

Chairman **Tower**. Gentlemen, I don't like being arbitrary in that our primary focus today is on Lebanon. I would suggest we return to that topic. We can turn to Grenada later if you desire to do so.

You say that you have no prepared statement?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, sir, but I will be glad to discuss any point you wish. I can make a brief statement, but I thought you would prefer to have questions.

Chairman **Tower**. You might give us a brief statement and then we will proceed.

Secretary **Weinberger**. On Lebanon? Yes, sir.

We, of course, have been in Lebanon with the Marine forces for over 1 year now. They have been ordered in twice.

The first time they went in with a specific mission of enabling the PLO to be taken out of Beirut. That was accomplished in something under 30 days. As we know, they left when that mission was accomplished.

Following that withdrawal, there were the massacres in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and the assassination of President Gemayel's brother, and conditions deteriorated very rapidly, and we had an urgent request again to go in, and we did that with a multinational force consisting of Italians, French, and later joined by, I believe, 100 British troops.

The multinational force has been in Beirut for over 1 year. Their mission at the time they went in, which is still the mission, was to provide a peacekeeping force that could be inserted between the various factions that were locked in combat and to assist the Government of Lebanon to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

The idea is that when opposing forces are locked in close combat and they are told to withdraw pursuant to an agreement, they need some assurance that all sides will keep that agreement, because withdrawing when you are in that kind of position is a very difficult and hazardous military maneuver.

This multinational force was to be there to give confidence to all parties that the agreement, when reached, would be carried out. They were also there, recognizing almost complete breakdown of civilian authority in Lebanon, to try to lend strength to the legitimate constitutionally chosen Government of Lebanon while they reconstituted civil authority.

As a totally separate mission, Mr. Chairman, and not connected with the multinational force, the United States has undertaken a program to train and reequip the Lebanese Armed Forces—again, at the urgent request of Lebanon—and that assistance is underway and had proceeded very successfully.

Lebanon now has a force of some 35,000 fully trained and fully equipped troops. The army is actively recruiting and growing in strength. The army represents really the only multiconfessional group now in Lebanon. It is stronger than any of the factional elements. It is very well trained, very well equipped, and we have helped the Lebanese Government accomplish this very quickly.

It is one of the achievements I think our military can be really proud of. The Lebanese forces have been tested and have withstood those tests very well. They were under very repeated, continued attacks at Suq el Gharb, and they stood off all those attacks and still hold the ground there.

That revitalization of the Lebanese army plus the firepower we assembled in our naval units off the coast, I think, was instrumental in enabling us to secure what is obviously a very fragile ceasefire.

The marines were assigned the Beirut Airport as their sector of multinational force responsibility.

The French forces are to the north, somewhat closer to Beirut City.

The Italian forces are a little bit to the east.

These comparatively narrow sectors were assigned to the multinational force so that they could fulfill that dual function that I have mentioned—the principal emphasis being that when we were able to achieve withdrawal agreements, the multinational force would be able to give confidence to the withdrawing units all around them that the ceasefire would be maintained.

One of our other responsibilities in connection with our multinational force participation and the location assigned to us at the airport—recognizing that the operation of a large international airport is an important part of the normalization process of a country such as Lebanon—was to keep that airport open and help restore it to operating capability as soon as possible. That was done.

The airport is closed from time to time when it comes under fire from the mountain area, the Shuf and Alayh, but it is otherwise open and operating and one of our functions is to see that that continues, although the operation of the airport is entirely under Lebanese Government control now.

The building in which the Marine battalion headquarters and service company was located and billeted was the most modern building in the area, one of the few in that area that was entirely whole or intact. It is what would be the equivalent of an administration building at one of our airports.

In fact, it was the administration building for the airport. Because of its condition and its location, essentially in the middle of our perimeter and in a dividing strip between the two runways, it was felt to be a proper location for the headquarters operation. And because of its condition it was determined a proper place for the troop billets.

It was, as we all know, totally destroyed, resulting in a horrible loss of life. It was destroyed by a suicide type act which certainly had all the overtones of a terrorist act, but which our information indicates was planned and carried out by elements of one of the warring factions or groups in Lebanon. The French headquarters was attacked at the same time under the same conditions, and this attack also had many of the characteristics of the attack on our embassy some months ago in Beirut.

The Beirut Airport is visited by military and nonmilitary traffic in connection with airport operations. The main airport road runs by the Marine headquarters building. There were cyclone fences, chainlink gates, barriers, and there were two Marine posts on the access road to the Marine headquarters. The truck carrying explosives ran through both guard posts, was driven up the steps into the lobby of the building, and the explosion took place immediately thereafter and caused this terrible, terrible tragedy.

Chairman **Tower**. Mr. Secretary, there has been a great deal of concern that we have not fully articulated what our objectives are in Lebanon, and what the role or mission of the Marine presence in Lebanon is in support of the pursuit of those objectives.

I think that will have to be clearly defined. It will have to be defined in terms as simple as possible so it can be understood. In your view, could we achieve our political objectives and the reconciliation of the various warring factions in Lebanon and the maintenance of cessation possibilities without a military presence in Lebanon?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; I don't think we could, Mr. Chairman. That is not to say that there aren't other ways of doing this, but I think that it is essential that we maintain a military presence.

I think it is very important to emphasize, and perhaps I haven't sufficiently, the vital nature of those political and diplomatic objectives which do require military force. They are simply to try to secure some kind of peace in that area—a peace that is so vital to our national interest—and to make sure that it does not fall into totally and completely hostile hands, bearing in mind the very large and growing Soviet military presence, both weapons and troops in Syria.

Chairman TOWER. Gentlemen, I would like to limit questions to 5 minutes, considering the full attendance we have and the limitation on our time. I yield to Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, did the Marines have full permission from you and others to take whatever steps were necessary to protect their own security at that command post?

Were they under any restraints, diplomatic or otherwise, to avoid taking security-protecting steps?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The quick answer to that, Senator, is that within their assigned area they were free to return fire and take necessary steps to protect themselves.

They did not have, because of the assigned area and the role of the multinational force, the ability or the authority to move out of that perimeter, to occupy the surrounding high ground, to attempt interdiction or anything of that kind.

They did have the rules of engagement changed so as to enable them to return hostile fire or to engage by fire those areas such as Suq el Gharb, would have put them in very considerable peril if allowed to fall into hostile hands. They certainly had the ability to fire back.

They had an ability to call in naval gunfire, which they did, the ability to call in air strikes from the carrier, which they have not yet, and certainly the ability to take the steps that their mission and their capabilities permitted them to take.

If you ask me, did they have the ability to move out 10 or 15 miles themselves in patrols, the answer is clearly "No," they didn't have that.

Senator NUNN. How about physical barriers, concrete revetments?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They could do any of that.

Senator NUNN. General Trainor, could I ask you, generally, whether from a Marine Corps point of view you felt you were under difficult diplomatic restraints from our Government or from the multinational force that would prohibit you from taking the normal prudent security steps to secure that area?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. BERNARD TRAINOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS

General **Trainor**. No, sir, the rules of engagement for the Marines which were established by the Commander-in-Chief, Europe, under whose operational command the Marines come, were thoroughly reviewed when the Marines first went into Lebanon and, subsequent to that, after the explosion which took place at the embassy. To the best of my knowledge, the Marines felt that they had the requisite authority to take the defense measures necessary to insure the integrity of the force, to include the use of deadly force if threatened.

Senator **Nunn**. Do you believe, looking back on it, that all steps were taken to protect the security of that compound that should have been taken?

General **Trainor**. Senator, that is a difficult question for me to answer. That unit is in the operational chain of CINCEUR. At this point I have to depend on reports that come back.

I am trying to sift out the reporting that you receive from the media on the spot and the official information that I receive to try to make some sense out of it.

Senator **Nunn**. When we say CINCEUR, under CINCEUR is the Marine headquarters here.

Whose responsibility was the security? Who was the top person in military uniform whose duty it was to make sure that the base was secure, and go down the chain of command?

What was the order of responsibility for security at that base?

General **Trainor**. If I may perhaps start from the other end, the responsibility for the security rests with the local commander within the rules of engagement that have been established by his superiors.

Now, that would be for all practical purposes the battalion commander who commanded the battalion landing team there, who was under the command of the 24th MAU commander. Colonel Geraghty. The 24th MAU is headquarters for the battallion landing team, the aviation unit, and the supporting units that are out there.

Colonel Geraghty is under the command of the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force which is afloat. He in turn is under the command of the Naval component commander, the commander, 6th Fleet, and the Naval component commander comes under CINCUSNAVEUR, under the command of the theater commander, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, of the USCINCEUR. He is the one who establishes rules of engagement, approved back here by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

Senator **Nunn**. Your testimony is that the rules of engagement did not in any way inhibit the marines on the ground from taking all steps they needed, in their view, to secure the area; is that correct?

General **Trainor**. That is correct, Senator.

Senator **Nunn**. Is that your understanding, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes; it is with the only exception of patrolling far beyond the perimeter.

With regard to the perimeter security itself, the rules of engagement were broad enough to leave that up to the battalion commander. Beyond that, any question the commander on the ground might have goes up to the chain of command to see if there is any problem with it.

There is nothing I know of in the rules of engagement that inhibited area security at all.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary——

Chairman TOWER. I am sorry, I am going to enforce the time because I am getting complaints from members on your side of the table.

Senator KENNEDY. I certainly wouldn't complain.

Chairman TOWER. There is a suggestion we limit ourselves to one question each.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, that came from me. That was not directed to any one member of the committee.

If the Secretary has to leave at 12:30, we could at least go around and have one question.

Senator NUNN. I didn't know that was the rule.

Chairman TOWER. No; I had limited you to 5 minutes. I think Senator Exon's point is well taken.

Why don't we go to one question?

Senator WARNER. If you can do two in 5 minutes, you can do them?

Chairman TOWER. I will have to limit you to one question.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, historically when has the U.S. military force tried to perform a mission in terms of the order given these Marines comparable to what they are now doing in Lebanon?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, you can go back through military history and there are a number of different kinds of instances and episodes and places where the Marines have been inserted, going back to China. I don't have a specific instance.

Senator WARNER. I think the American public has the opinion that this is the first time Marines have been inserted in a hostile situation and given such restictions.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I can't tell you if it was the first time. I don't believe it was.

Senator WARNER. Will you kindly research that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We will.

[The information follows:]

Secretary WEINBERGER. The only restrictions imposed on our Marines are restrictions of territory—restrictions common to the Multinational Force contingents. It must be reemphasized, Senator, that the Multinational Force is a peacekeeping force; they are not combatants. To fulfill their part of the Multinational Force mission, their assigned area of responsibility is the Beirut International Airport—a location with inherent tactical disadvantages. They are not tactically deployed as they would be if they were combatants. The rules of engagement do permit our Marines to use deadly force, as necessary, to defend themselves.

Their present peacekeeping mission is indeed difficult and demands great courage and restraint. Historically, the Marines frequently have been called upon to perform a diversity of "presence" missions—in China, Iceland, the Suez, and previously in Lebanon, to name but a few. And, of course, Marines are assigned to perform internal security at our embassies and consulates—many of them in hostile areas—throughout the world. The employment of our Marines as noncombatants in hostile situations is certainly not unprecedented.

Senator **Warner**. You used the phrase that the attack on this building was "characteristic of an attack on our embassy."

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, sir, it had several of the same characteristics.

Senator **Warner**. The question is in view of the attack on the Embassy, I question the degree of security that was utilized to protect this particular building.

Having had that experience in a timeframe so recent, it would appear to me that we inadequately protected this building.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think we should describe to you the security precautions that were in effect and the way in which they were breached. The point that I made yesterday in discussing the matter with the Speaker and various Members of the House, was that if there is a suicide Kamikaze-type attack, even the most stringent security precautions are not going to guarantee that an incident of this kind can't happen.

I would like to have the General explain the route this truck took, bearing in mind this is a public area, that one of the duties of our marines is to keep the airport open, and that the airport main road is traveled by military and nonmilitary traffic, just as was the case of the U.S. embassy in the center of the city.

With that background, General.

General **Trainor**. I brought along a photograph. Yesterday I gave you a word picture of the arrangements out there.

Chairman **Tower**. While this is being passed around, I have members here who have not had an opportunity to ask questions. We have 37 minutes. I will divide it equally 3 minutes each if that is agreeable.

General **Trainor**. I will try to answer that question as quickly as I can.

You will see the four-lane highway. The vehicle which we believe was a garbage truck or dump truck of some sort was going on the far side of the highway toward the terminal, which is to the left of the photograph you are looking at, but out of the photograph.

On the left of the photograph you will see a parking lot. That parking lot is adjacent to the terminal and there is a lot of civilian traffic in and out of it. It is a very heavily traveled highway.

The truck was headed toward the terminal. It turned in at a checkpoint which is just off the top left of your picture and went in among the cars, as near as we can determine. It then headed directly toward two Marine positions, which were sandbagged, and a double apron of barbedwire. The truck then went through the barbedwire, went through the Marine position, and went down to where you see the wrought iron fence.

Whether the gate to the fence was closed or not, I don't know at this point. Perhaps we will never know. It went through the fence. Behind the fence there was another barricade of some sort with sandbags and a metal plate. It either ran over this or ran around it. That is uncertain also.

Then there were more sandbags at the entrance to the building. It ran through that and exploded. Those were the defenses as I know at this point.

The marines on post at both the outer inner perimeters were armed.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Mr. Secretary, you were quoted over the weekend as saying we would keep open the option of retaliation.

Against whom and in what way?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have first of all to identify as clearly as we possibly can the perpetrators, and at that time we will try to make the punishment fit the crime—pretty damn serious crime.

Senator HART. How are you going to do that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I will wait until we find out who actually did it. We have a lot of circumstantial evidence, as I mentioned to the chairman. This would certainly be something that we would be planning for and working on. I am not able to tell you right now precisely what we would do to whom, but first of all, we want to try to identify the people responsible. We have a fair amount of information on that and some preliminary estimates.

Senator HART. Who do you think it was?

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is certainly very strong circumstantial evidence pointing to the Iranians. There are a lot of questions whether these are just individual Iranians of whether it is part of the Iranian Government.

My own feeling is that that is immaterial, that these people may very well have done that. I think it is inconceivable that any action of this kind would have taken place without Syrian knowledge at least.

I think those are directions in which we are going to continue to look. The similarities of the types of explosives, the type of truck, the modus operandi of the crime—all of these things plus some other information we have been given by the agency points toward Iranian involvement.

Senator HART. You would leave open the option of retaliation against either the Syrian or Iranian Government.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would leave that open. You ask how we are going to do it. I am not prepared to say how we are going to do it at the moment. I probably would not be prepared to say anything until it is completed.

Senator HART. Is there any thought that this committee might be advised before this retaliation takes place? It might be considered an act of war.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, there are other ways than bombing someone. [Deleted.]

There are all manners of things to do. That is why I don't want to single out any one course or announce our intentions.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Humphrey?

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, there are many things that can be and are being said at this juncture, many critical questions that need to be asked.

It seems to me the most important question that needs to be asked at this point is what have we done since 6:20 Sunday morning to improve the security of our troops?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have put everybody, of course, on the very highest alert. The President has ordered General Kelley, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to Beirut, and has directed him to recommend to us any measure or measures that he feels will be desirable and necessary to improve that security. The commander of the Marine amphibious unit, I understand, has already taken certain local measures, as is his responsibility and his duty.

So, we are awaiting General Kelley's full report before overall changes are made.

Senator HUMPHREY. How many people do we have ashore there now?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have approximately 1,600. We have about 300 afloat.

Senator HUMPHREY. How many are being billeted in one spot each night?

Secretary WEINBERGER. They are billeted in many different spots, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. They are not clustered any longer?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The headquarters element was in this building, but the various companies, Alpha Co. and others, are situated in a number of different locations.

When I visited the Marines in their previous landing, I think we went to something like 15 or 20 buildings or pieces of buildings that were left in Beirut.

They are situated all around. Some of them are in bunkers. Some of the positions are equivalent to large foxholes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did these other billets have defenses more adequate than M-16 rifles?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Some do and some don't.

General TRAINOR. Senator, the sentries are armed with M-16's and some with M-16's and grenade launchers, but within the headquarters I believe there were also antitank weapons available.

Senator HUMPHREY. Why weren't they used in this situation?

General TRAINOR. I believe there are two reasons.

No. 1, the attack came very, very quickly.

No. 2, the range of acquiring targets.

No. 3, if you recall, I indicated that the attack was coming directly from the direction of the air terminal and parking lot of the air terminal.

I think, and again this is just speculation, it was the fact that there was not sufficient time to react with an antitank weapon and at the distance at which the target would have been acquired. An antitank weapon probably would not have been armed because a safety device prevents the round from prematurely exploding, and the target was already closer than the minimum arming range of the weapon.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Just quickly to set the stage, not to argue or offer an excuse. Here you have a truck of a kind seen all around Beirut, coming 40 or 50 miles an hour off a civilian road, where there is a lot of traffic, both military and nonmilitary traffic, the trunk turns suddenly, is challenged by the first Marine post in the parking lot, and does not respond.

That sentry correctly notifies the Marine post near the headquarters building. Then the truck crashes through the gate and then goes up the steps and into the building. This is all a matter of 15 or 30 seconds, maybe 1 minute.

Again, it is not like an organized military attack against the perimeter. It is just a sudden flash incident of this kind.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are making the argument for a multiple perimeter defense. I hope we will soon implement it at all our facilities there.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have asked General Kelley to give us detailed and complete recommendations. Knowing him, I have no doubt he will.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary—I won't take all the time allowed, but I want to get the facts that we are talking about now and just express an opinion here, a challenge to you and the administration.

I think our constitutional law, with the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, indicates that Congress has the sole power to make decisions about whether or not we are going to commit the Nation to war.

I think it puts the burden on the Chief Executive when he is considering going into any situation that might lead to combat. He would have to establish through the legislative branch some kind of liaison, contact or understanding, and have someone represent him to develop an understanding of the plan or purpose of that mission.

I think the time has passed when you can turn any executive loose, no matter who he is, to make the sole decision whether or not to go into any of these places. I think the quicker we realize that and try to work on something to avoid these consequences, the quicker we will have real plans before proceeding.

If we are going to yield the mandate, the legislative branch must be considering a plan which includes them. I have made up my mind on it. I am going to try to do everything I can to put that thought over.

I am not attacking you, Mr. Secretary, or anyone else, but something has to be done. My reasoning goes back to what I saw and experienced, myself, as a Member during the war in Vietnam.

Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is a bit of an irony here because the Secretary of Defense is coming before us to defend a position which, at least from reports I have read, he was not in favor of in the first place. That makes his role here much more difficult this morning.

Mr. Secretary, a number of articles written recently, one by the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, another by columnist, George Will, in this morning's paper, raise the question whether or not we have to do more or less.

We can't continue to have a force that is numerically irrelevant to a stated mission and keep that force stationary as a visible target for either artillery or terrorist action.

I am wondering what your reaction is to that and whether or not you have given consideration to either expanding the perimeter or allowing the Marines to function in a more mobile capacity than simply sitting there trying to survive?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That has been considered and is being considered. I think it will be one of the things that General Kelley will make some recommendations on, that we can perform our mission perhaps in other ways or other places than the present location that was assigned.

I would say that I think the force was correctly sized for the mission. The mission, as I mentioned before, was based on the hope that we would have a signed withdrawal agreement. Our mission was and is to help carry those agreements out. Those withdrawal agreements have not been executed.

Israel signed one and withdrew part way. The Syrians have not. Everything turns on getting a Syrian withdrawal agreement signed.

The force is correctly sized for that mission, I am convinced, but it is perfectly true that they could perform that mission in perhaps other locations or a more mobile location, a safer location, than was originally assigned to them.

We have to bear in mind we are part of a multinational force. Whatever we do under the terms under which we went in and encouraged other nations to go in would have to be done in consultation and conjunction with those allies.

Senator COHEN. Have the rules of engagement changed? In other words, were the orders to shoot anything that might be approaching?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Shoot what, sir?

Senator COHEN. Is there a difference in the rules of engagement?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The rules of engagement are perfectly adequate to take care of that. For example, if through hindsight or some kind of ability to foresee the future, the first sentry knew that that truck was carrying explosives and planned to drive into the building, there is nothing whatever inhibiting him from shooting the tires or shooting the driver.

General TRAINOR. The rules of engagement are not inhibiting. The Marines are authorized to fire if they are threatened. A few months back, you may recall, they did. In fact, at the temporary embassy, a vehicle approached and tried to run the roadblock and the marine guards opened fire on them.

Senator COHEN. There was a report there were at least three vehicles suspected of having dynamite aboard going back and forth in front of the airport.

Secretary WEINBERGER. When was this?

Senator COHEN. The report was on the news this morning.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have no information of that kind. As far as we knew, there was a speeding truck speeding down the road turning into the parking lot.

Senator COHEN. There was a new sighting of vehicles going back and forth by the airport this morning.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I have not heard of that.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have two questions I will ask together.

First news reports indicated that the President ordered General Kelley to Beirut supposedly to see what we could do to enhance the security of the Marines there. This is the question that seems to be uppermost in the minds of many of the committee Members this morning.

I thought that was a good move, but I saw this morning that General Kelley had stopped over and was visiting 16 marines that are in the hospital in Germany. That seems rather curious. I was wondering if that was part of the direction and if the General should not be over there doing his job rather than visiting marines, as nice as that might be.

Second, why did we not use the facilities of the Israeli Government and their facilities to at least take care of some of the more seriously wounded men? It would seem to have made more sense than to fly them back to Europe.

Secretary WEINBERGER. As to the first question, General Kelley stopped to refuel, which I think is a useful thing to do, and while he was on the ground he did visit some of the people who had been wounded in this horrible attack.

Again, I would have done the same thing, myself, and I would certainly think that was the proper thing to do. He is now in Beirut, and has been there some hours.

He left within a short time of the President's direction, although he had just returned from Lebanon. He is carrying out his function. Certainly during the refueling stop, he stops to visit wounded marines.

For a person like General Kelley, whose first interest is the welfare of his marines, it seems to me that that was an entirely proper and normal thing to do. It did not delay his getting to Beirut.

Senator COHEN. He just spent 15 or 20 minutes refueling?

Secretary WEINBERGER. You spend an hour and a half refueling.

The other question with respect to medical facilities, we used the medical facilities we have. We have medical facilities aboard one of the ships. There is a complete surgical unit and the Admiral will go into more detail about this later.

We used some facilities at Larnaca in Cyprus which, is the closest area to our troops. We have some who are being treated in Germany, and so on.

We did not refuse any hospital facilities anywhere. We used the ones we had and we obviously think our facilities back in Germany are the very best that we can get. We used all the facilities that were readily available.

I had a call Sunday morning, perhaps a couple hours after this event, maybe 3—I have forgotton which—from the Defense Minister Arens of Israel, who is a good personal friend. He offered to help in any way he could. I thanked him very much for his offer. He asked if we needed any additional hospitalization. I said I didn't know. He said he has some in Haifa. I said that was fine, I would pass that word on, and if the commanders and operational people felt that was necessary, obviously they would be totally free to do that.

The hospital facilities that were chosen and utilized were those that the commanders in the field thought were the best. Again, they were not inhibited from using any that were available.

Do you want to fill in, Admiral?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ALMON C. WILSON, DEPUTY SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. NAVY

Admiral WILSON. We have a very well developed medical evacuation system, as you know. In this case it went into motion in a routine fashion. The medivac system went into action as we would have expected it to have done.

Just to recap briefly how we manage casualties, we manage them as quickly and as promptly and as fully as we can on site to make sure that their immediate resuscitation needs are cared for, that they are breathing, that their hemorrhaging has stopped, that they are getting enough oxygen, they don't have obstructed airways.

Then we send them on to places where they can get necessary treatment. In this case we had an amphibious support ship (LPH) offshore and casualties went to that ship. In that ship we have a fully trained surgical team that consists of an orthopedic surgeon, general surgeon, anesthesia people and extra operating room technicians. They are capable of managing casualties of this sort.

In this particular instance the medical evacuation teams were called in after those patients were stabilized. It is an inviolable rule among medical people that you don't put people in an airplane unless they are stable. You don't put patients in an airplane who are clinically shaky, who are in a position to be further injured.

Senator **Cohen**. Admiral, I think you have covered it. No need to go into these long explanations. I just wanted to know why we didn't use the facilities in Israel. You are telling me we didn't need them; is that right?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The offer which was made—a very kind offer—was passed on, and anyone who felt, on the field or on the ground, that that was needed was perfectly free to use it.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Jepsen?

Senator **Jepsen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on the question posed by Senator Exon, 200-plus are dead and a large number of people are dying. Medical facilities were minutes or so away when the offer was made. I have been on the LPH class ships, with only two surgeons, one operating room, and with the numbers of wounded, it is difficult to understand why we did not use those facilities. But time will tell.

Who made the decision to locate 300 sleeping U.S. servicemen in the main headquarters building in Beirut?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would have to assume the commander in the field did.

General **Trainor**. That is correct. The battalion commander is the one that is responsible for where people are going to stay.

Senator **Jepsen**. Is there anything in the manual or history of Marine Corps operation that recommends you put 300 people in one building under any circumstances? I don't think there is. I will answer the question.

General **Trainor**. I think you have to recognize the location of the headquarters is right in a busy commercial area. We really didn't have too much control over that.

Second, you will recall that just a couple of weeks ago we were under artillery, mortar, and rocket fire and this building, which had withstood the fighting between the PLO and the Israelis, provided, in fact, the best protection for the headquarters unit.

In retrospect we can say it would have been better if they had been spread out so that if something like this happened, fewer would have been killed. I could not agree with you more.

Secretary Weinberger. It is a cruel dilemma. You put them in a building to safeguard them from sniper fire, artillery, and rocket fire. Having them in the building, they are, therefore, much safer from that kind of fire.

Yes, in retrospect they were very vulnerable to a suicide bomb attack.

Senator Jepsen. If there were enough sandbags around the building, they would not have had a truck in there. I am of the old military school.

Secretary Weinberger. That is one of the things we hope to hear from General Kelley: What additional precautions or billeting arrangements should be made.

Certainly men dispersed in tents—and there is a great shortage of standing buildings in this area—men dispersed in tents might be safer from a suicide 5,000-pound bomb blast, but they would not be safe from the artillery, sniper, mortar, and rocket fire that has been coming in.

I am not in a position to say that the commander in the field was either right or wrong. It was his decision. It was his responsibility.

My policy has been not to interfere with people in whom we have confidence.

This morning I am not trying to direct this invasion or this operation or whatever it is our forces are doing.

Chairman Tower. Senator Levin?

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Did these marines at the two checkpoints have machineguns and did they use them?

Secretary Weinberger. I don't know how they were armed.

General Trainor. The BLT headquarters did have machine guns, did have antitank weapons. The quick reaction force was located there.

Those that were actually standing post at the outside perimeter were armed with rifles.

Senator Levin. Did they use the machineguns at either of these two positions?

General Trainor. To the best of my knowledge, the machineguns were not used. We do have indications that the truck was taken under fire, but that is as much as we know. Whether it was rifle only, rifle and machinegun, or just machinegun, at this point we can't say for certain.

Secretary Weinberger. It was a matter of seconds. Whether there was fire, we don't know. We probably will never know whether there was fire at the truck after it went through and breached the first position.

Senator Levin. We read about a week ago that the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army, a Druze, withdrew.

Can you clarify the situation, the Druze position in that army? Is that particular Chief of Staff the General——

Secretary Weinberger. General Tannous is the commander of the Lebanese Army. He is a Maronite.

Senator Levin. Whoever that Druze Chief, that general, was that went to the village and left the Lebanese Army, is he back and are the Druze now fully committed in that Army?

Senator **Weinberger**. The Druze are serving in the Army. The Army is a multiconfessional organization, practically the only one in Lebanon.

There are about 35,000 people in that Army.

Senator **Levin**. Are you familiar with that particular general?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I know in general the Lebanese armed force represents all of these elements. There are Maronites and Druze, and Sunnis, and Shiites.

Senator **Levin**. Will you let us know for the record the situation with that particular Druze general that so much publicity was given to? When he left the army it was felt to be a very severe weakening of the army which showed the Druze were pulling away from it.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't have information that supports that.

[The information follows:]

The Druze general in question is Brigadier General Hakim. He was the Chief of Staff in the Lebanese Army. This is the second highest and second most important position in the Lebanese Army. Druze officers have traditionally held this position. [Deleted.]

Senator **Levin**. We did apparently have a prearrangement to move our troops to Cyprus, so some of our marines did go to Cyprus?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes.

Senator **Levin**. Did we have that prearrangement with Israel?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't know. Again, if not, probably because we didn't feel there was any need.

Senator **Levin**. I am talking about prearrangement.

Secretary **Weinberger**. None that I know of.

Senator **Levin**. Any political reasons?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No; these are medical reasons only. When I heard of the offer from Mr. Arens about 10:30 or 11 that morning, I passed it on with the words "if this is necessary, this is a very generous offer."

What happened thereafter, I don't know.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Quayle?

Senator **Quayle**. Mr. Secretary, you said you are certain Syria had some knowledge of this terrorist activity.

Given that fact, why shouldn't we inflict some punishment on Syria?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Again, we have to bear in mind precisely what are we talking about. We are there with this force which is designed to try to secure and keep the peace and to help the government secure an unoccupied strong and sovereign Lebanon.

We don't have the kind of information that I would feel is certain enough to warrant taking that kind of action of military reprisal directly against Syria. [Deleted.]

Senator **Quayle**. Shouldn't some punishment be inflicted?

Secretary **Weinberger**. That is right. That is what I said. What that punishment is or what it would be if the connection is firmly established remains to be determined. I am telling you circumstantial evidence at least points in that direction. We would certainly want to take appropriate retaliatory action; yes.

Senator **Quayle**. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me in response to Senator Cohen's question that you disavowed the viable option to increase the marines there, maybe in conjunction with the multinational force.

In other words, Dr. Kissinger said what we really need to do is restore the balance of forces favorably for the United States in the Multinational Forces and bring in the Israelis.

Secretary **Weinberger**. It depends on your mission.

Senator **Quayle**. You said that the mission was not necessarily——

Secretary **Weinberger**. I said the present mission does not require any increase in forces. If the goal is to conquer Lebanon, then I need [deleted].

Senator **Quayle**. Is it your position that our mission might change?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Not that I know of.

Senator **Quayle**. In other words, our mission would have to change before we would pursue that line of more and restoring the balance of forces favorably to us?

Secretary **Weinberger**. You size the forces for the mission. The mission is not to conquer Lebanon at the moment nor, so far as I know, will it ever be.

The mission is to restore to Lebanon the ability to operate as a sovereign, independent, strong nation.

Senator **Quayle**. Within the next 90 days under what conditions will the United States begin a phased withdrawal without being rendered impotent?

Secretary **Weinberger**. If we accomplish our objective to get the foreign forces out of Lebanon.

Senator **Quayle**. Do you believe that is going to happen?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would hope very much it would happen. If that did happen, we would certainly then want our forces to come out as quickly as possible because they would have accomplished their mission.

Senator **Quayle**. Are we linking our stay to the withdrawal of Syrians?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We went in to perform a particular mission which was to secure that type of unoccupied, strong, sovereign Lebanon that could protect its borders, and not allow them to be used against Israelis, and so on.

We were on the road to accomplishing that when the Israelis signed the withdrawal agreement in May. We have not been able to get the Syrians to sign it.

If the desire is to change the mission, that can be done. As the chairman said, walking away in the face of these kinds of attacks with the huge Soviet involvement in Syria, I think would be very much against our national interests.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Kennedy?

Senator **Kennedy**. I would certainly agree that walking away would encourage international terrorism, but I don't think that is really what is at issue today. I think the message that you are giving us is a good deal different than was given to this committee by General Kelley and others in the Department when we previously asked about the security of the marines. If my memory serves me correctly, the greatest threat to the security of the marines at that time was to shorten the 18-month period, not terrorism, not mortars and not sniper fire.

From what I have heard this morning, as long as there are terrorists in this part of the world, the marines will be vulnerable. Anyone that understands the history of that part of the world knows there are many terrorists and that the United States is the No. 1 target.

So, as long as we are going to keep them in this vulnerable position at the airport, according to what you are saying today, we are going to have many more casualties. I think we are being unrealistic unless we realize that.

My question specifically is we saw a car bombing kill Mr. Gemayel's brother, we saw a car bombing destroy the American Embassy, and we saw American marines take extraordinary steps to protect American diplomats at the British Embassy; including huge vehicles with 50-caliber machine guns.

Why in the world did we not take similar steps to protect U.S. marines?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, again hindsight is very easy. The important point to recognize is that part of the mission, part of the assignment is to keep the airport open and operating.

Senator **Kennedy**. What does that have to do with protecting the marines, and putting in the kind of roadway blocks which are used at other embassies?

Secretary **Weinberger**. There is a great deal of commercial traffic going up and down the road all the time.

Senator **Kennedy**. At the entrance where they are housed?

Secretary **Weinberger**. You have an operational unit in this area. You can do all the things that you describe, which are proper for a building in the middle of a city where terrorism is indeed rampant, but when you have an operational area, where troops have to keep moving in and out and perform a great many different types of tasks, some of those security measures would be inappropriate.

Senator **Kennedy**. Was it ever recommended?

Secretary **Weinberger**. They have not been recommended; no, sir. If they are recommended by General Kelley after his survey--

Senator **Kennedy**. Was it recommended before?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, sir, nothing of that kind, to my knowledge, was ever recommended.

What was recommended was done. Authority was given to the commander in the field and he was given the resources that he requested.

Senator **Kennedy**. Could I ask the general that question?

General **Trainor**. Senator, the battalion commander made the judgment fully cognizant of the various threats he faced—the terrorist threat, the sniper threat, and artillery threat.

He made the judgment to establish his security as he did. In retrospect we know that his judgment could not have foreseen a suicide threat of such proportions.

Senator **Kennedy**. Just on this question then——

Mr. Chairman, is it appropriate to have for the committee any memoranda, letters or other communications from Marine officers in Lebanon or in the United States questioning the adequacy of the security arrangements at the airport? Can the committee have that kind of information?

Chairman **Tower**. It occurred to me that we could get that information, yes.

Secretary **Weinberger**. If it exists.

Chairman **Tower**. Let's pursue that.

Senator East?

Senator **East**. I shall be brief because I realize I must make this point around here.

First of all, as a Senator from North Carolina and a former Marine officer stationed in Camp Lejeune, N.C., I wish to commend the Marines and the Navy for the great pride they are bringing, not only to my State, but to the country. I hope you will convey, however you can, that we in North Carolina are particularly sensitive to this, are enormously grateful and can take great pride in what you have attempted to do under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

As a former Marine officer stationed in Camp Lejeune and a Senator from North Carolina, I feel particularly sensitive to it.

One final observation. I would appreciate the Secretary's comment on this.

It occurs to me if our role is being transformed from a peacekeeping role into an active armed combat role in a broader strategic sense, that we are going to have to rely, as the Soviet Union has done, on its local allies to carry the major burden in terms of ongoing active combat roles.

In this case it would be the Israeli Army, Israeli military. I think secondarily, we must do what we can to shore up the army and the moral support that we can give to the Government of Lebanon, Amin Gemayel.

I do feel there will be increasing sentiment in this country to the extent we become involved in a protracted, expanded operation whereby American ground forces become a substitute for the Israeli capability, that we will make the great mistake that General MacArthur warned about, by getting involved in a land mass warfare.

Israel has the third most powerful military force in the world and it is and has been capable, and I think is willing to assume the major responsibility in that area.

I think our policy should be to continue to be a strong policy supporting the State of Israel, morally and logistically; militarily they can bear the main responsibility. I am convinced they will not allow that situation to deteriorate to the point where the Soviet Union and Syria dominate the Middle East. That is the ultimate stake.

I think that is true in Central America. We need to help our allies help themselves. The Soviet Union very clearly uses its proxies and surrogates to do its work. We must rely on our allies in terms of the ongoing active combat role.

So, I do personally feel that if our role is being transitioned from that of a peacekeeping role and if we are now seeing a transformation into an ongoing active combat role, the present administration needs to rethink it and move back to the strategic reality which namely means the Israeli Army should be the principal source.

Secretary **Weinberger**. There is no suggestion of changing the role that I know. That is why I don't think it is necessary or desirable to increase the size of the forces, as has been suggested by some of the people on the radio and television recently.

I don't think the mission should be changed. If it were changed, we would need vastly increased forces.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Bingaman?

Senator **Bingaman**. Mr. Secretary, this may be something that has been covered, but I couldn't understand the response. If the mission is to get foreign forces to leave Lebanon, how does our continuing to keep these 1,600 or 1,800 marines in this compound at the airport accomplish that mission?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I don't think there is any necessity to keep them in the compound at the airport. I have made that point many times.

It is important to have their presence there along with the fellow members of the multinational force. They are not going to be able, nor were they ever attempting to be able, to drive the foreign forces out of Lebanon.

They were to be there to assist in the diplomatic effort to get these withdrawal agreements signed. Some military presence was believed to be necessary. I think it is necessary, in order to see those agreements enforced, but unfortunately those agreements have never been secured.

I don't recommend for a moment changing the mission to one of driving the foreign forces out of Lebanon militarily. That is clearly not anything that I think is desirable or should be done. It is necessary to have a force of generally the size that is there, I think, to give assurances that if these agreements are ever entered into, that they will be carried out.

Senator **Bingaman**. Unless we get agreements from them to help enforce, then there is really nothing for them to do?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No; there is the other aspect to our presence, which is to provide some kind of stability for the new Government of Lebanon to build on the shattered foundations of the previous civil wars—to engender the kind of strength that will enable Lebanon to be a sovereign, independent, unoccupied nation.

We are doing that, but not just by participating in the multinational force. That is certainly part of it, and that is keeping the airport open.

But we are also doing it in another way, by training and equipping the Lebanese Armed Forces. We are doing that on our own.

Senator **Bingaman**. Are our troops involved in training and equipping the Lebanese Armed Forces?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Bingaman**. Are the 1,800 there doing that?

Secretary **Weinberger**. We have troops doing that. We have obviously a number of people involved in the training and equipping of the Lebanese Armed Forces. That has been, in my opinion, a magnificent achievement to have done what we have so rapidly.

Senator **Bingaman**. That is being done there, not here?

Secretary **Weinberger**. It is being done there.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think it is clear to you from the comments made by Senator Warner, Senator Kennedy and others that there is a strong as possible concern here that there was inadequate security against an act of terrorism—one which has caused a great loss of life.

I am very much interested when General Kelley returns to find out why there were not physical barriers around that building. I concede the possible wisdom of trying to put marines under shelter away from sniper and other fire.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There were physical barriers, Senator.

Senator WILSON. Let us leave that question. I think it needs to be answered, but I will await General Kelley's return to get that answer.

The question I have for you relates to the fact that we are concerned with two separate incidents properly. One is an act of terrorism, unhappily successful, and the other is what the proper role of the United States and the Marines on the ground in Lebanon should be. Because there was a successful act of terrorism, I don't think we should necessarily contemplate abandonment of that role. It was right in the first place.

There has been much discussion this morning as to whether or not the size of that force is appropriate to that role. There have been other suggestions that we should be calling the United Nations to replace the multinational force. I would point out United Nation's forces who were there for several years before the Marines proved so ineffective in policing southern Lebanon and that it, in fact, occasioned the Israeli experience. I see no reason to expect the U.N. forces now will be adequate for that mission.

Looking back to another historical moment in 1958 when President Eisenhower put 10,000 Marines into Lebanon, I am not sure that 1958 was vastly different than what we expect the Marines to perform in this instance. They were differently sized. I think they were perceived as having a different charter, perhaps, in the rules of engagement. I think their success at that time, even accounting for some historical difference in the opposition, might suggest—even from the current role we are seeking, which is to stabilize Lebanon long enough to allow the Lebanon Army to more permanently stabilize it—that we, in fact, need to beef up the Marines and, as Senator East suggested, involve our Israeli allies. Do we need to increase the size of our forces in Lebanon?

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is no need to increase the size of the Marine force unless you change the mission. I think the historical parallel you cited is not really, if I may say so, very apt because there was a totally different situation in Lebanon at the time that President Eisenhower sent in Marine elements in 1958.

We have here something in the neighborhood of about 4,000, close to 5,000 in the total multinational force. The Marines are furnishing 1,600 on the ground and 300 afloat, and we have very, very substantial naval gunfire.

We should not assume that everything has to be done by ground forces. The *New Jersey* is the most powerful single ship afloat and [deleted].

What we have is a force that is properly sized for that mission. If the mission is to drive the foreign forces out of Lebanon, then [deleted]. We don't have any slight suggestion that that is either necessary or desirable.

No one that I know of has suggested changing the mission to that. We are still trying to secure the withdrawal agreement which we got from Israel and which we need to get from Syria.

[Deleted] the Soviets have sent to Syria in very substantial numbers—5,000 or 6,000 troops in addition to new equipment that they have not exported elsewhere. With this additional Soviet support they constitute a major threat.

That makes the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, the stabilization of this situation, all the more important. There are two or three ways you can respond.

One way is to throw up your hands and say it is too big and too risky and we are coming home.

Or, you can do what we are trying to do, through patience and continued efforts to get the withdrawal agreement. Finally, you can get impatient and call up the forces and go in and declare a war and try to drive them all out.

I favor the second.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Evans?

Senator **Evans**. Mr. Secretary, leaving aside all of the current problems arising out of the terrorist act and besides being a peacekeeping force, it would give strength to the constitutional Government of Lebanon, the Gemayel Government, and help bring their Army up to strength enabling the foreign forces to leave. It seems to me, if I understand correctly, the current constitution, its requirements in Lebanon and the current makeup of the various factions in Lebanon, that it is an impossibility for us to continue with the Gemayel Government without some reconstitution or some major change.

It seems to me it is increasingly difficult for us to support just that government and not move or appear to move quite consciously toward some different form. We are being viewed by the other factions as taking sides, we are putting ourselves in danger and may very well have triggered the attack which occurred.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I would not go that far. However, I do think you are correct, we do have to and indeed we are trying to get the Government of Lebanon to have a broader base.

We are supporting and indeed are largely responsible for the fact that leaders of the various factions are meeting with President Gemayel in Geneva to attempt a reconciliation.

[Deleted] the Lebanese Army is a model because it is exactly that kind of broadly based multi-confessional organization.

We have certainly not sponsored one faction against the other. We have been scrupulously careful not to do that. That is one of the reasons the rules of engagement seem to some people to have shifted because we have wanted not to get drawn into any of the multitude of factional fights that go on within that country. Among your private militias, private armies, Sunnis, Shiites, et cetera.

We want to support a constitutionally supported broad-based government with a multi-confessional character. That is what we are urging on President Gemayel and he is responding.

That is why he is meeting with various factional leaders in Geneva. First you have to get people to agree to meet.

To suggest that this act of terrorism by people, whose only goal is to get us out of Lebanon, was invited by us, I think is not only a very damaging, if I may say so, but a very irresponsible remark.

Senator EVANS. I did not mean to suggest that we invited it. You said in your remarks that at least the planning of this attack could have occurred by one of the warring factions. There are a lot of warring factions.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There are indeed, but the Iranian supported groups with Syrian approval you can or cannot call a warring faction. They are people whose sole interest is to get the multinational force out.

We should not forget the French took a heavy blow also, in a different position, not by the airport, but doing the same kind of mission we are.

Senator EVANS. I understand. You excluded, then, from your remarks on warring factions the various factions who are Lebanese?

Secretary WEINBERGER. First of all, we have to get Lebanon itself in a sovereign multiconfessional mode, the way it survived for so many years. Then that Government will have to recognize that it will have to deal with a whole raft of foreign elements that are very interested in not permitting that to happen—those who want to retain all kinds of separate influences such as Syria has always had and such as Iran wants, in Lebanon.

It is to everybody's interest not to allow that to happen.

Senator EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, but I think it is terribly important I understand that we are not talking in different terms.

When you mentioned planning by warring factions, you were then talking about those foreign factions or terrorist factions. You were exluding, for instance, the Druze, the Shiites, and others?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The Sunnis, and the Maronites, and Shiites, and all of those others that we need to get together in a national government.

Senator EVANS. You are not suggesting any one of those groups was involved in this bombing?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir; practically everyone in Lebanon has a gun, and most of them have missiles, and some rockets [deleted].

It is the ultimate responsibility that we are interested in establishing not as individual warring groups. We don't think they did it.

We think, on the basis of circumstantial evidence that we have been shown, that the Iranians were responsible and that they certainly had at least Syrian knowledge and probably Syrian complicity.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Secretary, we want to thank you for appearing. I would like to ask General Trainor and Admiral Wilson to remain behind.

We thank you for appearing on short notice.

Secretary **Weinberger**. I appreciate very much, as always, the courtesy of the committee.

Chairman **Tower**. We will hold the record open until 5 p.m. this afternoon if there are more questions to be submitted to witnesses for response for the record.

I might, too, note that we have already put in a request for General Kelley to appear before this committee at the earliest possible moment on his return from Lebanon.

Senator **Humphrey**. When is he returning?

Chairman **Tower**. I don't know. I don't think that has been determined at the moment.

Admiral Wilson was the senior medical officer present at the marine compound in Beirut advised of the availability of the Israeli hospitals?

Admiral **Wilson**. I cannot answer that, Mr. Chairman.

In the first place, it is not clear to me at this point who was the senior medical officer at the time because we are not sure yet who survived that explosion. We have some terrible fears that a good many of our medical people were killed in the blast.

Chairman **Tower**. But there was a surviving Navy doctor, I assume?

Admiral **Wilson**. Yes; I believe there was on the beach, yes.

Of course, the senior Navy medical officer in the area would have been in the ship.

Chairman **Tower**. Were they deployed to go ashore after the incident?

Admiral **Wilson**. I think some of them came ashore, but not the senior people. They were in the ship taking care of the more severely wounded.

Chairman **Tower**. But they did have some personnel ashore?

Admiral **Wilson**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Tower**. You had to make a decision on how to deal with the mass casualties?

Admiral **Wilson**. Yes, sir, that is true. What happens in such instances is that the senior person aboard at the time where the casualties are makes decisions about who can be moved. The rule of thumb is that you resuscitate people to the point where they can be moved to a place where they can be stabilized.

Then you can decide on who needs to be cared for first and what needs to be done and where that can be done.

So, the initial decision was not whether or not to move them to Israel, but who was in need of some immediate resuscitation effort and where could they go.

Now, in such instances we used the ships offshore for the more severely wounded simply because that is where we have the greatest surgical capability.

We did take some of the medical officers from the other ships like the *New Jersey* and the *Milwaukee* and they went ashore to help the Marine doctors.

Most of them had been trained down in San Antonio in combat-casualty techniques.

The answer to your question is no, I don't know if a senior medical officer did make that decision, but secondarily, it might not have been necessary at that specific moment until things settled down a bit.

Chairman TOWER. You say the first thing you do is attempt to stabilize the patient before you move him to a hospital or elsewhere?

Admiral WILSON. That is correct.

Chairman TOWER. How many patients died in transit from the theater to the naval facilities?

Admiral WILSON. To the best of my knowledge, there was one.

Chairman TOWER. Only one?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up a little bit more if I could on the matter of planning your withdrawal.

General, I will address this to you.

What do we have to beef up our security there?

General Kelley is there. I think that is an excellent move and we will await his return.

Are you aware of any plan now to withdraw troops? Do we have a fall-back plan to withdraw troops under any eventuality?

One eventuality I could think of would be that the President might decide we want to get out. I don't think that is going to happen, but we may be thinking about a phased withdrawal of some kind.

Is there any planning in that area now or are all of our plans and contingencies based now on strengthening the troops there and sending in more men?

General TRAINOR. Senator, when the marines first went into Lebanon there was a prospect of the peacekeeping mission turning into a major attack against the MNF.

In line with good, prudent planning, yes, contingency plans were drawn up a year ago as to exactly how we would conduct a withdrawal. They do exist and they include the other nations on a cooperative basis. This is a routine military plan.

However, I don't think that is the sort of withdrawal you are speaking of.

Senator EXON. I assumed you had that and that is good.

General TRAINOR. In terms of a withdrawal because of a political decision, no, sir, I know of none. That would be a decision taken on the part of the administration.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, throughout your testimony this morning the phrase has been used "Marines were assigned to this sector."

Who made this assignment?

General TRAINOR. When the MNF went back in the second time there was a cooperative effort between the United States and its allies to determine the best location for their forces.

It was the intention of this administration to, No. 1, try to secure the airfield; No. 2, to try to put the Marine forces in an area of low visibility so that they would not have a major interface with the civilian community.

For those two reasons we went around the airport.

Senator **Warner**. Who sat down at the table and said the U.S. Marines will take the airport? At what levels in the U.S. Government was this decision made?

General **Trainor**. Senator, I should know that answer, but, frankly, I forgot. I will supply it for the record.

Senator **Warner**. You will supply it for the record?

General **Trainor**. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The decision was made through diplomatic negotiation by representatives of the United States, Government of Lebanon, France, and Italy.

Senator **Warner**. Having served in the Marines, myself, I have some minimal understanding of these situations.

I want to say here and now that I am going to examine the security issue up the chain of command.

I would like you to supply for the record, in addition to the request made by Senator Kennedy, the names of all flag and general officers who visited that Marine position in the past several months.

[The information follows:]

The following lists the names of all flag and general officers who visited the Marine position in Lebanon from April–October 1983:

General John J. Vessey, USA, Chairman, JCS.
Admiral J. D. Watkins, USN, CNO.
General P. X. Kelley, USMC, CMC.
General R. H. Barrow, USMC, CMC (Previous).
General W. T. Smith, USAF, DCINC, EUCOM.
LtGen P. C. Gast, USAF, Director for DSAA.
LtGen B. E. Trainor, USMC, DCofS, PP&O.
LTG D. M. Babers, USA, Dep Commander, DARCOM (Material Readiness).
MG Toner, USA, Director, ECJ4/7, EUCOM.
RADM Elfelt, USN, Director, ECJ3, EUCOM.
MG W. E. Odom, USA, Asst CofS, Intelligence.
RADM Tuttle, USN, CTF-60.
MG A. M. Gray, USMC, CG, 2D Marine Div.
MG K. A. Smith, USMC, CG, 2D Marine Air Wing.
BG A. Cooley, USA, DOD Mil Rep to Habib Mission.
BG C. Stiner, USA, DOD Mil Rep to McFarlane/Fairbanks Mission.
BG R. D. Wiegand, USA, Asst DC/S Logistics.
BG Lutz, USA, Commander, 1st SOCUM.
BG Winglass, USMC, CG, 2d FSSG.
BG Cook, USMC, Dep Dir, ECJ3, EUCOM.
BG Mead, USMC, Dep CofS Manpower.
COMO J. S. Cassells, USN, The Medical Officer of the Marine Corps.
BG Heinz, J-2, EUCOM.

Senator **Warner**. On the question of what instructions were given to the outpost sentry. Secretary Weinberger said maybe we will never know.

Are we to infer from this that those unfortunate individuals perished or were wounded or cannot provide the information about what transpired? Is that the first interdiction point?

General **Trainor**. Senator, of those on post, I don't know who survived, but all of the marines that were on post were aware of the rules of engagement. In addition to their general orders, their special orders were the rules of engagement. This included the right, indeed the obligation, to use deadly force if their positions or they themselves were threatened.

Senator **Warner**. All of us have seen many reports on television. I have some recollection of seeing a marine trying to recount what happened. He said he pulled his bolt back.

Was he able to get a round in? Do you know anything about that?

General **Trainor**. Sir, I saw one television clip which was referred to in the New York Times this morning about a marine who was on the roof. This was on CNN television. He made some remark concerning the fact it was unfortunate that he wasn't allowed to keep his magazine in his rifle so that he could have gotten a couple of shots off.

Now, I want to tell you in that particular instance of that marine it may have been true that he did not have his magazine in his weapon. He should not have because he was not a marine sentry on the perimeter.

All the marines on the perimeter have their magazines in their weapons. It is only those that are in the interior that do not have magazines in their weapons unless they are in a heightened state of alert.

Senator **Warner**. On the picture that you provided, this point here is the point of entry.

Was the gate opened or closed at the time the vehicle approached?

General **Trainor**. Sir, as I testified earlier, we don't know. There is a gate there. Whether it was open or closed, I don't know.

Senator **Warner**. I apologize for having to leave before you responded to my question. I was summoned to the floor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Kennedy?

Senator **Kennedy**. Are there additional security procedures that are being followed now for the protection of the marines?

General **Trainor**. Yes, sir, there are. We continue to get generalized bomb threats from the intelligence community. I suppose you could say in a sense it is a little bit like closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. But, yes, indeed, prudent measures are being taken.

Senator **Kennedy**. You were getting bombing threats before, according to all the reports.

If there are additional steps that are being taken now as a result of bomb threats, why weren't additional steps being taken earlier when you had bomb threats?

General **Trainor**. Let me answer it this way, if I may, Senator.

The threat of a terrorist attack, car bomb attack, or things of that nature, these were general threats, but at the same time we were still receiving direct sniper fire, which was an active threat as opposed to a generalized threat.

Also, in the generalized threat category was the likelihood of continuing mortaring and rocketing and artillery fire on the airport because shooting was still going on in the Chouf area despite the cease-fire.

It is that sort of atmosphere in which you have to estimate your greatest threat.

Now, the commander obviously thought that he had adequate protection for the building. If you look at the photo, you can see that there are vehicles that ring all sides of the building with the exception of the side facing the parking lot where he had barbedwire and fixed positions.

All I can say to you is that his judgment was that that was sufficient to deter a terrorist attack or any sort of ground attack. He obviously did not anticipate that somebody was going to be able to launch a suicide attack of this nature which he could not stop.

Unfortunately, he was wrong.

Senator **KENNEDY**. Even though they had had this kind of terrorist attack that was successful against both the American Embassy and start against Mr. Gemayel's brother?

General **TRAINOR**. There is no firm proof in either——

Senator **KENNEDY**. There were car bombs that went off. You don't have to read much about Northern Ireland or England or other parts of the world to know that is a modern technique used by terrorists.

General **TRAINOR**. No one regrets more than the Marine Corps and the commander on the scene that he didn't take greater precautions.

Senator **KENNEDY**. I certainly recognize that. There is also recognition that the marines did take these steps when they did provide for the security of the American diplomats.

The part I find difficult to understand is if they did take these steps under the orders by the marines, set up by the marines, to protect civilians, why in the world did they not do it to protect their own personnel? I find that difficult to understand. I am sure there is some explanation.

I think you must understand the sense of frustration that exists with many of the Americans in any part of the country. "If they took steps to protect civilians, why didn't they do it to protect my son?"

I don't know what kind of answer to give them.

General **TRAINOR**. Sir, I can only give a conjectural answer in that the temporary embassy is right on the main street with absolutely no maneuver room, if I may use that term. Therefore they had to block off the street—a commercial thoroughfare—while we were out at the airport.

Senator **KENNEDY**. You were talking about from the parking lot to the entrance of the BOQ?

General **TRAINOR**. The assumption was that the barbedwire, double strand barbedwire, backed by the sentry post, one of which shows in the picture, well away from the building, plus other obstacles that were between the sentry post and the building would be sufficient to stop somebody from driving up to do the job.

It may have been sufficient if somebody came in a Volkswagen. As it turned out, at least to the best of our knowledge, it turned out to be some sort of garbage truck or dump truck which made the run.

Senator **KENNEDY**. Regarding the steps that are taken now for the security of the marines, what is your assessment as to the protection of the marines against terrorist attack?

How much security do they have?

I would accept the fact that there are a number of terrorists in that part of the world who are going to be after American marines.

What can you tell us now about additional security steps taken in that entire compound because of the nature of the danger to American marines?

Can you guarantee to us the security of those marines?

General **Trainor**. Sir, I can't guarantee that. As to the steps we have taken, I just know in general what is being done right now.

I would respectfully request that you hold that question until General Kelley's return with his analysis.

Clearly something will be done to modify the entire posture, not just in that particular area. There are many options that are being looked at. I think it would be prudent to await his return in terms of giving you a risk-free environment, that is absolutely impossible.

As long as we are there, it is a dangerous area with dangerous people, many of whom are fanatics, and it is not going to be risk free, Senator. I in no way can guarantee that we are not going to take casualties there.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Humphrey?

Senator **Humphrey**. General Trainor, we realize we cannot have a risk-free environment, but 2½ days have gone by. Let me follow up on Senator Kennedy's line.

Have we done nothing so far to improve security? Is that what we are to infer, it is still the status quo?

General **Trainor**. No, Senator, that is not what I meant to imply. I don't know other than in a general sense the steps that have been taken. I have not in my capacity gone out on the zone to ask them what steps specifically. We know there are steps being taken, but I would be more than happy, to satisfy you, Senator, or any member of the committee, to specifically ask those questions and give you the specifics of it.

However, I would say by the time I get a response you will have General Kelley back here anyway.

Senator **Humphrey**. We don't know when General Kelley is coming. We are not going to await General Kelley's return before we do something. Bulldozers can create earthworks protection.

General **Trainor**. I can assure you steps have been taken. I don't know the specifics.

Senator **Humphrey**. If you don't know, I can't imagine who would.

General **Trainor**. Sir, I don't know because I have not specifically requested that information.

Senator **Humphrey**. I think it is the most important element in this whole picture, what we are going to do to protect the security of our troops. I wish somebody would give me an answer and not say wait a few days because in a few days some other terrorist attack might occur.

General **Trainor**. Again, I assure you that steps will be taken and I will find out what they are.

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator **Humphrey**. Now, several references have been made to the decision about the adequate security.

General TRAINOR. Let me qualify that. As Senator Warner pointed out, responsibility runs up the line. The commander is responsible. He sets up the defenses. But his immediate superior has the ultimate responsibility.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was the judgment of security of those two senior commanders on the scene based on military considerations or were there some other considerations imposed from above, either from other military authorities or civil authorities?

General TRAINOR. Sir, they were based upon military considerations, but I think implicit in the judgment made was a realization of what the role was out there and the specific location they were in which was a heavily trafficked, commercial area, which was open for public use.

There was no specific directive or guidance given by the military or political authorities pertaining to the defenses. But given the present mission, as the Secretary of Defense pointed out, a solution to dig a hole and put American troops in there would not have been appropriate at all.

Senator HUMPHREY. It distresses me to hear local officers blamed. I think there were other considerations such as not creating too much of a fortress atmosphere, striving to have some semblance of normalcy and that kind of public relations, political kinds of consideration.

Reading between the lines, I think that is the case. I think the heart of the problem is putting PR above the security of our troops. That is outrageous.

I am not blaming it on senior commanders.

Admiral Wilson, if there is one bright spot in this whole miserable picture, it is the performance of your medical personnel. I was aboard the *Iwo Jima* the morning of the explosion. I was there all day when they brought out the casualties. There was not one instance I saw of panic or confusion or chaos, not one marine lay unattended to.

The moment they hit that deck there were medical teams on them. It was really magnificant. It is a perfect example of how training and adequate military supplies and the high caliber of people come together to minimize the disaster.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Preparedness, I was proud of what I saw and you should take pride in it, too.

Admiral WILSON. Thank you.

Senator HUMPHREY. I was aboard the C-9 that brought the casualties and my only criticism of the medical area, was the decision, at whatever level it was made, and again I think they were political considerations, not having already in place contingency plans to evacuate to Israel. That should have been a contingency plan.

We did in fact lose the man enroute. We also had another critically wounded with cranial bleeding, unconscious. I don't know what the ultimate outcome was of that man's struggle, but surely 1-hour flight is a hell of a lot less stressful than a 4½-hour flight to Rhein-Main Germany.

Admiral WILSON. No question, Senator.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Admiral, did you have a doctor on the ground over there?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. How many did you have before this?

Admiral WILSON. I think there were two or three before the explosion.

Senator NUNN. Did any of them survive?

Admiral WILSON. I am not sure yet. We had two different medical units ashore. One was a battalion aid station housed in the building that was destroyed.

The other one was an element with the MSSG, Marine Service Support Group. That was at a distance, as I understand it.

We are not yet privy to who were killed. I know only there were five corpsmen on the wounded list in Germany. I don't have adequate data on the rest of the medical teams ashore.

General TRAINOR. I may be able to assist on that in gross terms. There were six naval officers with the MAU and 72 Navy enlisted. Out of all of these were the medical people, some would be naval gunfire people. Probably four out of the six officers were probably doctors.

Senator NUNN. Probably?

General TRAINOR. Four out of the six were doctors, two physicians and two dentists. I would suspect these were spread between not only the battalion, but also the aviation unit, the MAU headquarters element, and the support unit.

Senator NUNN. One other question, the answer to which you may furnish for the record.

I would like to know the number and names and times of visits of all the senior officers in the chain of command that visited that area.

General Kelley is not in the chain of command, is he?

General TRAINOR. No, sir, he is not.

Senator NUNN. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, this is one of those questions we get.

We have a terrible tragedy here and understandably the head of the Marine Corps is going over there. He wasn't in the chain of command and he is still not in the chain of command, Yet he has been designated by the President to go over and take care of the security element that exists now.

That is not a question we can answer here today, but it is sort of a strange setup that we have.

It would seem to me the senior man in the chain of command would be Bernard Rogers, would he not?

General TRAINOR. Yes, sir. He is the CINC and he answers directly to the Secretary of Defense.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. There has been a lot of emotion surrounding this issue and there probably will be a lot more. Please understand the questions that I ask are not based on pure emotion nor on any lack of support. I think my record is pretty clear on that.

However, I intend to pursue, Admiral, the issue of why with the numbers that were dead and dying and Israeli medical care available within minutes, there was not one person treated in an Israeli hospital? The Israelis have frequently been at war; they have just finished some very serious fighting. I guess they would have the latest in experience and the latest in equipment. They are minutes away and we were advised of this—I have had information double checked that Israeli offers were made at all levels. Why with the numbers that were dead and dying, and so on, not one person was treated in Israeli hospitals?

Especially when we knew the history of the area and the dangers there. I was there in the middle of February of this year. I was shown pictures of that building and it was built for someone to drive underneath it. You could drive underneath it.

We were not permitted to communicate with the Israelis earlier this year. At the time they were conducting what we call reconnaissance by fire because they were being ambushed. They were beside our people who were sitting there firing with Israel going over their heads, but they were not allowed to talk to them. The other components of the MNF were. It was insane.

I pursued that back here. It was taken care of and permission to communicate with the Israelis was granted. If we find there was one political thought given to the rufusal of the Israeli medical care at the expense of the life of any one of our Americans, I am going to start asking and I am going to get all my colleagues to ask for the resignation or whatever other action that is appropriate against those involved.

We have gone through terrorism in Korea. The North Koreans wrapped themselves up in burlap and you shot them and they kept on coming.

We went through the kamikaze in World War II. We went through it in Vietnam. We have had it in Beirut.

Very candidly, Mr. Chairman, when the Secretary of Defense says, well, we are going to have terrorism, there is not much we can do, we have to expect it, that is not going to help those of us who are trying to support what is going on in Beirut. It is not going to help us keep this undefined mission or mission impossible, supported.

The No. 1 person says on network TV and again in the papers that terrorism is going to be very hard to cope with and the innuendo is that it may happen again. But it will not happen again with our sons.

Thank you for being here and for your answers this morning. Somewhere, somehow, sometime, someone in this whole scheme of our foreign policy and military policy we have to get back to the days when there was accountability. Someone has to be accountable.

In Iran someone should have been accountable. There has to be accountability if we are going to succeed in winning public support for our foreign policy. I don't think the people in this country will ever be able to understand that the United States somehow is not going to be able to make it, that it is acceptable that we just don't ever win.

I assure you, I and my colleagues are going to pursue this from all angles, not for any personal reasons, but because somewhere someone has to be accountable in the military area. Our foreign policy that does not allow us to let marines be marines has to stop.

Senator **Humphrey**. I suggest it start with the State Department.

Chairman **Tower**. Admiral Wilson, I would like you to supply for the record the answer to the question of whether or not the senior medical officer in charge of the treatment and disposition of mass casualties had knowledge that the Israeli hospitals were available to him.

Was that a purely discretionary decision made by the medical officer on *Iwo Jima?*

I assume the medical officer on *Iwo Jima* was the senior medical officer in charge of the operation.

Admiral WILSON. I suspect there was a medical officer ashore responsible for that area and another one on the ship who had responsibility for that.

Chairman TOWER. We would like you to provide all that information for the record as soon as you can.

I understand you don't have complete information about who was the senior medical officer ashore, indeed whether he survived, and who was the medical officer afloat.

I am delighted to hear Senator Humphrey say that everybody performed well in the circumstances, but I think it is important for us to know if they had complete knowledge of all the facilities that might have been available to them.

Admiral WILSON. I will make every attempt to find that out and we will report back.

[The information follows:]

The information requested falls within the area of responsibility of the operational chain of command. This question will be considered by the commission tasked to investigate the incident.

Chairman TOWER. General Trainor, I think I appreciate the difficulty of stopping someone bent on a suicide mission, having had some experience with suicide swims, suicide boats, and suicide aircraft.

But it occurs to me that something was missing in the security element here. I understand the kinds of situations we were involved in where there are a lot of irresponsible elements, a lot of fanatics, and a lot of very small terrorist groups.

Of course, from time to time we have been exposed to acts by individual terrorists that didn't represent any particular group.

I think you can see the concern of this committee that we didn't do everything, to the extent possible, to at least minimize the risk or the attempt of an action such as this being successful.

I think you should know of our great concern about that as we await further information.

We will provide you with questions for response for the record, and we would like to talk to General Kelley at the earliest possible moment on his return. We particularly would like to know what additional security measures have been taken up to this moment.

Any further questions?

Gentleman, thank you.

General TRAINOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Questions submitted for the hearing record, with answers supplied, follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER WITH OFFICIAL REPLY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Chairman TOWER. Would you please put the U.S. participation in the Multinational Force in the context of overall U.S. diplomatic and military efforts regarding the crisis in Lebanon.

ANSWER. U.S. participation in the Multinational Force (MNF) is a significant aspect of our diplomatic and military efforts in pursuit of peace in Lebanon. Taken together, our activities during the Lebanese crisis all aim toward the objectives of a viable government in Lebanon, restored Lebanese sovereignty, and a strengthened national armed force capable of maintaining peace and supporting civil rule. These objectives are crucial to the withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon—another prerequisite to a peaceful Lebanon. It also follows that a peaceful Lebanon, free of all external forces and sovereign over all its territory, will be a major contribution to Israeli security. U.S. participation in the MNF, therefore, is a key element in building the kind of stability in Lebanon that can protect the country from those external forces and internal strife to which it has been so susceptible. Such stability is essential to an overall Middle East peace. Our diplomatic and military efforts have promoted the removal of external forces from Lebanon, while at the same time, encouraged negotiations among all Lebanese factions. In this context, the MNF was created to help stabilize the situation in Lebanon until a government could be established and a Lebanese national army mobilized to restore Lebanese sovereignty over its own soil. U.S. participation in the MNF continues to reinforce our continuing efforts in this direction.

Chairman TOWER. To what extent does the attainment of stability in Lebanon contribute toward the achievement of U.S. interests in the region?

ANSWER. The Middle East, as a key to the economic and political life of the West, is of vital concern to the United States. Its strategic importance, its energy resources, its location astride world shipping lanes, and the well-being of the nearly 200 million people living there are all integral to our national interest and to world peace. If this region should fall into the hands of a power or powers hostile to the free world, the result would be a direct threat to the United States and to our allies. The United States is particularly concerned over the situation in Lebanon because of the adverse impact of instability there on the Middle East as a whole. This impact is magnified by the destabilizing role that external forces have in that nation's civil strife. The United States continues to see a direct linkage between the unstable situation in Lebanon and the potential for the export of low-level subversion or even a broader Middle East conflict due to the variety of foreign interests involved, especially those of Syria and Israel. Consequently, U.S. efforts seek to promote stability in Lebanon in order to preclude wider conflict in the region and, consequently, an increased threat to U.S. strategic, economic, and political interests.

Chairman TOWER. What is the mission and objective of the Marines in Lebanon?

ANSWER. The specific operational mission of the Marines is to contribute to peace in Beirut by keeping order in their sector and preventing the area from becoming a battlefield. Part of their task, in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, is to guard Beirut International Airport. Because of their presence, the airport has remained operational. In addition, they patrol the surrounding area. The mission that we have set for the Marines is not a classic military one. Our basic mission is one of presence which is conducive to the stability of Lebanon and which offers a visible manifestation of U.S. strength and resolve to Lebanon and to the free world. This mission is part of the larger objective which we are fulfilling in conjunction with our partners in the MNF. This objective is to help bring peace to Lebanon and stability to the vital Middle East. The role of the Marines in this endeavor is to help stabilize the situation as the Lebanese government reasserts authority and the Lebanese army prepares to assert Lebanese sovereignty over its own soil as foreign forces withdraw. The physical presence of the Marines lends support to both the Lebanese government and its army, permitting the diplomatic process an opportunity to succeed.

Chairman TOWER. Should that mission be in any way changed by the attack on Sunday?

ANSWER. The United States, in conjunction with its partners on the MNF, should continue the mission which the Marines have been successfully carrying out. In the year that our forces have been there, Lebanon has made important steps toward stability and order. A government has been formed under the leadership of President Gemayal and Prime Minister Wazzan, and that government, with U.S. assistance and training, has reconstituted its national army. Insofar as the MNF continues to contribute positively to the prospects for further diplomatic progress in Lebanon, no change in mission is warranted.

Chairman Tower. Please describe for the committee the political implications for the United States position in the Middle East of a U.S. withdrawal from the Multinational Force.

Answer. U.S. participation in the Multinational Force offers a visible manifestation of U.S. strength and resolve to Lebanon and to the free world. Withdrawal from the MNF would indicate a significant retraction of our commitment to the future stability of Lebanon and an acknowledgement that our presence there has been ineffective. The linkage between the terror bombing of Marine Headquarters and our withdrawal from the MNF would be unavoidable, perhaps provoking similar attempts at political coercion in the future. Our allies—above all, our French, Italian and British partners in the MNF—most certainly would question our intentions and our long-term resolve in working for a settlement to overall Middle East problems. Saudi Arabia and Jordan would be less likely to support U.S. peace and security initiatives in the Middle East if they perceived a new uncertainty in our efforts toward a solution in Lebanon, leaving a political void that could be quickly exploited by Syria and the Soviet Union. Our withdrawal from the MNF could only lend encouragement to Syria, the Soviet Union, and other hostile forces, allowing them to believe that their confrontational policies had been successful in resisting U.S. policy efforts in the Middle East. Such encouragement would adversely affect the negotiations process both in Lebanon and between Arabs and Israelis.

Chairman Tower. Is the administration giving consideration to removing the Marines from the Beirut Airport to the naval ships off the coast of Lebanon?

Answer. In order to enhance security of U.S. MNF elements in Lebanon, some support personnel have been relocated to ships off the coast.

Chairman Tower. Would such a move have any adverse political implications for the U.S. position in Lebanon?

Answer. We do not envision that the movement of some support personnel to ships off the Lebanese coast will affect the U.S. position in Lebanon because the nature of our mission there has not been altered. The redeployment of personnel to positions offering greater security is intended to enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. MNF mission.

Chairman Tower. What role has the U.S. peacekeeping force been playing in the hostilities in Lebanon?

Answer. The U.S. MNF contingent has taken a strictly defensive posture during the hostilities in keeping with the mission and Rules of Engagement of the Marine presence. This policy has permitted the Marines to return fire in self-defense when fired upon. During the recent hostilities in Lebanon, the Marines found it necessary to return fire with artillery and naval gunfire to halt direct firing upon U.S. MNF positions. As the U.S. peacekeeping force is not a classic military mission, however, its presence has been aimed at reducing the level of tension by preventing the area under its control from becoming a battlefield.

Chairman Tower. Could their role be expanded so as to facilitate a withdrawal of the U.S. Marines?

Answer. An expansion of the MNF to facilitate withdrawal of the U.S. Marines would be contingent upon the efforts of our MNF partners and other allies who might be willing to participate. Withdrawal of U.S. Marines, however, would carry unavoidable political and strategic implications for American interests, despite the fact that an augmented MNF might permit a reduced U.S. presence.

Chairman Tower. Former Secretary of State Kissinger has suggested that the United States should begin coordinating a more aggressive military posture with other countries, including Israel, to bring about a change in the balance of power between the moderate and radical in Lebanon.

Do you agree with Secretary Kissinger that the current balance of power in Lebanon favors the radical elements over the more moderate elements?

Answer. Evidence can be cited to show the preeminence of either radical or moderate elements. In the latter case, one can point to the facts that the government of President Gemayel has served a full year successfully, the Lebanese Army has reconstituted itself and performed very ably and cohesively when called upon, the Lebanese Government has negotiated a withdrawal agreement with Israel, and the national reconciliation process has adopted reasonable approaches to the tasks at hand, in lieu of the divisive course advocated by radicals. Our aim in Lebanon has been to reduce the level of tension. We continue to work with our allies in providing support for the government of Lebanon as it seeks to rebuild a national consensus. In this way, we continue to believe that the moderate forces will be able to gain legitimacy and increasing political dominance.

Chairman Tower. Do you believe that Israel or other interested countries could be persuaded to adopt a more aggressive military posture in Lebanon?

Answer. [Deleted.] Other nations have shown little interest in adopting a more aggressive military posture, in keeping with the peacekeeping role of multinational forces, and it would be presumptuous to respond on their behalf on this very difficult question.

Chairman Tower. What options would be available to the United States if the pattern of violence persists?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Chairman Tower. What was the reaction of the other countries participating in the Multinational Force to the attacks on Sunday?

Answer. France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have firmly stated that they will not be intimidated by terrorism or acts of political coercion. Each nation remains committed to participation in the Multinational Force. The Italian Chamber of Deputies reaffirmed this commitment in a resolution which it approved on November 3. France has reconfirmed and enhanced its commitment, and Prime Minister Thatcher has stated Great Britain's resolve.

Chairman Tower. Is there any indication that Italy, France, and the United Kingdom have lost any of their earlier commitment to the Multinational Peacekeeping presence in Lebanon?

Answer. No.

Chairman Tower. At this point, are you able to say with any certainty who was responsible for the attacks on Sunday?

Answer. We cannot yet identify with certainty the perpetrators of these attacks. There is a lot of circumstantial evidence based on a fair amount of information. There is certainly very strong circumstantial evidence pointing to the Iranians, but a lot of questions whether these are just individual Iranians or whether they are part of or supported by the Iranian Government. Syrian knowledge of the planned bombing is also being investigated.

Chairman Tower. Do we have any evidence of direct Iranian, Syrian, or Soviet involvement in the attacks?

Answer. At this time there is some evidence suggesting an indirect rather than direct Iranian and Syrian involvement in the bombing. As yet, however, the evidence is not conclusive.

Chairman Tower. Can we have your frank appraisal, were security precautions adequate?

Answer. The security was adequate for the threat that was determined to exist at the time in Beirut. In the month preceding the attack, warnings of terrorist threats resurfaced from the intelligence community. While terrorist bomb intelligence continued to be imprecise, the focus of attention was the threat of car bombs to convoys providing support to the U.S. diplomatic community in Beirut. While the terrorist threat remained vague, the active threat to the Marines from artillery, mortar fire and small arms was increasing. Against the threat then existing, as analyzed from intelligence information, the Marines were prepared. Only extraordinary security could have countered the massive and unanticipated threat from a 5-ton capacity truck. The delivery of a 5,000 pound truckbomb at very high speed took approximately 6 seconds from start to finish. Rough calculations indicate that it would require a very dense concrete wall to stop a vehicle of this size and weight, travelling at this speed. It is of particular importance to note that the USMNF security precautions were oriented toward the threat of the past several months, i.e., artillery, rockets, mortars, small arms and car bombs. In this context, the U.S. NMF Commander's security efforts had been successful. Obviously, the Commander's security arrangements were inadequate to prevent this form of large-scale "kamikaze" attack.

Chairman Tower. Is someone at fault for not having dispersed the Marines or at least having fashioned a barricade to limit damage?

Answer. Marines were billeted in BLT headquarters because this building afforded maximum protection against small arms, mortar, rocket and artillery fire, which intelligence showed to be of primary concern. This building was chosen because during the earlier fighting for Beirut it had endured repeated Israeli artillery barrages without being destroyed. An earth tremor last June also failed to cause any structural damage. Moreover, in a 13-month period, no Marine billeted in the building was killed or injured due to incoming artillery, mortar, rockets or small arms. Structural barriers were in place around BLT headquarters. Headquarters buildings and facilities were sandbagged. Over a quarter million sandbags were emplaced. Barbed wire entanglements were emplaced throughout. Concertina wire was strung in the civilian parking lot in front of headquarters. A metal sewer pipe barrier was placed in front of the building. Each of these measures was designed to address the threat existing at the time of the attack. These measures were not adequate to stop a large, heavily laden truck loaded with 5,000 pounds of high explosive, traveling at a high speed and driven by a suicide driver, who executed the attack in only 6 seconds from start to finish.

Chairman Tower. What "rules of engagement" are our Marines operating under?

Answer. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) used in Lebanon are the Peacetime ROE used by U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, modified to fit the situation in Lebanon. In general, force may be used when required in self defense [deleted].

Chairman Tower. At what level were these "rules of engagement" developed? Who decides when our Marines can shoot back?

Answer. The rules of engagement were promulgated by Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and modified and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Deleted.] In an emergency, U.S. forces are authorized to act in self defense without further authorization.

Chairman Tower. Do you consider these "rules of engagement" to be appropriate for the situation in which the Marines find themselves in Beirut?

Answer. The "rules of engagement" as detailed in the response to question 22 are appropriate for the situation in Beirut.

Chairman Tower. Would you sketch the logistical chain of command, again from Beirut to the President.

Answer. The logistical support chain runs from 24th Marine Amphibious Unit through Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, through Commandant, USMC, through the Secretary of the Navy, through the Secretary of Defense, to the President.

Chairman Tower. Does the State Department plan any direct role in the Marine Operation as a "peacekeeping force"?

Answer. The State Department does not plan any direct role in the Marine operation as a "peacekeeping force".

Chairman Tower. In light of the event on Sunday, what options are being considered to improve the security of our forces in Lebanon?

Answer. Measures already underway or under active consideration include the following:

[Deleted.]

Chairman Tower. Admiral Wilson, would you furnish for the record the names and positions of those in the chain of command who were advised that the Israeli hospitals were available for use by our wounded.

Answer. About two hours after the bombing, the U.S. Attache in Tel Aviv received the first of several calls from the Israeli Government offering any assistance they could provide including medical equipment, transportation, and hospital beds. This request was sent by the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv to our task force off the Lebanese coast. The task force responded by thanking the government of Israel for their offer and saying that it appeared they had ample assets to meet their requirements. As the day progressed, the task force did request some material assistance from Israel. This aid was promptly provided to the Attache's office and the materials flown by a U.S. helicopter to Beirut. Approximately 11 hours after the explosion, Minister Arens called Secretary Weinberger to express his personal condolences and to offer his assistance in whatever we might need to respond to the incident. The Secretary expressed his thanks for the Minister's condolences and his appreciation for the generous offer of support. The Secretary immediately made known this offer to General Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Vessey immediately told General Lawson, the deputy commander of our European command, to use Israeli medical facilities if they were needed.

Chairman Tower. Would you also provide the names of those who made the decision not to take advantage of these Israeli facilities?

Answer. By the time that Minister Arens conveyed the Israeli offer of assistance to Secretary Weinberger, the commanders on the scene had already been aware of it, had made some use of the offer, but had determined that there was no need to transport wounded personnel to Israeli hospitals. The point should be made, in the most emphatic terms, that neither the Secretary of Defense nor any of our commanders refused the offer of Israeli assistance. The offer was received with thanks; however, assistance was not needed in the view of the commanders who were on the scene with adequate resources available.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER TO LT. GEN. BERNARD TRAINOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS, POLICY AND OPERATIONS

EMBASSY BOMBING

Chairman TOWER. In light of the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April, what actions were taken by the Marines to safeguard against a similar occurrence?

General TRAINOR. The following actions were taken at the headquarters area as a result of the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in April:

Civilian traffic was prohibited from the headquarters area.

All civilian and military vehicles were searched in the proximity of the headquarters complex.

Headquarters buildings and facilities were sandbagged. Over a quarter million sandbags were emplaced.

Barbed wire entanglements were emplaced throughout. Concertina wire was strung in the civilian parking lot in front of headquarters. While the civilian parking lot adjacent to the BLT Headquarters lot was ideally suited for a mine field in a tactical sense, mines were not emplaced as the lot served the commercial airport and was actively used by civilians.

Additional Marines were posted in each guard post during high threat periods.

Roof-top surveillance was increased.

Foot patrols were increased within the headquarters area.

A metal sewer pipe barrier was placed in front of the BLT headquarters building.

Tunnels beneath the headquarters complex were sealed.

The use of night observation devices was increased.

Magazines were inserted in weapons at appropriate posts. (This was in addition to previous orders which directed Marines on the perimeter and on patrol to stand duty with loaded weapons.)

Tank ditches were contemplated, but considered unnecessary and impractical in view of the threat existing at the time and the commercial nature of the airport.

SECURITY

Chairman TOWER. Many questions have been raised about the security arrangements surrounding our Marines in Beirut. Why were 300 Marines and Navy personnel living in a single hotel?

General TRAINOR. The large number of Marines billeted in the BLT Headquarters were located there to provide them protection against intensive small arms, mortar, rocket and artillery fire which had been prevalent from the end of August until 26 September.

Chairman TOWER. Why weren't there adequate barricades to prevent a vehicle from crashing into the lobby—especially since that type of threat was known to exist following the Embassy bombing?

General TRAINOR. The threat of the truck attack was unknown and the security measures were adequate to meet the known threat, i.e., car bombs.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Chairman TOWER. Would you sketch the operational chain of command from our Marines in Beirut to the President?

General TRAINOR. The operational chain of command is as follows:

Commanding Officer, Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU).
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF).
Commander, Sixth Fleet.
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR).
U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR).
Secretary of Defense.
President.

Chairman TOWER. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN LEBANON

MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in room 222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, East, Wilson, Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy and Bingaman.

Also present: McClure, Symms, Sasser, Dixon, and Ford.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Louis W. Arny III, Michael B. Donley, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III; David S. Lyles, José E. Martinez, Bruce D. Porter, Patrick L. Renehan, Carl M. Smith and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Gerald D. Strickler, printing and documents clerk; Drew A. Harker, Judith A. Freedman, and Douglas R. Graham, research assistants; Karen A. Love, Jacquie S. O'Grady, Patricia Watson, and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Ron Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Robert Savitt, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter D. Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin; Matthew Murray, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Lawrence W. Horowitz, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Ed McGaffigan, assistant to Senator Bingaman; and Gordon Kerr, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Battalion Landing Headquarters at Beirut International Airport, the President ordered Gen. P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, to Beirut. Although General Kelley is not in the military chain of command, he was directed to undertake a complete review of ways to provide better protection for the Marine Corps contingent in Lebanon. The General was also to consult with the Lebanese military and the friendly militias to determine what they could do to improve the security of the U.S. marines in Lebanon. Finally, General Kelley was to meet with officials from the other countries contributing troops to the multinational peacekeeping force to determine what can be done to reduce the collective exposure of the multinational force. On his return, General Kelley was to provide the President with recommendations to improve the security of the U.S. MNF contingent.

Today's hearing was called to enable the committee to review the military situation in Lebanon with General Kelley and Gen. Bernard Rogers, who as Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, is in the operational chain of command of the U.S. MNF contingent in Lebanon. This executive session as called to enable General Kelley and General Rogers to discuss with the committee the nature of security measures that have been implemented since the bomb attack and the recommendations that General Kelley has made to the President. The committee will then move into open session in room SD-105 to receive testimony from General Kelley and General Rogers regarding the circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack. In the interest of time, I would ask the members of the committee to limit their questions in this closed session to current and planned measures to improve the security of the U.S. military personnel in Lebanon.

I hope you appreciate the need for having a closed session when we talk about security measures. Obviously that is something that you do not want hostile forces to have access to since that is in the interest of the security of our troops themselves, and there should not be too much information given to hostile forces as to the nature of those security measures.

Before hearing from our witnesses, let me yield to Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a statement here, but I do have a statement that I will probably give in the open session.

I want to thank you for calling these hearings, and I want to thank General Kelley and General Rogers for being with us today. I think there are a lot of questions we would like to ask. I think the challenge is going to be to try to refrain from the questions that could be asked in the open session and to try to hold those back for the open session and ask only those questions here that would touch on classified information.

Just for my information and that of the members of the committee, Mr. Chairman, General Kelley, as I understand it, has an opening statement.

Is that a classified statement, General Kelley?

General KELLEY. No, sir, it is not, but it is imperative that I give it to this committee, sir, because without this statement, there is no way in the world that I could logically answer your questions without an appropriate backdrop.

Senator NUNN. In other words, you believe it is important to give that before any questions are asked in the closed and then again in the open session?

General **Kelley**. Yes, sir. I feel quite strongly about that. We have potentially 239 people who have died for this country and I have to say, in all honesty, I have a story to tell, and I beg this committee to let me tell it in its entirety. It will take about 30 minutes, but it is an imperative to do that.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, I have no problem with that at all. I think you certainly should be able to give that statement.

What I am wondering, though, just regarding the amount of time, I don't know what we will be doing on the floor, but I know there will be a lot of questions. I just wonder if we are going to have the time to get to questions if we have that statement given in closed session and then again in open session.

I pose that for everyone's consideration. If we get interrupted two or three times today——

Chairman **Tower**. But there are no votes until 5 p.m.

Senator **Nunn**. So we will have about 30 minutes in closed and then in the open session?

Chairman **Tower**. I would propose we try to conduct this meeting with as much dispatch as possible, dealing with those sensitive matters, and then going to open session. I think we should afford General Kelley the opportunity to present his statement both here and in open session.

Senator **Nunn**. I don't object to that at all, Mr. Chairman.

Is there a reason why we could not have the open session first and give him a chance to present his statement?

Chairman **Tower**. Well, I don't think people were expecting that session for about another 25 minutes or so.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, I just wonder. It seems to me that we might be here in closed session for a couple of hours. I don't see how we could be here for less than 2 or 2½ hours in the closed session. If we just take 5 minutes for each Senator here, we would be here for 2 or 2½ hours. It seems to me we may want to have an open session at a later time. I don't know. Maybe we could have it this afternoon.

Chairman **Tower**. Well, why don't we go ahead as it is set up currently to see how we do. It occurs to me that a number of the questions will be open session questions and not closed session questions, and I would suggest that we go ahead and get started to see how well we do on that.

Do you have anything further?

Senator **Nunn**. No, thank you.

Chairman **Tower**. All right, General Kelley, you may proceed as you see fit.

I don't believe General Rogers has a prepared statement, but if he has anything in addition that he wants to add at the conclusion of your statement, we would invite him to do so. Then we will go to questions.

General Kelley?

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General **Kelley**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I truly appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee. Need-less to say, I am deeply saddened for the reason that I am here, but there is a story to be told and I would like to tell it. I think it is a story of professionalism and dedication and I think it will clarify, hopefully, many of the issues that we have all agonized over for the past week.

But first let me set the scene, if I could, Mr. Chairman. Our Marines are situated in the middle of Beirut International Airport. This is a highly commercial airport, the international terminal for a country of over 3 million people, and we are there as guests; we are not there as invaders, so our facilities are provided in coordination with the Lebanese Government.

So picture, if you will, the commercial activity at this airport, with people, innocent civilians, cars, trucks, major new construction, significant repair activity, to include even a major new drainage system for the city of Beirut. This is a civilian environment, a hubbub of activity by civilians, not by military. It is not a tactical strongpoint as some may have envisioned.

Our mission is not, in a direct sense, the physical security of the airport. That specific mission is assigned to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Our basic mission is presence and, of course, the logical question to ask is, how do you define presence?

Well, first let me tell you that presence as a mission is not in any military dictionary and it is not a classic military mission. But the chain of command at the time correctly took presence to mean, be visible, provide a backdrop of U.S. presence which could be conducive to the stability of Lebanon, a sovereign nation, but it did not mean build a Fortress America. I guess the best description is that we are a visible manifestation of U.S. strength and resolve to Lebanon and the free world, and in all honesty, sir, you cannot hide behind a berm line and do this.

Besides, given the area we occupied, the threat as described at the time by all available intelligence sources, and a highly active commercial environment which was literally crawling with civilians, it would have been impossible for the commander to establish a hard point defense in the classic tactical sense.

Again, I ask that you remember we were guests of a friendly nation; we were not on occupation duty.

My remarks today will take into account my trip to Beirut immediately after the terriorist attack. They include background information on the mission of marines since their second entry into Beirut on September 29, 1982. This background is essential if we are to have a complete understanding of what happened and how it could have happened. They will deliberately avoid discussion of the political and diplomatic considerations for our presence in Lebanon. It is not the place for me as a marine to discuss these imperatives for military employment. My remarks, Mr. Chairman, are based on historical facts as I know them and as my staff knows them at this time.

The facts clearly show that our presence in Lebanon has gone through phases, each different but clearly identifiable in a kaleidoscope of events over the past year. Each phase saw the threat to the security of marines ebb and flow in form and scope. Because of the ever-changing circumstances and events, our forces banked heavily on information and warnings of danger from the intelligence community both national and multinational. On the basis of this information, the marines sought to anticipate events and take protective measures rather than just react after an event.

Subsequent to the successful evacuation of the PLO from Beirut from August 25 to September 9, the marines, as you recall, withdrew from Lebanon on 10 September and resumed their normal duties as part of our 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. The marines, as part of the Multinational Force, returned to Lebanon on September 29, 1982. The Government of Lebanon requested the MNF to restore order after the assassination of their president, Bashir Gemayel, and the tragic massacre of Palestinian refugees at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The Lebanese Armed Forces alone were clearly unable to exercise control in Beirut and the surrounding countryside.

As I previously mentioned, the assigned mission of the MNF, simply stated, was presence. It should be clearly understood that this was basically a diplomatic and political mission, again, not a military mission in the classic sense, and the positioning of marine forces in Beirut International Airport was not driven by tactical considerations. Moreover, the threats at the time, as reported to the marines by the intelligence available, did not require tactical deployment. Indeed, the mission of presence mitigated against such measures. Put another way, the marines had to be seen by the Lebanese people if our presence was to be effective.

The major threat when the marines returned to Beirut was from the accidental detonation of over 100,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance. This ordnance lay strewn and buried in and around the airfield, which was a no-man's land during the battle of Beirut.

The rules of engagement under which marines were to operate were carefully constructed and promulgated by the operational commander. These were normal peacetime rules of engagement. They were restrictive in nature but provided the right of self-protection and self-defense. The mission and rules of engagement were considered appropriate and adequate to the environment and the threat.

During this phase, the marines were warmly greeted by the Lebanese people. Ordnance clearing operations and civic action projects undertaken by the marines were appreciated by the populace. The security of BIA was, howevver, and still is the overall responsibility of the Lebanese Armed Forces. In compliance with the mission, marine dispositions were made at the airport to accommodate the Lebanese Armed Forces, our hosts, and to facilitate construction projects which would return the airport to normal use. Until November, all went well.

By the beginning of November, we entered a new and more ominous phase. The marines had received intelligence reports that the passive threat environment of the previous month had changed. The intelligence community reported that problems from dissidents had become not just a possibility, but a probability. Armed with this intelligence, the commander on the scene prudently initiated a variety of defensive measures.

The combination of warning and preparation paid off on November 1, 1982 when a 300 pound bomb—a car-bomb—exploded on the main thoroughfare near the beach area over which marines received supplies from their ships offshore.

A review of the measures previously taken to safeguard the beach area reveals that the Commander had hardened his beach positions, dispersed the beach support facilities, limited access to the beach, segregated all marines from civilians, increased his alert posture, and provided mobility at each checkpoint. The terrorist effort was clumsy, amateurish, and a failure. With a failure of the car-bomb, no further incidents occurred against the marines during this period.

It was also during this phase that the marines were authorized to begin an informal training program to assist in the training of the Lebanese Armed Forces. This help was part of an overall effort to create a viable military entity which could eventually assume the security responsibilities for Beirut and later expand to greater Lebanon.

While in itself this training effort may not be germane to the October bombing incident, it may be relative to the local perception of the role of marines in Beirut. Some may have perceived that Americans were no longer exlusively in a presence role, that we were, in fact, in an assistance role. Motorized patrols were also initiated during this phase, and were conducted in east Beirut to provide clear visibility of U.S presence.

In the latter part of December 1982, marines were ordered not to patrol the Old Sidon Road southwest of the airport. The rationale for this restriction is not immediately relevant to the issue at hand, but it should be remembered that by the first of the year, for all practical purposes, the marine perimeter was limited to the commercial complex and the runways of Beirut International Airport.

In February 1983, the low-threat environment continued. The marines participated in a major rescue operation during a severe blizzard in the mountains east of Beirut, and as a part of the MNF, they operated beyond Syrian lines, rescuing both Christians and Moslems. These operations helped sustain the principle of evenhandedness and confessional neutrality. It also had a major impact on the credibility of our presence.

The new phase of the Beirut story began in March of this year. The situation began to deteriorate somewhat at that time. Although there was no intelligence of an increased threat, a 12-man marine presence patrol in a community north of the airfield was attacked by a grenade thrown from a building. It resulted in five marines receiving minor wounds. It was not predicted and was the first such incident against marines in over 4½ months. The commanders immediately increased passive defensive measures such as varying patrol routes, times, and the size of patrols. In the opinions of some, about this time several Lebanese factions may have perceived a subtle shift of the U.S. MNF from being pro-Lebanese to pro-Christian.

In April, the tragic car bombing of the U.S. Embassy took place. Clearly, the United States was emerging as a prime target for those who either opposed or misinterpreted the role of the multinational force in Lebanon. The former reason is more likely. The Italians and the French were also victims of terrorist harassment, even though they were not significantly involved in the reconstitution of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Although I know of no intelligence warning which indicated that the spectacular car bombing of the Embassy was in the offing, there were renewed warnings that terrorist attacks were likely to continue. Car bombs were viewed as a likely form of attack.

The Embassy bombing prompted several decisive steps to counter the threat. The marines provided a special protective detail from the temporary U.S. Embassy and initiated a significant number of increased security measures. A marine unit provided security and constructed the defensive obstacles, as an example, at the Ambassador's residence. Intensive efforts were made to increase intelligence sources in the immediate area of the marine positions.

As it pertains to the headquarters area itself, civilian traffic was prohibited headquarters area. All civilian and military vehicles were searched in the proximity of the headquarters complex. Headquarters buildings and facilities were sandbagged. Over one-quarter of a million sandbags were emplaced during that period. Barbed wire entanglements were emplaced throughout. Concertina wire was strung in the civilian parking lot in front of our BLT headquarters. While the civilian parking lot adjacent to the BLT headquarters was ideally suited for a minefield in a tactical sense, mines were not emplaced in the lot, sir, because it served the commercial airport and was actively used by the civilian population. Additional marines were posted at each guardpost during the high-threat periods. Rooftop surveillance was increased. Foot patrols were increased within the headquarters area. A metal sewer pipe barrier was placed in front of the BLT headquarters building. Tunnels beneath the headquarters complex were sealed. The use of night observation devices was increased. Magazines were inserted in weapons at appropriate posts. Tank ditches were contemplated but, again, considered impractical and unnecessary in view of the threat existing at the time and the fact that this was a commercial airport, not totally different from Washington airport, and not a tactical defensive perimeter.

Throughout May, the marines operated in a high-threat environment and continued to actively patrol, train the Lebanese Armed Forces, and improve security. During June, there was a noticeable deterioration in the relations of some factions of the local population. This was exacerbated by the reinfiltration of PLO elements into neighborhoods surrounding the airport. Among other indications, verbal harassment was directed at marine patrols for the first time. The first rocket and mortar attacks against the LAF in the Beirut International Airport complex occurred. Spillovers of stray rounds came into the marine positions. The marines fully recognized the increased threat posted by this firing and continued to harden positions by emplacing sandbags and digging in deeper.

Marine and LAF patrols were also integrated. Intelligence then indicated that rockets and mortars were to continue to be the primary concern for the commander regarding the safety of his troops.

During August, the periodic rocket attacks did increase against LAF targets with continued spillover into our marine positions. It was decided at this time to move the remainder of the BLT support personnel and a reaction platoon of approximately 150 men into the BLT headquarters building to afford them maximum protection against small arms, mortar, rockets, and artillery fire.

It should be pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that this building was chosen because during the earlier fighting in Beirut it had endured furious Israeli artillery barrages without being destroyed. In fact, an Earth tremor in June also failed to cause any structural damage. It should be noted also that in the 13-month period preceding the bombing, no marine, sailor, or soldier billeted in that building was killed or injured during incoming artillery, mortar, rocket, or small-arms fire.

In late August, armed conflict between the LAF and the Amal militia in West Beirut began in earnest. On September 4, the Israeli Defense Forces withdrew to the Awwali River, bringing active fighting and factional fighting to the Alayh and Chouf regions above Beirut. Sustained hostile fire, some directed primarily at marines, impacted at the airport with increasing frequency.

The shooting in and around Beirut was at ammunition levels rivaling major battles of World War II—over a million artillery rounds. Our marines took appropriate measures to harden their positions, to increase their alert status, and to move all support personnel in the terminial complex into reinforced buildings for protection against this intense shelling. The shelling was, of course, sufficient to halt all operations at the airport.

When fired upon, the U.S. MNF fired at specific targets with appropriate counterbattery fire. Our naval gunfire support for the LAF was a major influence on the subsequent cease-fire but, unfortunately, some could conclude that it may have increased the Moslem perception that our marines were pro-Christian and no longer neutral. Be that as it may, I am in no position to judge.

During this trying period of heavy fighting, the intelligence community continued to carry terrorist attacks as an active threat, but the threat was nonspecific. It was general and overshadowed by the very specific and active reality of conventional military action.

The cease-fire on September 26 brought a fragile and uneasy peace to Beirut, but sniping at marines became a daily occurrence. This brings us to a new phase. The warnings of the terrorist threat resurfaced from the intelligence community. While terrorist bomb, intelligence continued to be nonprecise, the focus of attention appeared to be the threat of car bombs to convoys providing support to the U.S. diplomatic community in Beirut. Roughly 100 car-bomb possibilities were developed since June 1, 1983. In some instances, the makes, colors, and license numbers were provided. Marines on security duty received this information. All United States, French, Italian, British, and Lebanese Armed Forces units were continually looking for suspicious automobiles, particularly as they related to convoys.

The threat became a reality on October 19, 1983, when a car bomb was detonated in an attempt to impede a marine supply convoy destined for the temporary Embassy about 12 kilometers from the airport. Alertness and protective measures had already been taken by the marines and therefore minimized the results of this attack. Like the car bomb at the beach the previous November, the attack against the convoy could be judged to be a failure.

At the same time, it must be remembered that the cease-fire was beginning to break down. Artillery fire in the Chouf was intermittently resumed, as was the small arms fire against our marines. The terrorist threat remained vague, while the active threat from artillery and small arms was increasing.

What I have been trying to paint for you, sir, is a picture of Beirut for the past year. It is only within this framework or in the framework of this picture that we can have any hope of understanding fairly the tragic events of a week ago. It is a world where violence and normalcy live side by side, where marines are on a diplomatic mission while located in a busy airport complex whose traffic and congestion rival that of any major city. It is a marine unit whose well-being depends upon intelligence to protect itself. A marine unit which for months had undergone the indignity of attack with discipline and forbearance. A force of men whose morale remains high in spite of all that has happened.

I would like now to describe what we believe happened on Sunday morning, October 23, and why I believe that only extraordinary security could have met that massive and unanticipated threat.

At daybreak, as you know, a 5-ton capacity Mercedes truck—that is roughly the size of a large dump truck, and of a type that was commonly seen in Beirut International Airport by our marines—entered a public parking lot that was adjacent to the four-story, steel-reinforced concrete and sandbagged building which housed the headquarters of Battalion Landing Team 1/8. After making a complete circle within that parking lot it gained acceleration and while traveling at an extremely high speed, this truck crashed through the outer defensive barbed wire emplacements, moved at a high speed between two sandbagged sentry posts, passed through a gate in an iron fence, jumped over a sewer pipe which had been placed as an obstacle to impede the movement of vehicles, plowed through a sandbag barrier, hit with precision a 4-foot wide passenger entry into the lobby of the building, and by sheer velocity and mass wedged itself into the lobby where its cargo, estimated now by the Defense Intelligence Agency to be some 5,000 pounds of explosives, detonated.

The entire event, which can best be described as the delivery by a suicidal driver of a 5,000-pound truck bomb at very high speed, took approximately 6 seconds—6 seconds from start to finish. Rough calculations indicate that it would require a massive concrete wall to stop a vehicle of this weight and traveling at this speed.

It is of particular importance to note that the commander's security was oriented toward the threat of the past several months, that is to say, artillery, rockets, mortars, small arms, and car bombs. In this context, the security had been very adequate. Obviously, the commander's security arrangements were inadequate to counter this form of kamikaze attack, but in all honesty, I have yet to find any shred of intelligence which would have alerted a reasonable and prudent commander to this new and very unique threat. There was not even an indication of a capability to undertake such a monumental and precise action.

General Tannous, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, informed me during consultations that he cannot recall, in his vast experience, a terrorist attack of the type and magnitude which hit our headquarters on October 23. In his opinion, and in mine, this represents a new and unique terrorist threat, one which could not have reasonably been anticipated by any commander.

Almost simultaneously, a much smaller vehicle approached an eight-story building to the north of Beirut International Airport which housed the French contingent. Since this building is on a busy thoroughfare, there would be no reason to suspect its intention. As it approached the building, it accelerated. It took a sharp right turn into the driveway and forced entry into an underground garage where it exploded.

During my personal conversations with General Cann, the commander of the French contingent of the MNF, he informed me that he had no intelligence whatsoever that would have warned him of such a threat, and General Cann, I might add, is a man with considerable experience in that area. General Angioni, the commander of the Italian contingent, also informed me that he had no information concerning such a threat.

I believe it important to recognize that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that both instances were not suicidal attacks by some individual fanatic. They were instead well-planned and professionally executed attacks of terrorism which appear designed to force U.S. presence out of Lebanon.

To bring you up to date, it is my professional estimate that our marines have been targeted for terrorism by highly professional non-Lebanese elements. In my view, sir, these acts of violence will continue, and the perpetrators will carefully examine and analyze our vulnerabilities and make every effort to exploit them. In short, I firmly believe that highly sophisticated and well-trained terrorists will target our marines in the months to come. Therefore, I do not believe that we can ever create an effective passive capability which can counter all forms of terrorism in Lebanon or anywhere else, for that matter.

With the foregoing said, I would like to discuss initiatives which are underway or contemplated for increased security. The 24th MAU is in the process of decreasing vulnerability associated with large concentrations of marines in single locations. When I say is in the process, I mean they are moving out with dispatch, and my report to the President will be mostly after the fact. The day that this attack occurred they started to recognize that they had a new threat on their hands. But specifically, for the time being, Lebanese Armed Forces' APC's armored personnel carriers, have been positioned at the BIA terminal and at the traffic circle in front of the airport. Vehicle access to the command post is now restricted to emergency and military vehicles. Civilian pedestrian access to the command post has been restricted to one single location. MAU units have been placed in an indefinite condition one, the highest level of alert status. All entrances to the command post have been blocked and reinforced. All rifle companies have reinforced the perimeter fence lines adjacent to their positions. An additional 0.50 caliber machine gun has been positioned to cover avenues of approach into the command post. Additional guard posts have been established throughout the MAU area, and an additional rifle company was sent from Camp Lejeune to provide security during the period of recovery operations. Mobile reconnaissance patrols with antitank weapons have been established within the Beirut International Airport periphery. The Battalion Landing Team 2/6 command element arrived in Beirut, and it has already replaced the Battalion Landing Team 1/8 command element. Definitive action is underway to strengthen the 24th MAU positions and to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks by isolating and barricading command and control and support areas.

Of continuing personal concern to me, however, is the safety of our resupply convoys between Beirut International Airport and our security force at the temporary Embassy. An effective terrorism technique, one which has been used against us unsuccessfully already, is the parked vehicle, full of explosives, which is command detonated as our convoy passes. We can be as clever as circumstances permit, but there is no way to fully counter this threat. There are only so many alternative routes that we can use, and there are literally hundreds of parked cars. We are very vulnerable in this area, and it is merely a matter of time before we are attacked again.

In summary, I believe that our security measures were not adequate to stop a large, heavily laden truck loaded with 5,000 pounds of high explosives, traveling at a high speed, and driven by a suicide driver who executed the attack in seconds from start to finish. This flying truck bomb was an unprecedented escalation in our terrorist threat, both in size of the weapon and method of delivery. I must continue to emphasize, however, that under our current disposition, restrictions and mission, we will always have vulnerabilities, and the other side will make every effort to exploit them.

That completes my remarks, but I would like to make a few final comments which I think are germane. I recognize that there are many unanswered questions and a great deal of confusion surrounding this tragic event. For example, it was reported that the commander, Colonel Geraghty, stated that he received a warning of the threat 2 days before the incident. The following message from him clarifies what he actually said:

> Sir, comment made to the media was a general statement on car bomb warnings. At the weekly intelligence meeting between the Multinational Force Intelligence Officers and the Office of Beirut Security, the SURETE GENERAL, a listing of suspected car-bombs, complete with car descriptions and license plate numbers is disseminated to the MNF by security officials. These car descriptions are copied and disseminated to our posts. Since our arrival, at least 100 potential car-bombs have been identified to the MNF. After the attack on our convoy on 19 October 1983, the car-bomb threat was quite obviously real to the U.S. MNF; however, specific information on how car-bomb attacks were to be conducted, i.e., kamikaze, or a description of the large truck that conducted the attack on the BLT were never received by 24th MAU.

Another example is what I was reported to have stated last week that security was adequate. Let me set the scene and the context in which my remarks were made.

Mr. Chairman, 5,000 pounds of high explosives destroyed a four story steel-reinforced concrete building. You had to be there to see the devastation. For 50 hours prior to my arrival, day and night, our young marines had clawed at steel and concrete, more to save the injured who were trapped at the time than to recover the dead. The emotional scars were already deep, and they are getting deeper. "Why me," they asked? "Why am I alive and why are my buddies dead?"

[Pause.]

Their Commandant was asked, "was security adequate?" I replied "yes". It was adequate to meet what any reasonable and prudent commander should have expected prior to dawn on Sunday, October 23, 1983. I want you to know that in that atmosphere, my remarks were not directed to the press; they were directed to weary and frustrated marines.

Let me phrase what I was saying in a different way. If you were to ask me whether the security around the headquarters building was adequate to protect the occupants against a 5-ton Mercedes truck carrying 5,000 pounds of explosives at high speed, my answer, Mr. Chairman, is an unequivocal "no." If you were to ask me, on the other hand, would a reasonable and prudent commander have sufficient cause to suspect such a threat from intelligence sources available to him, again, sir, my answer is, "no."

And if you were to ask me whether the commander should have known, given the explosion in the Embassy in April, my answer again is, "no." Both instances involved a terrorist bombing from a motor vehicle, but that is where the similarity ends. The delivery systems were totally different, as was every other aspect of the two incidents.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I have urgently requested, as you know, an impartial inquiry to determine the facts in an atmosphere that is conducive to such an inquiry. Knowing the Secretary of Defense as I do, and with the tremendous respect I have for Admiral Long, there is no question in my mind but that there will be a complete and thorough examination of this awful tradedy. I truly suggest that we all await the board's findings.

I could not conclude my report to you, or my remarks to you, without addressing the manner in which are reported our casualties. I know of your concern, and I share it. Our procedures have appeared to be excruciatingly slow. Please understand that in the impact of the destruction of the BLT headquarters and the tragic loss of life, our casualty reporting records for that BLT were destroyed. The requirements placed on the survivors to extricate and evacuate the killed and wounded marines as soon as possible, and the necessity to proceed slowly with regard to reporting for the sake of accurate identification and notification of next of kin were staggering.

Due to the size of the task at hand and the painfully slow progress in this regard, the decision was made to release the names of those marines who survived this disaster. We did not do this before for obvious reasons. The process was slow mainly because of the need for complete accuracy. We didn't want to hurt anybody, particularly loved ones, needlessly. Marines and members of your staffs worked tirelessly to insure that timely and accurate information was released. The enormity of the situation is still upon us, and no one could feel more remorse than I for the prolonged suffering caused many families by an unavoidable delay in notifying them of their loved one's status.

The Marine Corps, Mr. Chairman, is proud of many things, but nothing more than the way we take care of our own. I want each of you to know that everything humanly possible is being done to facilitate this process, but I would like to thank you and your staffs for your assistance and your understanding.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say, with as much emphasis as I possibly can, that the subject of increased terrorism against all Americans around the world may be one of the most serious problems which could be addressed by this committee on a priority basis. This unprecedented, massive kamikaze attack was not against young marines, sailors, and soldiers. It was a vicious surprise attack against the United States of America and all that we stand for in the free world.

Let me say, without reservation, that there are skilled and professional terrorists out there right now who are examining our vulnerabilities and making devices which are designed to kill Americans, lots of Americans, around the world in further acts of mass murder by terrorism. Let there be no doubt about that.

I would hope that the Congress would use this incident of cruel and premeditated mass murder to help us determine ways which tell nations that they cannot export and support terrorists who kill innocent Americans with impunity.

The perpetrators and supporters of this challenge to the rights of free men everywhere must be identified and punished, and I will have little sleep until that happens.

That concludes my remarks, sir.

Chairman Tower. Thank you, General Kelley.

General Rogers, do you have any comments that you would like to make or anything that you would like to add to what has been said by General Kelley?

STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, U.S. ARMY, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE; COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General Rogers. I have very little to add to what General Kelley has said. As a responsible officer in the chain of command, since the marines are attached to my command, the European Command, I would just like to point out that my Deputy Commander in Chief, General Lawson, went to Beirut just prior to General Kelley's arrival this past week for the purpose of meeting with not only our commanders, but also the commanders of the other contingents in the multinational force. He prepared with all commanders a series of actions that should be taken, some of which have been covered by General Kelley.

Chairman Tower. Are you referring to General Lawson of EUCOM?

General Rogers. Yes, my deputy in my United States role. He is the Deputy Commander in Chief of the European Command. There are some recommendations that have been forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which they have under consideration today. I would anticipate some of those actions will be approved and be implemented in addition to those that have been related by General Kelley.

Chairman **Tower**. Are they consistent with those recommended by General Kelley?

General **Rogers**. Absolutely consistent, because General Kelley and General Lawson met with the commanders on the ground as they presented those actions which they believed should be taken in the aftermath of this tragedy.

I will just tick off some of them. One has to do with intelligence. [Deleted.]

Steps are being taken—and they must be taken at a national level—to insure complete coordination and dissemination of this intelligence information on a timely basis. That is very important.

Meantime, Ambassador Bartholomew is insuring that within the U.S. community such intelligence will be coordinated and fully disseminated, and that includes the intelligence which he gets from the U.S. National Intelligence Agencies.

There is another need to increase the support by the LAF, the Lebanese Armed Forces, for all types of security to include the security of the MNF by controlling the movement of people and equipment, by establishing and maintaining roadblocks. Hopefully we can turn over to the LAF one area which is somewhat vulnerable where a company is located at the University. Steps are being taken to implement that turnover. The road to the airport has been reduced to one lane. There are additional blockades upon that road, but we must insist that the LAF man those roadblocks for which they have the responsibility, and I cannot say to you in all candor that that has occurred. We anticipate that it will.

Others are passive defense measures, most of which have been covered by the Commandant. Handing over the position that I mentioned at the university is a key recommendation.

Another recommendation is that all those who have administrative and logistics duties should be kept afloat so as to reduce the numbers ashore who are vulnerable. Whether or not that will be agreed, I do not know, because that gives the appearance of our cutting and running to a certain extent, and is a decision that has to be taken at a fairly high level. That is before the JCS at this time.

We are concerned about fleet security. A reporter can go to Lebanon, he can hire a small aircraft, and he can overfly the fleet, and one damned near got shot down the other day because he did just that. I anticipate he will get shot down if he does it again because aircraft must understand that any attempt to attack the fleet will cause them to be shot down. It is difficult to tell what is aboard an aircraft, and when you have those who seek paradise in the afterlife by this kind of terrorist attack, one must be extremely careful.

So there are a number of things that still need to be done. I have not covered by any means all of the recommendations, that are before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I would expect action to be taken on them very soon.

I would just like to underscore, if I could, the valor of those marines. You know, the commander thought that with the information he had available that he was doing those kinds of things within the parameters of human judgment that prudence calls for. Yet we all know, all of us in the chain of command know that it was not enough to prevent the attack and loss of 239 lives.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from General Lawson, the DCINC, who closed his report to me saying:

> I will just close by saying that I have been proud of my profession for all my career, but I have never been more proud to be an American than I have during the past 2½ days. The continued dedication and resolve of the youngsters there in response to that attack upon them has been nothing short of magnificent. Their performance stands as a beacon to free men and women everywhere and clearly answers those who have questions about the dedication of Americans to the cause of freedom, regardless of the price.
>
> Our challenge, the challenge of us leaders, is to fulfill that mission with the absolute minimum cost of life and suffering.

That was the intent prior to the attack, and it continues to remain our intent. We were not successful on this one occasion.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General.

Gentlemen, I would suggest that we confine our questioning only to those matters that are sensitive and should be responded to only in closed session. I would suggest if any of the questions you pose can be answered in open session that this be indicated and that you reserve those so that we can move as soon as possible into the open session.

I would propose to limit the questions to 3 minutes.

I do not believe I would have any questions myself to ask, and if you believe you can reserve your questions for open session, I hope you will do so.

Anything that has to do with detailed security arrangements I assume probably should be reponded to in closed session.

Am I correct, General?

General KELLEY. We do not really have much more than what we have already told you with regard to that, but I do think the security arrangements in any context probably should be responded to in closed session, yes, sir. There is no sense in tipping our hand as to what we are doing.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the General, are you speaking about the details of the security?

General KELLEY. I am sorry, sir. I did not hear the question.

Senator THURMOND. If a question should be asked concerning the general security and not the specifics, should that be asked here or in the open session?

General KELLEY. That is fair for the open session. Everything in my statement is unclassified. The fact that we have a tank sitting astride a road at the entryway going to our Marine Amphibious Unit Headquarters, I do not consider classified information. The tank is sitting there. So those kinds of things we can talk about in open session.

Chairman TOWER. Why don't we just proceed with the questioning, and why don't you identify, then, those questions that you think can be answered in open session and we will defer those.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. I have just a couple of questions.

General Kelley or General Rogers, I will direct this to both of you. You have alluded to it already. What are the remaining vulnerabilities that you believe we should be most concerned about after you take all of the steps that you can envision now to beef up our security? What kind of vulnerabilities will remain? What do you most fear that you cannot adequately address?

General KELLEY. I will try that first. The vulnerability is from all forms of terrorism. We just do not know from what direction they will come. General Rogers suggested the aircraft that went over the fleet. That bomb that went off at our BLT headquarters—and I call it a bomb—was a 5,000-pound bomb and it could just as well have been introduced by a Cessna aircraft in that area. It did not have to be delivered by a truck. Those are the kinds of vulnerabilities that we have.

If that terrorism threat increases, we have a whole spectrum from satchel charges right up to kamikaze attacks. They are there, Senator, and they are real.

Senator. NUNN. Are there deployments that could be changed that would address that and make the vulnerabilities less?

General KELLEY. Yes, there are. But what we are experiencing, of course, and what we will have in almost any deployment you want to take, as an example, is [deleted] a change of perception.

Let me give you an example of what I am talking about. [Deleted.]

There are other options that one could look at. We could [deleted]. But then it is a question of living with the problem of moving convoys or patrols lengthy distances in order for them to be seen.

Perhaps another option which has been looked at is to [deleted], Senator Nunn, that might have been a decent option when we went into Lebanon [deleted].

So we really have a fundamental problem.

Senator NUNN. So no matter what we do, you consider our position still vulnerable there in terms of terrorist attack?

General KELLEY. There is no position that you could think of that would not be vulnerable to one type of attack or another. It just so happens that right now that is the technique used by the other side and it is quite obvious why they do that. We have tremendous combat capability in the area, as manifested by the *New Jersey* and also the aircraft carrier *Eisenhower*. They know that. If they strike us with conventional weapons, then we have the ability to retaliate with some fairly significant fire power. If they strike us with a terrorist attack, however, whom do you hit?

Therein lies the nature of the problem with terrorism, and the urgent request that we look at that as the problem.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

I do have a code-word question, but I will reserve that until everything else has been completed.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I think the questions I have don't go into detail, so I will just wait until later to ask them and save time.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a general question.

You mentioned intelligence in your statement. I don't know that I fully understood all that you said. For emphasis, it wouldn't hurt repeating the intelligence problem.

General **Rogers**. [Deleted.]

My deputy, when he visited there, did not think that that has been adequately pursued. It will be now.

Senator **Stennis**. I suppose my time is up. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Senator Warner?

Senator **Warner**. Do you have any intelligence to the effect that forces inimical to ours might be able to get one of the Syrian missiles and target any element of our forces with that missile?

General **Kelley**. I don't have any intelligence in that regard, [deleted].

Senator **Warner**. Well, General, that leads to my next question.

I have been supporting the President and this deployment, but I am now beginning to be greatly concerned in view of what you have said, both of you collectively, about our ability to protect our forces.

Are we now just leaving our people there in positions that are exposed to forms of terrorism which no man can foresee and protect against?

If so, is that price justified?

General **Kelley**. I can't answer that, sir. I cannot answer the latter part of your question. I can only say as a professional senior military officer that our troops will be vulnerable to terrorism in those circumstances. Our troops in Europe are vulnerable also to terrorism on a day-to-day basis.

What we need, in my opinion, is a national policy which says that we make extraordinary efforts to run down the perpetrators and we hold the host country responsible for their actions.

Now, that is sort of a grand and glowing statement. I don't mean to be up on a lofty plane, but I think that is what is necessary. We in the military can only do so much against that kind of attack. We cannot stay in a Fortress America.

Senator **Warner**. I am aware of that, but are you prepared at some point in time to advise the President, the Commander in Chief, and say, "Mr. President, I can no longer afford protection to my men."

General **Kelley**. I can only advise the Commander in Chief, exactly as I can advise you, that our forces, no matter what we do, are going to remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks that are unthought of. This was unthought of. Now that has to be weighed in the context of U.S. vital interests in the area and that is a decision, sir, that is somewhat above me.

General **Rogers**. Those of us who are threatened by terrorist attacks make an assumption that I think is applicable here, that the terrorist will always get the first shot off. And there is no way that General Kelley and I can sit here and guarantee that irrespective of what we do, with the mission that we have, that we can guarantee that there will not be further terrorist attacks which may result in the loss of lives.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Exon?

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up, if I might, on the questions that have been raised by Senator Warner, I have two or three questions.

Do we have any protection with regard to the possible poisoning of the water supply? I assume the water supply comes out of Beirut someplace? Is that someplace where we are highly vulnerable, General?

General **Kelley**. Sir, a man who wanted to go in and poison the water supply and kill us with that kind of warfare could kill us off. You see, we are walking into new areas of terrorism. I consider this to be an escalation. I have talked to experts in international terrorism, and they have never given me a precedent. They can't give me a precedent for the incident that happened on the 23d of October. We continually escalate. However, let me say this. We don't drink that water. We have our own filtration units and if poisoned water was a threat, we would change and drink ship water if we had to. But we have our own reverse osmosis machines, and I think the filtering system is quite good. Please don't hold me to saying that that is perfect. Nothing is perfect.

Senator **Exon**. I understand.

You indicated in your prepared statement and then your following comment that we did have a tank positioned there.

Have we considered the possibility of ringing that building? We have plenty of tanks over there somewhere. We can use them if we need them; can we not?

General **Kelley**. Well, the whole area does have walls around it, and there are other ways to do it that are probably less expensive than surrounding it with tanks. We put tanks at the normal entryways. You have to realize that the avenue of approach of the attack—and that is just what it was, it was an attack—was a parking lot. It wasn't an area which is normally secured. It is not normally secured. We are convinced that the defensive barrier that we had across that parking lot—and we have agonized over this since a week ago Sunday—we are convinced that that was adequate to stop the threat at the time of a car bomb, and I emphasize a car. We have calculated that it would take the construction of a 10-foot-thick wall to stop a 5-ton Mercedes truck of the type that perpetrated this act going 60 miles an hour to probably have sufficient kinetic energy to penetrate a 10-foot-thick concrete wall.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you. I think my time is up.

I just want to correct one statement. I am sure you did not mean it that way, General, but you said something about costs. I mean, costs certainly are no factor with the conditions that the marines and you people find yourselves in today. I didn't think you meant that cost was a factor, and I just wanted to correct the record.

General **Kelley**. If I said cost, I did not mean it in the sense of dollars.

Senator **Exon**. I have no further questions.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Humphrey?

Senator **Humphrey**. General Kelley, your statement that it would take a concrete wall 10 feet thick to stop such an attack is impressive. Nevertheless, it seems to me that aggressors weigh the chances of success before they undertake a mission, and if there were a formidable appearing barrier which created uncertainty in the mind of a potential attacker, then you are way ahead of the game.

So my question is what have we done in the way of physical barriers, earthwork barriers, concrete barriers, or ditches, to at least create that doubt about success?

General **Kelley**. At this particular moment they have withdrawn into a Fortress America concept, with the idea that at this time that sort of incident could happen.

[Deleted].

Senator **Humphrey**. Why?

General **Kelley**. We need that kind of professional advice.

Senator **Humphrey**. Fine; let me interrupt you because my time is so short, and I apologize.

Chairman **Tower**. Is that classified?

General **Kelley**. Yes.

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, it seems to me that 300 to 400 marines or sailors in that building were an inviting target.

How many do we have in these concentrations, and are you saying at the same time that there are no physical barriers around this concentration?

General **Kelley**. Do you mean a physical barrier that would obviate all types of threats?

Senator **Humphrey**. Well, not all, but create uncertainty about success in the mind of an attacker.

General **Kelley**. Well, I still have to get back to my statement, sir, that if we did that, if we built a wall 20-feet high and 50-feet thick, and we had people in there, or any target that is lucrative, our adversary—and we are not talking about a hophead on hashish, we are talking about a sophisticated terrorist operation that is sponsored by a country——

Senator **Humphrey**. We understand that.

General **Kelley**. And so, the way around that would be, I might suggest, to breach that security by an airplane.

Senator **Humphrey**. But let's take them one at a time.

We are worried now about vehicles. Do we have no ditches or physical barriers?

General **Kelley**. They are in the process of providing adequate security now on the ground.

Senator **Humphrey**. Beyond what you said?

You see, as far as I can see, we still have no physical barriers even to create doubt in the mind of an attacker.

General **Kelley**. Oh, I would disagree with that, sir. I would disagree with that completely. We have significant physical barriers. There is no way they are going to get in. The whole place is surrounded by a wall, as you know, with the exception of the entryways, and all the entryways now are stuffed.

A truck would need a significant run to get up the kinetic energy to again do what it did. You don't have that significant run around there anymore. But now you are subjected to a different form of threat—the little old lady who pops a satchel charge over the wall.

So we have to do two things. We have to put the physical security there. They are in the process of doing that right now. But we have to realize that Colonel Geraghty has a very, very serious problem facing him. You saw the death and destruction and the rubble. So he has done that, added the physical barriers, and I think they have done that rather adequately.

But the other side of that coin is then to thin out the populations that are in the area so that we don't present a lucrative target. You see, that was the dilemma facing the commander prior to October 23. If someone had ever said to him that this kind of threat was even considered in the world, and there was no one in the world who had considered it, then he was delinquent if he didn't provide some sort of security. If it were a reasonable threat, he was delinquent, but no one ever said that.

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up, but I humbly urge you to disperse while we are arguing about these things.

General KELLEY. That is the thing to do, to disperse.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, did you indicate that the statement you made is or is not classified?

General KELLEY. My statement, sir, is not classified.

Senator LEVIN. Will copies of that be made available?

General KELLEY. Sir, I have never in my entire life worked for so many masters as I have in the past week.

Senator LEVIN. Did you say masters?

General KELLEY. I said masters. I did not say the other word, Senator. I never have.

If you want to, of course, you may see this statement which was being literally massaged in the car coming over; I just do not have a further prepared statement.

Senator LEVIN. Well, if it is unclassified, that is what is important.

General KELLEY. There is nothing in there that is classified.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General, how many sentry points were there of ours that the truck went past? Were they there, and was there live ammunition in the weaponry that was at those sentry points?

General KELLEY. Well, I can give you a conjecture, of course, but unfortunately I don't have the same ability as the press has of being on scene in swarms but, Jim, would you take a second to show an overlay of the exact position with the points?

Would that be permissible, Mr. Chairman?

Senator COHEN. It is in Time Magazine.

General KELLEY. No, sir, this is a little bit different.

Senator COHEN. Well, we have seen a lot of different graphs. I am not sure I want to use my time up.

General KELLEY. But this is an interesting story about the evolution.

Senator LEVIN. I am particularly interested in how many sentry points that truck went past, were they manned, and was there live ammunition in the weaponry at each point? Those are my questions.

General KELLEY. Let me answer irrespective of what other rumors have been existing, that there were no magazines in the weapons. That was on order of the MAU commander, and he thought that was the prudent thing at the time. I cannot say that I disagree with him. Circumstances may prove different, but I cannot say that I disagree with him. But I can say this, an M-16 rifle, irrespective of whether there was a magazine in it, would not have stopped that truck.

Senator LEVIN. How about a machinegun?

General **Kelley**. I have a serious doubt if they could do that. That truck was quite well protected, I would guess.

Sir, to give you an idea of the magnitude of the explosion, after most any explosion, the terrorist people tell me, you see or at least you recover the engine block. Well, there isn't any engine block. All that is left of that truck is the crankshaft, that is all.

[The diagram follows:]


FENCE
FENCE
1. GREY MERCEDES TRUCK ENTERS PARKING LOT, CIRCLING TWICE.
OPEN PARKING LOT
2. TRUCK ACCELERATES AND BREAKS THROUGH WIRE
NOT TO SCALE
RESTRICTED TO PUBLIC BLT PARKING LOT
P-7
P-6
3. TRUCK STILL MOVING AT HIGH SPEED, BYPASSES SENTRIES
GATE
POT SHACK
CLOSED GATE
SHOWERS
PIPE
EMPTY TENTS
BLOCKED
ENTRANCE
ROADWAY
ROADWAY
GUARD POST
PIPE
4. TRUCK SMASHES THROUGH GUARD SHACK AND DETONATES OVER 2,000 LBS OF EXPLOSIVES
FLAG POLE
GUARD SHACK
ACCESS ROAD
SANDBAG WALL
MOTOR 'T'
HQ BLT BUILDING DESTROYED

General **Mead**. Let me show you this. I was the commander that initially went in in September, and went back in again in February. So I have about 7 months ashore, and a lot of these defenses were the product of my thinking and my response to the threat.

The one you are very concerned about now obviously is from the BLT command post through the double concertina wire which was put in after the bombing of the American embassy and, prior to that, these positions were reinforced as sandbagged positions here, an area which is about 75 meters across. But in the process of the threat coming from this access [indicating], a car that would have to go through this type of position would be slowed down and could then be brought under fire from this avenue [indicating] to here, here, and here.

After it got through that, it had to go through a closed or open gate. Sometimes it was open. The reason it was open is because the Lebanese army would sometimes use the area because of their severely constrained training areas and, as you know, General Tannous only has a very short time to bring his force up to speed. So they used this area for training during the day.

So there is fire here, fire here, fire here, and then it would be through the gate. Now it has to negotiate a 16-inch thick pipe. Now it has to negotiate sandbags to get it to this particular building. So that is about a four layer defense.

What happened is that the truck penetrated through this defense because of the size of the vehicle coming through with such speed that they did not have time to bring it under fire.

The issue of the magazines in the rifles is the one that I agonized over terribly because here is a decision that I would have to make repeatedly. I had civilians surrounding this. I had a presence mission. If my marines got spooky at any time and brought people under fire needlessly, it would have created a situation we wouldn't like at all. So what we have done concerning magazines is we say, "Marines, I want a second or a second and a half for you to think before you engage."

Now, around the British embassy that built in delay is not so. The sentry's rules were that the minute anybody touched the fence outside the British Embassy, he was to fire. Why? Because we didn't have this 175 yards, we only had 25 yards around the U.K. Embassy.

It is an agonizing decision. Three commanders agonized over the same thing. If you have that magazine in, then do you blast anything that comes at you? But it is a diplomatic mission, so you don't want to fire indiscriminately. You have to make sure before you fire.

A new threat [indicating], and insufficient time to put the magazines in, obviously. Two marines on each post, and it didn't work.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Cohen?

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers seemed to imply that there was some difficulty with respect to the sharing of intelligence even among the allies who are part of the multinational force, or indeed, perhaps even within our own intelligence agency network.

General Kelley, you indicated that only an extraordinary amount of security could have prevented the particular attack. If there had been a generalized warning of an extraordinary type of attack that was imminent, what measures would have been taken?

General **Kelley**. Well, it is very difficult to address a broad question like that because the commander on the scene literally reads dozens of those kinds of reports a day. He has to then make a general value judgment that they are real, that they are within the realm of the probable. In this case, as an example, we evaluate levels of intelligence from A-1 up to F-6, and we also consider the sources and the intelligence agency giving us an evaluation of the source. If it is A-1 and that commander didn't take prudent action to vacate the building and to put in an extensive perimeter, bring in Dragons, bring in TOW's and do all those kinds of things, if that happened, he would be relieved on the spot.

Senator **Cohen**. First, did the commander receive such information?

Second, what was the quality attributed to it?

General KELLEY. The answer to your question is that the commander had absolutely no information, and no commander in Lebanon—or any commander in the United States of America—had that kind of information. A defense attaché who just came back from Beirut to retire who in fact was out there, a marine named Craig, said, "Never in a million years would I have ever thought that something like this would be possible."

Senator COHEN. General, what are the rules of engagement there? I assume they are classified?

General KELLEY. Yes.

Senator COHEN. Would it be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, that they be a part of this classified briefing? I think it important that we understand exactly what peacetime rules of engagement are comprised of so that we know what restrictions these gentlemen are under.

I would like to request them for the record, but I will withhold that until you pass judgment on that.

Chairman TOWER. It is my understanding that the rules of engagement are unclassified.

General KELLEY. I believe they are classified.

Chairman TOWER. Well, since they are classified, I would suggest we have that submitted for the record, and that will be part of the classified record.

General ROGERS. They are not his rules of engagement, Mr. Chairman, they come from the chain of command.

Chairman TOWER. I understand that. They are not his.

I am informed that we already have that in the record and that the transcript is available to members of the committee.

Senator Kennedy?

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think I say the obvious, General Kelley, when I say that I think all of us understand that certainly no American grieved more deeply than you except perhaps the members of the families. I hope you understand that these are questions that really relate to the broad responsibility that we have, but I felt it important at least at the outset to mention this.

During the course of your statement and comment of the others, we hear about how you view your mission as one of presence. You are talking about the civilians around the compound. You are talking about visibility with which the marines have to maintain themselves.

I would like to know as a military trained person and one whose capacities, capabilities, knowledge, and career have been devoted to the military and the marines, how do you believe the political mission which you have defines the military mission you have to live with?

General KELLEY. Defines, sir?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes. It seems to me that an awful lot of the responses to the questions you gave here are as a result of political considerations. Presence is a political consideration that might be considered by some to be military, but it is a political consideration.

General KELLEY. Indeed they are, but historically the military has been used as an instrument of politics. By law, the marines do perform such other missions as the President may direct. We have historically done things like this. I was talking to a retired marine general the other day, General Krulak, a very respected officer, who reminded me that in 1937 the marines were almost in the identical position in Shanghai, China. They were positioned between the Japanese and the Chinese, shells were lobbing over back and forth, and every time one landed, if we could identify where it came from, we fired back. But it was a presence mission. It was a diplomatic mission. We tried to keep some peace and stability.

So it is not a totally new mission. I think that the military, without getting into the esoterics, the military is an instrument of foreign policy, and therefore you just cannot view this as a classic tactical mission. You use us as we can best be used.

Senator **Kennedy**. Well, if I could get just a response, how do you find the political considerations are dictating your military position in terms of protection of your troops?

General **Kelley**. Well, the political considerations mean that we are in the Beirut International Airport, which is a civilian airport, and this was done, in many cases, for political considerations. We also happen to be part of—and I think this point is overlooked all too often, Senator Kennedy, we are part of a multinational force. [Deleted].

So we have to weigh all of that against what is in the best interests of the United States. And that particular point is one that certainly should not be addressed by me.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Jepsen?

Senator **Jepsen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Who makes the rules of engagement that we talked about? Who is the last one who puts those out? Who is ultimately responsible for how we look at them?

General **Rogers**. I will take that, Mr. Chairman.

The responsibility lies with the theater commander, namely, me, to determine what those rules of engagement are. They are then submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval. Whether or not they are submitted to the Secretary of Defense for his approval, I do not know.

Senator **Jepsen**. You mentioned intelligence, general.

Do we have access to and utilize the intelligence of the Israelis in our situation over there?

General **Rogers**. There was a time when they did use it. Frankly, I would have to have the Director of Central Intelligence answer that question specifically; [deleted].

Chairman **Tower**. That input is not made directly to you in any case?

General **Rogers**. No; it is not.

Chairman **Tower**. That would be a foreign intelligence service, and that goes to the Agency, doesn't it?

General **Rogers**. In my U.S. role, that is correct. In my international role, I get information from other nations, but not from Israel in that NATO role.

Senator **Jepsen**. I just asked that essentially, Mr. Chairman, because day in and day out when they were undertaking roles over there, it seems to me the Israelis get the job done, and their intelligence seems to be pretty good. We didn't use those hospitals. That is something I will get into later on. We didn't use their facilities for medical care.

I was there, as you know, earlier this year, and we couldn't communicate with them at all even though there was reconnaissance by fire right along side of where our troops were. Somewhere or somehow in this whole thing we are going to find out who is responsible for making those decisions.

It doesn't make sense. And by the way, General, I don't think it is the military.

Chairman TOWER. Do you have any more questions, Senator Jepsen?

Senator JEPSEN. No, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Bingaman?

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kelley, were there any security surveys done on the encampment there, on the compound, whatever the reference would be, by agencies other than the marines?

General KELLEY. I would suggest that there were not.

Senator BINGAMAN. To your knowledge there were not?

General KELLEY. To my knowledge, no, and I will ask General Mead--he has just confirmed—that would not be a normal procedure.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me just followup what I think Senator Kennedy's question was. As I understood the explanation of the reason why these sentries did not have magazines in their M-16's, it was that the mission was one of presence, that there were civilians around, and there was concern about possibly causing an incident by virtue of someone getting shot who shouldn't be.

To that extent, is it accurate to say that the mission of presence did restrict the extent of our precautions against this type of incident?

General KELLEY. Well, in an indirect way, it always would. I would suggest that in my opening remarks, in trying to describe the atmosphere, I said we were in a friendly country, at least a country that was a sovereign nation, at the invitation of the legally constituted government and, therefore, we were not there to shoot people.

So it is like the policeman on his block who keeps his pistol holstered. In most police departments that is a requirement. You keep it holstered until you are going to use force.

So this is not totally different from that. You have a young marine out there. If you put a loaded magazine in your M-16 rifle, there is always the opportunity for an accidental discharge that is going to kill an innocent civilian. It doesn't take that long to put a magazine in an M-16 rifle. Everybody seems to think it is a long and involved process. A marine could do that in a matter of one or two seconds.

So the threats that are normally associated with those sentry posts are not ones that materialize in something less than that.

In this particular case, from start to finish, it was 6 seconds. He had long since gone by the sentry post in probably a second or two. He traveled that whole distance from the barrier to the building and exploded in 6 seconds.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. I might note that when I stood gangway watch in the Navy that we did not carry clips in our pistols. We had them in our belts, and we were instructed when to insert them at different times.

Senator LEVIN. Was that in Beirut?

Chairman TOWER. Oh, no, it was another situation.

Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. General Kelley, General Rogers mentioned that there was a possibility that at the university where there is an outpost, I believe, we may be able to get more assistance from the LAF.

Are we in the process of turning that responsibility over to the LAF, or are we going to stay there?

General KELLEY. Let me talk to that, Senator Quayle.

[Deleted.]

Senator QUAYLE. At the university.

General KELLEY. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Did you say in your statement that the troops which have replenished the marines on shore are made up more of combat troops than administrative support?

General KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator QUAYLE. Is that under consideration, to change the composition of our troops on the ground?

General KELLEY. I think what General Rogers mentioned was we are in the process of identifying what can be moved back aboard ship. You know, we always work against conflicting priorities in this.

For instance, last year, General Barrow took extraordinary heat from all quarters around this country because our marines weren't being fed hot chow, and the French were downtown drinking wine and doing all sorts of things, yet there were our poor marines.

As a consequence of that we reluctantly moved the chow halls ashore. You know, you are damned if you do and you are damned if you don't. It is that kind of proposition. So if we move the chow halls back aboard ships, then the kids have to go on rations again and get one hot meal a day. That is the kind of dilemma we are faced with.

We are looking at each and every administrative function to see what can be comfortably moved back aboard ship.

You know, Senator Quayle, we could deprive this young marine of all of the creature comforts, but that kid is still going to be there for 6 months, and you can't live in a hole for 6 months. So there has to be something that you give him.

It is a matter of conflicting demands all the time. In Vietnam, as an example, every single position that I know that the U.S. Marine Corps occupied, every single one was vulnerable in one way or another to an artillery attack. We didn't have big overhead bunkers except in the command posts, and if somebody came in with a surprise artillery attack, that wasn't the nature of the threat at the time. So we always have these conflicting demands.

Senator QUAYLE. I have just one final question as my time is up.

Would you describe what you think is the biggest terrorist threat specifically, whether it would be on land or to the ships that you perceive from the intelligence that you have?

General KELLEY. Well, the one that is still currently identified as a threat is the car bomb.

Now, I repeat, car, not truck.

Senator QUAYLE. Along the road, the one along the road?

General KELLEY. We have taken adequate protective measures to obviate the threat of the car bomb that nuzzles up—and this is what happened at the Embassy—it just nuzzled up to the Embassy in broad daylight. There is no forcible entry. There is no protection on the Embassy. It is just nuzzled up there and blows up.

Well, they can't do that to us. You know, if one did it tomorrow, don't hold me to it, but we have adequate protective measures that make it unreasonable for us to think that they could do that. But the car bomb along the road is the one that is really a threat.

Chairman TOWER. Senator East?

Senator EAST. General, I would like to commend you on what I think has been a very valuable and candid statement. I come out of this with a very pessimistic view of our men being able to continue to maintain any sort of viable military, and candidly, political position there. It seems to me you compound the pessimism.

I would appreciate your clarification of just this one point, and I will be brief because I know our time is limited.

You say the only way that you could prevent this sort of act of terrorism, whether it came from the air, the ground or the sea, is through retaliation against the host country. I simply wonder in this particular case who our intelligence would indicate is the host country, Iran, Syria or the Soviet Union? And if we are down to the point where it involves a retaliation against the host country as the only way to deter this, it strikes me as the ultimate in pessimism that this is a mission impossible being assigned to the Marine Corps. And I say that as an ex-marine officer myself who was stationed at Camp Lejeune, and as a Senator from North Carolina. I grieve deeply for the great loss of life there.

I guess it is the intelligence question that I am asking because I know a lot of this will be in open session. Who is the host we would retaliate against according to your intelligence?

General KELLEY. General Rogers?

General ROGERS. We don't know.

Senator EAST. Can you find out?

General ROGERS. That is being worked on by the intelligence community. Whether they have reached a decision yet, I am unaware, but I don't believe they have.

You know, there was some circumstantial evidence about the [deleted]. All that I am aware of up to this point is just that circumstantial evidence. Whether or not the Director of Central Intelligence has put his finger on the terrorists without circumstantial evidence, I don't know.

General KELLEY. I would like to just dwell on that for a minute because we cannot deal in absolutes. The question asked was can you counter all terrorist threats? Well, no, you can't counter all terrorist threats, but you can do a hell of a lot to counter the majority of them.

I am just giving you the caution that there are people out there who can devise all new sorts or types of threats. So I cannot sit before the Congress and say that I can devise the systems to counter those threats because some of them I probably don't even have the wildest imagination about.

Senator EAST. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. General Kelley, in your remarks, you mentioned the fact that convoys could be endangered by parked automobiles which could be remotely detonated.

Is there any way that that can be dealt with through the host country? I realize we are dealing with a limited number of access routes, but it seems to me with an action that is fairly predictable, you can foresee that the Lebanese would keep those routes clear.

I know earlier on some of the patrols, they were criticized as having indiscriminately sprayed along both sides of the road with machinegun fire. Perhaps it was not indiscriminate, and maybe there was a purpose, but it seems to me there might be a better way of achieving security.

General KELLEY. There are some ways that you could do that. Let me suggest that along those routes that I am talking about, those are not the roads where we are really lacing the area with fire. Commercial traffic or public traffic has moved up now to a normal tempo in Beirut, so we have literally hundreds of cars that are parked by the side of the road. This is a metropolis. We have to pass through that metropolis. As you can see, we cannot spray the area indiscriminately with 0.50 caliber machinegun fire.

[Deleted.]

So there are options that we can look at. The helicopter is an option, and that is a dilemma, because the helicopter has vulnerabilities downtown, too. It might be just a matter of time before someone takes on a helicopter as the landing vehicle.

So we have to weigh all of these considerations. Right now we had one incident, we have taken protections, we have fortified the vehicles. We are doing all of the right things that can be done. But what I am saying is it is only a matter of time before a determined guy who wants to get you on one of those convoys can probably find a way to do so if he really wants to get you.

Senator WILSON. Do you assume your position has been identified by air or by vantage from high ground so that the location of your people and your magazines is well known to everybody?

General KELLEY. That is a safe assumption.

Senator WILSON. I have nothing further for this session.

Chairman TOWER. There are two Senators that desire to ask code word questions.

Therefore, let me ask the staff to clear the room.

[Whereupon, at 3:39 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene immediately in code word session.]

OPEN SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 4:23 p.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, East, Wilson, Nunn, Stennis, Exon, and Levin.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Michael B. Donley, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, José E. Martinez, Bruce D. Porter, Patrick L. Renehan, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker and Judith A. Freedman, research assistants; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, Mary Kampo, and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Ron Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, and Robert Savitt, assistants to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; John Roddy, assistant to Senator East; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Frank Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Matthew Murray, and James Steinberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Tower. The committee will come to order.

On Sunday, October 23, the battalion headquarters of the U.S. military contingent serving as a part of the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon was destroyed in a brutal terrorist attack. This despicable act was perpetrated with one end in mind—to force a withdrawal of the U.S. presence from Lebanon.

In the aftermath of the attack, the President ordered Gen. P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, to Beirut. Although General Kelley is not in the military chain of command, he was directed to undertake a complete review of ways to provide better protection for the U.S. military contingent in Lebanon. On his return, General Kelley was to provide the President with recommendations to reduce the exposure and improve the security of the U.S. MNF contingent.

Today's hearing was called to enable the Committee on Armed Services to review the military situation in Lebanon and General Kelley and Gen. Bernard Rogers, who is commander in chief, U.S. European Command, is the operational chain of command of the U.S. MNF contingent in Lebanon.

The committee has just concluded a closed session with General Kelley and General Rogers regarding additional security measures that are now in place and which are planned in order to better protect the U.S. MNF contingent.

This public session is designed to review the military situation in Lebanon, with particular emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the bomb attack on the U.S. forces at Beirut Airport.

Since the attack, a number of questions have arisen regarding the security measures in place at the airport on the day of the attack. Some of the principal questions are: In view of the car bomb attack on the U.S Embassy in Beirut in April, what actions were taken by the marines to safeguard against a similar occurrence? Why were the kinds of safety measures that were used to protect U.S. diplomats in Lebanon after the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was destroyed not implemented to protect U.S. military personnel? Were the rules of engagement adequate to insure the safety of U.S. military personnel in Lebanon? These and other questions will be reviewed by the committee today.

Before hearing from General Kelley and General Rogers I would defer to Senator Nunn for any statement he may have to make.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for having these hearings in a very timely fashion, and I want to thank General Kelley and General Rogers for being here today.

All of us know that the terrorist bombing of our Marine Corps headquarters at the Beirut International Airport was a tragedy of immense proportions. First, I want to express my deepest condolences to the families of these fine young Americans who have died and my heartfelt wishes for the full recovery of those marines and sailors who were injured.

The questions that will be raised at this hearing are aimed at better understanding what took place and how a similar tragedy can be averted in the future. I would like to stress that neither the debate surrounding our presence in Lebanon nor the questions asked today reflect in any way on the valor or honor of those individual fighting men who are risking their lives and who have risked their lives for our country—certainly not those who have died or those who are injured or those who are still struggling under their orders in Lebanon today.

Whenever a military disaster occurs, whether it is in peacetime or wartime, it is imperative that we have a clear line of accountability and responsibility and that can only be done and undertaken by going up the chain of command. This must be done in order to preserve the critical concept of military command.

Fighting men are asked to obey command even at the risk of their lives. We are not looking for scapegoats today but we must insure that the integrity of the chain of command is maintained all the way to the top.

Mr. Chairman, I am asking for the record that the committee be provided with all communications relating to the security of our marines in Beirut from within the chain of command, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and between any of the above to which these witnesses were privy. I will ask that for the record. I know they do not have all of that with them today, and certainly we should respect any classified matter and will treat it accordingly.

I also believe, Mr. Chairman, that the committee should seek from the administration all such items, including those that I have named, that these particular witnesses may not have had access to and not been privy to but which nevertheless would shed light on the security of our marines in Lebanon.

The immediate problem we face in Beirut is protecting our marine force that is still there on the ground. There is now an abundance of reasons for implementing all appropriate security measures and precautions to insure that no incident even approaching this one again threatens our own Armed Forces in Beirut.

I believe there are serious questions as to whether enough can be done to properly protect our forces as long as they occupy the vulnerable positions in and around the Beirut International Airport. Military commanders are responsible for the day-to-day security of the marines, but we must not forget that keeping our marines in a basically vulnerable position is a political and diplomatic decision, not a military decision. Even so, even under those conditions, we want to do everything we can to protect the marines to the greatest extent possible.

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to having our open hearing testimony and I again thank the witnesses for being with us today.

Chairman **Tower**. General Kelley, we will ask you to present your statement. You may present it in its entirety for the record and then summarize, or you may choose to read it in its entirety. We would be delighted for you to proceed as you see fit.

At the conclusion of General Kelley's statement we will ask General Rogers for any additional comments he may have and then proceed to questions.

General Kelley?

STATEMENT OF GEN. P. X. KELLEY, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General **Kelley**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do choose to make remarks in their entirety and for a very good reason, Mr. Chairman—the potential exists for some 239 young Americans who are dead. We have a story and we owe it to the American public to tell that story.

On October 23, 1983, two suicidal drivers representing interests which are totally hostile to the United States of America and to the Republic of France conducted unprecedented and massive terrorist attacks, not against American marines, sailors, and soldiers, and French airborne troops, but against the free world.

While all Americans and Frenchmen are feeling the strong emotions resulting from this act, and while I am deeply saddened by the reason for my presence before this committee, I am relieved and heartened to know that today we start the process which I have sworn to defend all of my adult life. For the past week we have been groping at straws—asking ourselves the agonizing questions as to how this could happen, and for all of us it has been a week full of haunting speculation.

Today we start the process which was envisaged by our Founding Fathers. Today we start an orderly due process designed to provide the great citizens of this land with something they deserve—accountability. To insure that this process would remain fully intact, upon my return from Beirut I urgently requested that the Secretary of Defense conduct an inquiry into events leading up to the terrorist attack which took the precious lives of our Americans at 0622 on October 23.

We owe this to the loved ones of those who have been killed, to the American people, to the Congress of the United States, and, of tremendous importance to me, to our marines—past, present, and future.

With that said, Mr. Chairman, let me set the scene. Our marines are situated in the middle of Beirut International Airport. This is a highly commercial, active airport—the international terminal, if you will, for a country of over 3 million people. We are there as guests, not as invaders, so our facilities are provided in coordination with the Lebanese Government.

Picture, if you will, the commercial activity at this airport—people, cars, trucks, major new construction, repair. This is a civilian environment, a hubbub of activity by civilians, not military. This is not a tactical strong point, as some may envision. Our mission is not, in a direct sense, the physical security of the airport. That specific mission is assigned to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Our basic mission is presence, and the logical question is how do you define presence. Well, let me tell you that presence as a mission is not in any military dictionary. It is not a classic military mission. But the chain of command at the time correctly took presence to mean: be visible; provide a backdrop of U.S. presence which would be conducive to the stability of Lebanon, a sovereign nation with a duly constituted government.

I guess the best description is that we are a visible manifestation of U.S. strength and resolve to Lebanon and to the free world. Besides, given the area that we did occupy, the threat as described by all intelligence sources, and a highly active commercial environment which was literally crawling with civilians, it would have been impossible for the commander to establish a hard-point defense in a classic tactical manner. Again, please remember we were guests of a friendly nation. We were not there on occupation duty.

My remarks, Mr. Chairman, will take into account my trip to Beirut immediately following this terrorist attack. They include background information on the mission of the marines since their second entry into Beirut on September 29, 1982. I believe this background is absolutely essential to a complete understanding of what happened and how it could have happened.

These remarks will avoid any discussion of the political or diplomatic considerations of our presence in Lebanon. It is not the place, Mr. Chairman, for me as a serving military officer to discuss those imperatives for military employment. My remarks are based on historical facts as I know them at this time.

The facts clearly show that our presence in Lebanon has gone through phases, each different but clearly identifiable in the kaleidoscope of events over the past year. Each phase saw the threat to the security of marines ebb and flow in form and scope. Because of the ever-changing circumstances and events, our forces banked heavily on the information and the warnings of danger from the intelligence community, both national and multinational.

On the basis of this information, the marines sought to anticipate events and take protective measures rather than just react after an event. Subsequent to the successful evacuation of the PLO from Beirut from August 25 to September 9, the marines withdrew from Lebanon on September 10, 1982 and resumed their normal duties as part of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The marines, as part of the multinational force, returned to Lebanon on September 29, 1982. The Government of Lebanon requested the multinational force to restore order after the assassination of their President, Bashir Gemayel, and the tragic massacre of Palestinian refugees at the Sabra and Shatíla camps. The Lebanese *Armed Forces alone* were clearly unable to exercise control in Beirut and the surrounding countryside.

As I mentioned previously, the assigned mission of the MNF, simply stated, was presence. It should be clearly understood that this was basically a diplomatic or political mission, not a military one in the classic sense, and the positioning of marine forces at Beirut International Airport was not driven by tactical considerations. Moreover, the threats at the time, as reported to marines by the intelligence which was available, did not require tactical deployment. Indeed, the mission of presence mitigated against such measures. Put another way, the marines had to be seen by the Lebanese people.

The major threat when the marines returned to Beirut was from the accidental detonation of over 100,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance. This ordnance lay strewn and buried in and around the airfield, which was a no-man's land during the battle of Beirut.

The rules of engagement under which marines were to operate were carefully constructed and promulgated by the operational commander. These were normal peacetime rules of engagement. They were restrictive in nature but provided the right of self-protection and the right of self-defense. The mission and rules of engagement were considered appropriate and adequate for the environment and the threat.

During this phase, the marines were warmly greeted by the Lebanese people. Ordnance-clearing operations and civic action projects undertaken by the marines were appreciated by the populace. The security of Beirut International Airport was, however, and still is, the basic responsibility of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

In compliance with the mission, marine dispositions were made at the airport to accommodate the Lebanese Armed Forces and to facilitate construction projects that would return the airport to normal use. Until November, all went well.

At the beginning of November, we entered a new and more ominous phase. The marines had received intelligence reports that the passive-threat environment of the previous month had changed. The intelligence community reported that problems from dissidents had become not just a possibility but a probability. Armed with this intelligence, the commander on the scene prudently initiated a variety of appropriate defensive measures.

The combination of warning and preparation paid off on November 1, 1982, when a 300-pound car bomb was exploded on the main thoroughfare near the beach area over which marines received supplies from ships offshore. A review of the measures previously taken to safeguard the beach area reveals that the commander had hardened his beach positions, dispersed the beach support facilities, limited access to the beach, segregated all marines from civilians, increased his alert, and provided mobility at each checkpoint. The terrorist effort was clumsy, amateurish, and a total failure. With the failure of the car bomb, no further incidents occurred against marines during this period.

It was also during this period that the marines were authorized to begin an informal program to assist in the training of the Lebanese Armed Forces. This help was part of an overall effort to create a viable military entity which could eventually assume the security responsibilities for Beirut and later expand to greater Lebanon.

While in itself this training effort may not be germane to the October bombing incident, it may be relative to the local perception of the role of marines in Beirut. Some may have perceived that Americans were no longer exclusively in a presence role but that we were in an assistance role.

Motorized patrols were also initiated during this phase and were conducted in east Beirut to provide clear visibility of American presence. In the latter part of December 1982, marines were ordered not to patrol the old Sidon Road southwest of the airport. The rationale for this restriction is not immediately relative to the issue at hand, but it should be remembered that by the first of the year, for all practical purposes, our marine perimeter was limited to the commercial complex and the runways of Beirut International Airport.

In February 1983, the low-threat environment continued. The marines participated in a major rescue operation during a severe blizzard in the mountains east of Beirut. As part of the multinational force, they literally operated beyond Syrian lines rescuing both Christians and Moslems. These operations helped sustain the principle of evenhandedness and confessional neutrality. It also had a major impact on the credibility of our presence.

A new phase of the Beirut story began in March of this year. The situation began to deteriorate somewhat at that time. Although there was no intelligence of an increased threat, a 12-man marine presence patrol in a community north of the airfield was attacked by a grenade thrown from a building. It resulted in five marines receiving minor wounds. It was not predicted and was the first such incident against marines in some 4½ months.

Commanders immediately increased passive defensive measures such as varying patrol routes, times, and the size of patrols. In the opinion of some, about this time several Lebanese factions may have perceived a subtle shift of the U.S. MNF from being pro-Lebanese to pro-Christian.

In April, the tragic car bombing of the U.S. Embassy took place. Clearly, the United States was emerging as the prime target for those who either opposed or misinterpreted the role of the multinational force in Lebanon. The former reason is more likely in that the Italians and the French were also victims of terrorist harassment even though they were not significantly involved in the reconstitution of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Although I know of no intelligence warning which indicated that the spectacular car bombing of the Embassy was in the offing, there were renewed warnings that terrorist attacks were likely to continue. Car bombs were viewed as the most likely form of attack.

The Embassy bombing prompted several decisive steps to counter that threat. The marines provided a special protective detail for the temporary U.S. Embassy and initiated a significant number of increased security measures. A marine unit provided security and constructed defensive obstacles at the Ambassador's residence. Intensive efforts were made to increase intelligence sources in the immediate area of our positions.

As it pertains to the headquarters itself, civilian traffic was prohibited from the headquarters area. All civilian and military vehicles were searched in the proximity of the headquarters complex. Headquarters buildings and facilities were sandbagged. Over a quarter of a million sandbags were actually emplaced.

Barbed wire entanglements were emplaced throughout. Concertina wire was strung in the civilian parking lot in front of the headquarters. While the civilian parking lot adjacent to the BLT headquarters was ideally suited for a minefield in a tactical sense, mines were not emplaced as the lot served the commercial airport as a public parking lot and was actively used by civilians. Additional marines were posted in each guard post during high threat periods. Rooftop surveillance was increased. Foot patrols were increased within the headquarters area. A metal sewer pipe barrier was placed in front of the BLT headquarters building. Tunnels beneath the headquarters complex were sealed. The use of night observation devices was increased. Magazines were inserted in weapons at appropriate posts. Tank ditches had been contemplated, but they were considered impractical. There wasn't the kind of threat that required a tank ditch at the time and, besides, we were in a commercial, an active commercial, airport.

Throughout May, marines operated in a high-threat environment and continued to actively patrol, train the Lebanese Armed Forces, and to improve security. It was during June that there was a noticeable deterioration in relations with some factions of the local population. This was exacerbated by the reinfiltration of PLO elements into neighborhoods surrounding the airport.

Among other indications, verbal harassment was directed at our marine patrols. The first rocket and mortar attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces in Beirut International Airport complex occurred. Spillover of stray rounds came into the marine positions. The marines fully recognized the increased threat posed by this firing and continued to harden their positions by emplacing sandbags and digging in deeper. Marine and LAF patrols were also integrated. Intelligence then indicated that rockets and mortars would continue to be a primary concern to our troops.

During August, the periodic rocket attacks did increase against Lebanese Armed Forces targets, with a continued spillover into marine positions. It was decided at this time to remove the remainder of the BLT support personnel and a reaction platoon into the BLT headquarters building to afford them maximum protection against small arms, mortar, rocket, and artillery fire.

It should be pointed out that the building chosen was chosen because during earlier firing in Beirut it had endured furious Israeli artillery barrages without being destroyed. An Earth tremor in June, as an example, had failed to cause any structural damage. It should also be noted that in the 13-month period prior to the October 23 bombing, no marine billeted in that building was killed or wounded due to incoming artillery, mortar, rocket, or small arms fire.

In late August, armed conflict between the LAF and the AMAL militia in west Beirut began in earnest. On September 4, the Israeli Defense Forces withdrew to the Awwali River, bringing active fighting and factional conflict to the Alayh and the Chouf regions above Beirut.

Sustained hostile fire, some directed primarily at our marines, impacted at the airport with increasing frequency. The shooting in and around Beirut was at ammunition levels rivaling major battles in World War II—over 1 million rounds were fired. Our marines took appropriate measures to harden their positions, to increase their alert status, and to move all support personnel in the terminal complex into reinforced buildings for protection against this intense shelling. The shelling was sufficient to halt all operations at the airport. When fired upon the U.S. MNF fired at specific targets with appropriate counterbattery fire.

Our naval gunfire support for the Lebanese Armed Forces was a major influence on the subsequent cease-fire, but unfortunately some could conclude that it may have increased the Moslem perception that our marines were pro-Christian and no longer neutral. Be that as it may, I am in no position to judge. During this trying period of heavy fighting, the intelligence community continued to carry terrorist acts as an active threat, but the acts were nonspecific and they were very general and overshadowed by the very specific and very active reality of conventional military action. The cease-fire on September 26 brought a fragile and uneasy peace to Beirut, but sniping at marines became a daily occurrence.

This brought us to a new phase. The warnings of the terrorist threat resurfaced from the intelligence community. While terrorist bomb intelligence continued to be nonprecise, the focus of attention appeared to be the threat of car bombs to convoys providing support to the U.S. diplomatic community in Beirut. Roughly 100 car-bomb possibilities were developed since June 1983. In some instances, the makes, the colors, and the license numbers were provided. Marines on security duty received this information. All United States, French, Italian, British, and Lebanese Armed Forces units were constantly looking for suspicious automobiles—particularly as they related to convoys.

The threat became a reality on October 19, 1983, when a car bomb was detonated in an attempt to impede a marine supply convoy to the temporary Embassy about 12 kilometers from the headquarters. Alertness and protective measures already taken by the marines minimized the results of this attack. Like the car bomb at the beach the previous November, the attack against the convoy was judged to be a failure.

At the same time, it must also be remembered that the cease-fire was beginning to break down. Artillery fire in the Chouf was intermittently resumed, as was small arms fire against our marines. The terrorist threat remained vague, while the active threat from artillery and small arms was increasing.

What I have been attempting to paint for you, Mr. Chairman, is a picture of Beirut during the past year. It is only within the framework of this picture that you can have any hope of understanding fairly the tragic events of a week ago. This was a world where violence and normalcy lived side by side. It was a world where marines were on a diplomatic mission—located in a busy airport complex whose traffic and congestion rival that of any major city. It was a world where a marine unit's well-being depended upon the intelligence furnished to protect itself—a marine unit which had undergone for months the indignity of attack with discipline and forebearance. It was a force of men whose morale remains high in spite of all that has happened.

I would like to describe now what actually occurred from our information on Sunday morning, October 23, and why I believe that only extraordinary security could have met that massive and unanticipated threat.

At daybreak, a 5-ton capacity Mercedes truck, roughly the size of a large dump truck and of a type which was commonly seen at Beirut International Airport, entered the public parking lot adjacent to the four-story, steel-reinforced, concrete, and sandbagged building which housed the headquarters elements of Battalion Landing Team 1/8. After making a complete circle of the parking lot for acceleration and while traveling at a high speed, this truck crashed through the outer defense of barbed wire emplacements, moved at high speed between two sandbagged sentry posts, passed through a gate and an iron fence, jumped over a sewer pipe which had been placed as an obstacle to impede the forward movement of any car-sized vehicles, plowed through a sandbagged barrier, hit with precision a 4-foot wide passenger entry in the lobby of the building and, by sheer velocity and mass wedged itself into the lobby where its cargo, estimated now by the Defense Intelligence Agency to be 5,000 pounds of explosives, detonated.

The entire event, which can best be described as a delivery by a suicidal driver of a 5,000-pound truck bomb at very high speed, took approximately 6 seconds from start to finish. Rough calculations indicate that it would require a massive concrete wall to stop a vehicle of this weight and traveling at this speed.

It is of particular note that at this time the commander's security was oriented toward the threat of the past several months—artillery, rockets, mortars, small arms, and car bombs. In this context, their security efforts had been totally successful.

Obviously, the commander's security arrangements were inadequate to counter this form of kamikaze attack, but, in all honesty, I have yet to find any shred of intelligence that would have alerted a reasonable and prudent commander to this new and unique threat. There was no indication of a capability to undertake a task as monumental and with such precise action. General Tannous, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, informed me that he cannot in his vast experience recall a terrorist attack of the type which hit the headquarters of BLT-1/8 on October 23. In his opinion, this represents a new and unique terrorist threat, one which could not have been reasonably anticipated by any commander.

Almost simultaneously, a smaller vehicle approached an eight-story apartment building north of Beirut International Airport, one which housed the French contingent. Since this building is on a busy thoroughfare, there would be no reason to suspect its intention. As it approached the building it accelerated, took a sharp right into the driveway, and forced entry into an underground garage, where it exploded.

During a personal conversation, General Cann, the French commander in Lebanon, informed me that he had no intelligence that would have warned him of this threat, as did General Angioni, the commander of the Italian force.

I believe it important to recognize that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that both incidents were not suicidal acts by some individual fanatics. They were, instead, well planned and professionally executed acts of terrorism which appear designed to drive out U.S. presence out of Lebanon.

To bring you up to date, it is my professional opinion that our marines have been targeted for terrorism by highly professional, non-Lebanese elements. In my view, these acts of violence will continue and the perpetrators will carefully examine and analyze our vulnerabilities and make every effort to exploit them. In short, I firmly believe that highly sophisticated and well-trained terrorists will target our marines in months to come. Therefore, I do not believe that we can ever create an effective passive capability which can counter each and every form of terrorism in Lebanon or, for that matter, in any other part of the world.

With that said, I will discuss some of the initiatives which are underway or contemplated for increased security. The 24th MAU is in the process, I would say very much in the process, of decreasing vulnerability associated with large concentrations of marines. Specifically, we have placed Lebanese armed forces, APC's, at the Beirut International Airport terminal and at the traffic circle in front of the airport. Vehicle access to the command post is now restricted to emergency and military vehicles. Civilian pedestrian access to the command posts has been restricted to one location. MAU units have been placed on an indefinite condition 1, our highest level of alert status. All entrances to the command post have been blocked and reinforced. All rifle companies have reinforced the perimeter fence lines adjacent to their positions. An additional .50 caliber machine gun is positioned to cover avenues of approach into the command post. Additional guard posts have been established throughout the MAU area, and an additional rifle company was sent from Camp Lejeune to provide security during the period of recovery operations. Mobile reconnaissance patrols with antitank weapons have been established within the Beirut International Airport perimeter. Battalion Landing Team 2/6 command elements arrived in Beirut on October 25, and they have replaced, of course, the BLT-1/8 command element. Definitive action is underway to strengthen the 24th MAU positions and to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks by isolating and barricading command and control and support areas.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe first that our security measures were not adequate to stop a large, heavily laden truck loaded with 5,000 pounds of high explosives traveling at high speed and driven by a suicide driver which executed the attack in seconds from start to finish. This flying truck bomb was an unprecedented escalation in the terrorist threat, both in the size of the weapon and in the method of delivery. I must continue to emphasize, however, that under our current disposition, restrictions, and mission, we will always have vulnerabilities and that the other side will make every effort to exploit them.

That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to make a few final comments. I recognize that there remain many unanswered questions and a great deal of confusion surrounding this tragic event. For example, it is reported that the commander, Colonel Geraghty, stated that he had received a warning of the threat 2 days before the incident. The following message from him clarifies what he actually said:

> Sir, a comment made to the media was a general statement on car-bomb warnings. At the weekly meeting, intelligence meeting, between the MNF intelligence officers and the office of Beirut security, the Surete Generale, a listing of suspected car bombs, complete with car descriptions and license plate numbers is disseminated to the MNF by security officials. These car descriptions are copied and disseminated to our posts.
>
> Since our arrival, at least 100 potential car bombs have been identified to the MNF. After the attack on our convoy on October 19, 1983, the car-bomb threat was obviously real. However, specific information on how car-bomb attacks were to be conducted—that is, kamikaze—or a description of a large truck to conduct an attack on the BLT were never received by the 24th MAU.

Another example is what I was reported to have stated last week, that security was adequate. Here, sir, let me set the scene and the context in which my remarks were made.

Five thousand pounds of high explosives destroyed a building. It was a heap of rubble. For over 50 hours, day and night, young marines clawed at steel and concrete, more to save the injured who were trapped at the time than to recover the dead. The emotional scars were already deep, and they are getting deeper. "Why me?" they asked. "Why am I alive and why are my buddies dead?" Their Commandent was asked, "Was security adequate?" I replied, "yes." It was adequate to meet what any reasonable and prudent commander should have expected prior to the dawn of Sunday, October 23. I want you to know in that atmosphere my remarks were directed to weary and frustrated marines, not to the front page of the Washington Post.

Let me phrase what I am saying in a different way. If you were to ask me whether the security around the headquarters building was adequate to protect the occupants against a 5-ton Mercedes truck carrying 5,000 pounds of explosives at high speed, my answer would be an unequivocal "No." If you were to ask me, on the other hand, would a reasonable and prudent commander have sufficient cause to suspect such a threat from intelligence sources available to him, again the answer would be "No."

If you were to ask me whether the commander should have known, given the explosion in the Embassy in April, my answer again would be "No." Both instances involved a terrorist bombing from a motor vehicle, but that is where the similarity ends. The delivery system was totally different, as was every other aspect of the two.

For this reason, as I previously mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I have asked that we conduct an inquiry to get at all of the facts, and knowing the Secretary of Defense as I do, and with the respect I have for Admiral Long, there is no question in my mind but that there will be a complete and thorough examination of this awesome tragedy.

I could not conclude my report to you without addressing the manner in which we reported our casualties. I know of your concern and I deeply share it. Our procedures appeared to be excruciatingly slow. Please understand that in the impact of the destruction of the BLT headquarters and the tragic loss of life, our casualty reporting records for the BLT were entirely destroyed. The requirements placed on the survivors to extricate and evacuate killed and wounded marines as soon as possible and the necessity to proceed slowly with regard to reporting for the sake of accurate identification and notification of next of kin was staggering. Due to the size of the task at hand and the painfully slow progress in this regard, the decision was made to release the names of those marines who had survived the disaster. We did not do this before because of obvious reasons. The process was slow mainly because of a need for complete accuracy. We did not want to hurt anyone unnecessarily. Marines and members of your staffs worked tirelessly to insure that timely and accurate information was released. The enormity of the situation is still upon us and no one could feel more remorse than I over the prolonged suffering caused to many families by unavoidable delays in notifying them of their loved one's status.

The Marine Corps is proud of many things, but nothing more than the way that we take care of our own. I want each of you to know that everything humanly possible is being done to facilitate the process. I do want to thank you and all of the staff in the Senate Armed Services Committee for your assistance and understanding.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the subject of increased terrorism against all Americans around the world may be one of the most serious problems which could be addressed by this committee on a priority basis. This unprecedented, massive kamikaze attack was not against young marines, sailors, and soldiers. It was a vicious surprise attack against the United States of America and against all we stand for in the free world.

Let me say with all the emphasis I can that there are skilled and professional terrorists out there right now who are examining our vulnerbilities and making devices which are designed to kill Americans, lots of Americans, around the world, by further acts of mass murden by terrorism—and let there be no doubt about it.

I would hope—no, I would pray that the Congress would use this incident of cruel and premeditated mass murder to help us determine ways which tell nations that they cannot export and support terrorists who kill innocent Americans with impunity. The perpetrators and supporters of this challenge to the rights of free men everywhere must be identified and punished and, I must say, Mr. Chairman, I will have little sleep until this happens.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, General Kelley.

General Rogers, do you have anything that you would like to add to what has been said by General Kelley?

STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, EUROPEAN COMMAND

General **Rogers**. I could only add, Mr. Chairman, that last week prior to General Kelley's arrival in Beirut the Deputy Commander in Chief of European Command, General Lawson, visited Beirut, and at that time, working with those in the chain of command, developed actions which he and General Kelley believed to be prudent to implement, some of which have been mentioned by General Kelley.

Other actions have had to be forwarded to Washington for further evaluation by the appropriate personnel—namely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the present time—to determine whether or not those actions will also be implemented. They are in the field of intelligence, additional support from the Lebanese Armed Forces—those types of actions.

Chairman **Tower**. General Kelley, I am aware that the marines have no doubt agonized over the fact that their mission is to provide a visible American presence as a peacekeeping force, and had to balance that mission against the requirements of taking adequate measures for their own security.

Now in the light of what has happened with this terrorist attack, do you think this balance ought to be reexamined and perhaps tilted more in favor of providing additional security measures for the marines, even if it means some reduction of our visibility and possibly even some denigration of the mission?

General **Kelley**. Oh, I would agree with that completely, sir. We have in a sense a different environment. Our mission can still remain—presence—and I think we have to balance the risk of casualties against the degree of presence. I think we can do that. There are options that we are looking at right now which I think do that very well.

Chairman **Tower**. Do you have any recommendations about what we do in other areas where we have a U.S. military presence and where there are hostile anti-American elements present that could mount terrorist activity against us? What would be the implications, for example, of our withdrawal as a result of this action?

General **Kelley**. Well, my personal opinion—and I have had several trips to Lebanon—my personal opinion is that if the U.S. forces withdraw then, of course, the viability of a multinational force no longer exists and the multinational force would no longer be in existence as a viable instrument. If the multinational force no longer exists, I do believe that the Lebanese Armed Forces, which is still a fledgling armed force, would probably deteriorate.

Chairman **Tower**. General Kelley, are the rules of engagement appropriate for the marines in Lebanon, given the security risks to which they are exposed?

General **Kelley**. General Rogers may want to answer that, I think, as the unified command.

Chairman **Tower**. General Rogers?

General **Rogers**. The rules of engagement that have been approved, with some modified along the way, are adequate for the self-defense and protection of the forces there on the ground. I am speaking strictly to the subject of the rules of engagement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley, the press is reporting that the Lebanese Army's liaison with the marines had been warning marine authorities to strengthen their security for some time, and most recently just 4 days before the attack. Are you aware of this report? Do you have any comment on it?

General KELLEY. Well, I heard about the press speculation. We can't identify the Lebanese liaison officer. I was in the company of the only Lebanese liaison officer I know who was with the 24th MAU for a period in excess of 24 hours, and he certainly made no such comment to me, nor have I heard it from any reliable source.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley, in the aftermath of the car-bomb attack on our Embassy, was it not likely, in fact probable, that our military contingent in Lebanon faced a similar threat?

General KELLEY. Yes, it was, and we took all appropriate action to counter the car-bomb threat. There is no doubt in my mind that a car bomb could not have gotten into our compound.

If you would allow me to, I would like to just discuss this for a moment because a lot of people are confused, and think that there are great similarities. High explosives, Senator Tower, are common tools for terrorists around the world. Now, we accept that. That is well known and that is a given. The problem comes with identifying and countering the delivery means which can range in size from a letter bomb to an aircraft. Concerning the latter, it should be noted that the same level of destruction would have happened if an aircraft loaded with 5,000 pounds of the right explosive had crashed through the building.

Having identified the instrument of terror, last year we had a small pickup truck which pulled off the main road into the entranceway, the accessway to the U.S. Embassy—an accessway guarded by a lone Lebanese soldier. The truck pulled in. We do not know yet, because there is still some speculation whether the driver left the vehicle or stayed with it, but the vehicle did explode and did its damage. That was a pickup truck casually moving in off of a busy street in broad daylight.

What we saw this time was a dawn attack, an attack by a 5-ton Mercedes truck that bowled over all of our emplacements, that bowled over all of our defenses. This kind of terrorist act is unprecedented. So it was a totally different type of act.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley, there has been some criticism of the fact that we had so many troops massed in one building in a situation in which they were vulnerable. Were there security considerations involved in the decision to billet so many men in one building?

General KELLEY. As I mentioned in my statement, there were very good reasons for having those men in that building at that particular time. The intelligence threat was from terrorist acts; the real threat at the time was from artillery, rocket, mortar, and small arms fire. So it was the commander's decision to protect his men from the real threat.

Unfortunately, as history will show, that opened up vulnerabilities to another threat, but it was his decision at the time and it was based on what his real threat was. He had people who were being subjected to artillery, mortar, rockets, and small arms fire, and he provided them with protection.

Chairman TOWER. It did actually serve that function, then, in various circumstances where they were fired on?

General KELLEY. Oh, indeed it did, sir. As I mentioned in my statement, in the 13-month period that we occupied that building, not one single marine who lived or worked in that building was wounded or killed.

Chairman TOWER. That building was fired upon?

General KELLEY. Yes, that building was fired upon, yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kelley, on the distinction that you made between a car and a truck, is that the major distinction between the Embassy bombing and the bombing that occurred at your headquarters?

General KELLEY. No, sir. That is not the major distinction. The major distinction is in the way it was conducted. As I mentioned, one was a small truck, a pickup truck, that moved off of a busy highway in broad daylight against the undefended front of an Embassy. The other was a large truck which made a forcible entry at speeds we now estimate to be close to 60 miles an hour. It made a forcible entry and crashed through. It was not a lazy moving up under the Embassy overhang. This crashed through.

I guess it would be, Senator Nunn, if somebody said that you wanted to protect your front yard against people parking their cars in your front yard, you would put up a sufficient fence, but if an 18-wheeler came down the street going 60 miles an hour, that chain link fence is not going to do you much good at all.

Senator NUNN. I do not recall the Embassy situation well enough to remember whether there was a suicide mission or not. Was that a suicide mission or was the truck simply parked there?

General KELLEY. There is still speculation as to whether the driver remained with the vehicle or he did not.

Senator NUNN. Is that a big distinction here because it seems to me that if someone was on a suicide mission in terms of the Embassy that it might be reasonable to assume, or if there were strong suspicions that someone else might go on a suicide mission, and it seems to me if that is the case the difference between a small truck and a large truck is not that determinative.

General KELLEY. Well, Senator, I think the difference between a truck that parks next to a building in broad daylight and then explodes is significantly different from a 5-ton Mercedes truck that plows its way and bowls through your defenses. I see a significant difference, sir.

Senator NUNN. But did you not say that that type truck was seen often around airports?

General KELLEY. Sir, that type of truck is a common truck around the Beirut International Airport. It is used all of the time. There would be no reason for that sentry to be suspicious as that truck pulled into the commercial parking lot.

Senator NUNN. It seems that that is contrary to your previous point, though. If you could not have expected that size vehicle to come barreling through, then it seems to me that that is not consistent with the statement that that truck was seen all the time around the airport. Why would it be unreasonable to assume that a truck that was in common use around the airport might be utilized for this type of mission?

General KELLEY. Sir, no one had ever experienced this kind of technique before—the technique of charging through defensive positions and forcing your way in. The technique had never been experienced before.

Senator NUNN. Well, of course it seems to me the key there is whether you anticipate a suicide mission, because anybody who is willing to commit suicide would do whatever is necessary to get in. Did you anticipate a suicide mission?

General KELLEY. I think you always are alert to the possibility of suicide missions, but I am not sure that that is a totally relevant thing, whether the terrorist is going to commit suicide or not. We should make that assumption. The kamikaze mode of attack, which this was—this was a kamikaze attack. We did not have any total defense for it in World War II, and we do not have a defense for that kind of kamikaze attack in 1983.

Senator NUNN. Well, I can certainly appreciate the difficulty of defending against that kind of situation.

The description of the environment that you made in your statement—and I do not have a copy of it; I know you do not have copies at this time—but the best notes that I have indicated that you said this was a highly active commercial environment. Is that right?

General KELLEY. That is exactly true, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you said it was a civilian environment, not a tactical location, a tactical point for military deployments in the traditional sense.

General KELLEY. That is right, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you said the mission is presence. Our mission in Lebanon is primarily presence.

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And you said presence means being seen.

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. And I think you repeated that this was a diplomatic or political mission, not a military mission in the normal sense.

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. I believe you also said that the mission is not security of the airport. Is that right?

General KELLEY. That is true, but let me add to that the Lebanese Armed Forces have that mission, but by virtue of our presence on the airfield within the airport, we certainly help them in the accomplishment of that mission. We provide a backdrop which provides them with some security.

Senator NUNN. But the primary responsibility for securing the airport is the Lebanese Army?

General KELLEY. The primary basic responsibility for security of the Beirut International Airport is the Lebanese Army.

Senator NUNN. General Kelley, President Reagan made a speech the other night, and in that speech, which I will quote very briefly from, he says, and I quote:

> The operational mission of the Marines, the answer is to secure the peace of Beirut, to keep order in their sector, and to prevent the area from becoming a battlefield. Our Marines are not just sitting in an airport. Part of their task is to guard that airport.

It seems to me that that is inconsistent with the mission of presence. Either our primary mission is to secure the airport or the airport security mission is that of the Lebanese Army.

General KELLEY. I do not think it is totally inconsistent, Senator. What that refers to is there are company positions along the perimeter of the Beirut International Airport which do provide a certain element of security. That is a fact. But the responsibility for the security of Beirut International Airport belongs to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Senator NUNN. Well, that is not our primary mission in Lebanon.

General KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. That gets to the question of how well prepared the Lebanese Army is now. I am concerned about the security we have right now. We know that we have small arms, mortar, rockets, that kind of attack on our forces almost daily, do we not, still?

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. What kind of ranges are those arms coming from? How far out from your perimeter does most of that small arms fire come from?

General KELLEY. Well, within small arms range, if we are talking about small arms, we are talking about several hundred meters. If you are talking about artillery, we could go all of the way up to 20 kilometers.

Senator NUNN. Well, I am speaking of small arms now. Would you include mortars in small arms?

General KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. How far would the mortars be coming from?

General KELLEY. Well, mortars could come several thousand meters.

Senator NUNN. How about just the rifles?

General KELLEY. Rifles, several hundred meters.

Senator NUNN. Where have we taken most of our hits?

General KELLEY. Out at Alpha Company, which is in a position up by the university.

Senator NUNN. Were those with rifles primarily?

General KELLEY. Rifles. The current threat has been rifles and we have taken several RPG rounds.

Senator NUNN. What kind of range would that be?

General KELLEY. We are talking 500 meters.

Senator NUNN. Now just so that I get it in my mind, the Beirut Army is responsible for patrolling that area. We do not have people out there patrolling that area that would allow us to prevent that kind of small arms fire, do we?

General KELLEY. No. The counter to the small arms fire right now is when we receive sniper fire we return fire with appropriate measures.

Senator NUNN. Well, you would be better off if you did not receive it to start with, though.

General KELLEY. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Well, it seems to me—I mean, I have never envisioned our forces as supposedly the front line forces, but it seems to me that they have become the front line forces unless there is somebody that is going to patrol those areas. Now I am not saying somebody could stop artillery shells coming from Syria; I am suggesting the rifle shots, the short-range fire that is doing the most damage now.

Why doesn't the Lebanese Army undertake the mission of clearing out the area or at least patrolling the area and making sure that it is secure and that we do not have terrorist shooting at our men all the time? Has anybody asked them to do that?

General KELLEY. Oh, yes, sir. In fact, they do do it and they do provide a significant amount of cooperation, but you have to be on the scene to look at the built-up areas that are facing the Beirut University. I mean, it is literally a massive city that you are looking at, so the Lebanese Armed Forces come, patrol through the area, and then leave, and your terrorists or your snipers come right back into their positions.

So it is a very difficult thing to cope with. It is like a sniper that you would have here in Washington, D.C. sniping at this building. He snipes a couple of times and you send the police over there and they cannot find him, and then he goes over to another place and he snipes another couple of times, and you send the police over there and he is gone.

It is a very difficult thing, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. But if it happened every day, though, for several months, I think we would probably move the capital somewhere else.

General KELLEY. That is an option.

Senator NUNN. That gets to the question of our forces, and it seems to me we ought to ask the Lebanese Armed Forces at a minimum to protect the multinational forces within short range. If they cannot do that, General Kelley, how in the world do we believe they are ever going to secure the whole country?

General KELLEY. Oh, I think they are making every effort. This is a fledgling army and it needs an awful lot of tender loving care. It has come so far, so far in the last, close to a year. If we ask it to perform missions which are beyond their current capabilities, we then will, I think, minimize the effectiveness of the army. It is doing about all it can.

In my conversations with General Tannous, he has said he is going to take over more of that responsibility, but the problem is going to be that he is going to uncover other new areas of responsibility, but he is going to attempt to assume that added responsibility. So in answer to your question the Lebanese Armed Forces are going to take over more responsibility.

Senator NUNN. When?

General KELLEY. I would prefer not to give you that time in an open session, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kelley, I have backed the President's peacekeeping force in Lebanon and I have backed his actions in Grenada. I am deeply concerned about the security measures that were taken in Lebanon. Now, as I understand it you have adopted some new measures.

Do you feel that the new measures taken since the terrorist attack in Lebanon are adequate to deter a similar attack in the future?

General KELLEY. Well, you are asking me to say an absolute, and I cannot do that now, Senator. I cannot give you an absolute.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, you do not know whether they are sufficient or not?

General KELLEY. No. What I am saying concerns our judgment on the ground now. You have to narrow the focus on that question. If you are talking about a 5-ton Mercedes truck coming at us at 60 miles an hour in the MAU compound, that, in my professional judgment is highly unlikely.

Senator THURMOND. With regard to the new measures taken, had the new measures been in force at the time of the terrorist attack, could this attack have been averted.

General KELLEY. Well, let me phrase it a little differently. I will answer your question and say had these extraordinary measures—and I have to emphasize that; the new measures are extraordinary meausres; they are far more than I have ever seen in any combat experience of mine--these new measures, had they been in effect, yes, but no prudent or reasonable troop commander that I know would have gone to that extraordinary amount of detail under the circumstances that existed at the time.

Senator THURMOND. General Kelley, I understood you to say that the policy was not to have weapons loaded but to load if threatened. Was that the statement you made?

General KELLEY. No. I do not believe I said that, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I understood you made that statement in closed session, that the policy was not to have weapons loaded.

General KELLEY. Oh, in answer to a question. In answer to a question, I said that Colonel Geraghty has indicated—if that is the specific question—that the two sentry posts that were in the compound in front of the building which were closest to the wire did not have their magazines in their weapons. But you have to put that in a proper context. That was his judgment. That was his call, and I am not going to critique that one from 5,000 miles away.

But being there on the scene I can understand why he did that. There was no such threat to that position. It takes about 2 seconds to get a magazine into a weapon. It is much like the policeman on the beat. There are certain regulations on policemen unholstering their pistols. This is no different than that.

You unholster your pistol when there is a reasonable threat on your life. The marine puts the magazine in his rifle when there is reasonable cause to think that he has a reason to put it in. Now in this particular case Colonel Geraghty made the decision not to put the magazines in those rifles because those positions are close to the civilian populace and he did not want to have an accidental discharge.

Besides, Senator Thurmond, there is no way on God's Earth that that rifle fire could have stopped that truck going 60 miles an hour as it passed within a second or two of those two sentry posts—no way on God's Earth.

Senator **THURMOND**. I believe General Trainor testified last week that the marines at the guard posts had their weapons loaded. Is that inconsistent?

General **KELLEY**. That is not an inconsistent statement. The marines on the outer perimeter have their magazines—and let me get this correct for the record—they have their magazines inserted in their weapons but no rounds in the chambers. The marines on inner security do not have their magazines in the weapons.

Senator **THURMOND**. General, considering that the assassination of President Gemayel's brother and the attack on our Embassy in Beirut were both carried out by using vehicles laden with explosives, would it not be safe to assume that your intelligence would warn against such attacks and indicate that extraordinary defenses would be required to protect our marines?

General **KELLEY**. No, sir, I do not agree with that statement.

Senator **THURMOND**. I am just wondering why these extraordinary measures were not taken to protect the marines.

General **KELLEY**. There is absolutely total dissimilarity between the Embassy bombing and the bombing that took place on October 23. They are absolutely, totally dissimilar.

I gave an analogy, and I will give it one more time. It is like saying that you have the problem of a truck unobtrusively moving up against a building, so you want to keep the truck away from the building, so you build a barrier sufficient to do that. That is a totally different circumstance from a 5-ton Mercedes truck going at 60 miles an hour. That is not trying to move against a building; it is trying to crash through a barrier. And so I say there are significant differences.

Senator **THURMOND**. You understand, please, that we are just trying to bring out the facts so that we know what the situation is.

General **KELLEY**. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator **THURMOND**. Now were you responsible for the security measures in Lebanon?

General **KELLEY**. No, sir.

Senator **THURMOND**. Was General Rogers, as NATO Commander responsible?

General **KELLEY**. I am not. General Rogers can speak for himself.

General **ROGERS**. I am responsible, but not in my NATO role. NATO has nothing to do with this. I am responsible in my role as——

Senator **THURMOND**. For the record, would you tell us what command was responsible?

General **ROGERS**. In the chain of command, the European Command, of which I am the commander in chief—that is the theater in which Lebanon is located, that is my theater of responsibility. The marines are assigned to me for this activity. So the theater of responsibility is my theater, the European Command, but that is in my national role, Senator, and has nothing to do with my international role as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe.

Senator **THURMOND**. But you were responsible as commander?

General **ROGERS**. Anything that happens or fails to happen in that theater is my responsibility, Senator.

Senator **THURMOND**. What steps did you take in view of the intelligence available to prevent an attack of the kind that did occur?

General ROGERS. The steps that were taken were to advise the commander. In fact, the Combined Task Force Commander 61 who is in the chain of command, submits to his subordinate commander the intelligence information. That information was along the lines that General Kelley has described; namely, that the major threat against our members of the MNF contingent was from car bombs.

I would just like to make two points in that connection. One, not only was it different from that of the car bombs that had exploded before, but also General Tannous told my deputy, General Lawson, when he visited last week that he, Tannous, has evidence—in which he has complete confidence—that the driver of the vehicle at the American Embassy in April in fact was trying to get away from the vehicle when it was exploded by remote means. So that is another difference in addition to the method by which they used the vehicle.

The other point I wish to make is in response to Senator Nunn's question, so I will abstain at the moment, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Is there any other step that was not taken which you feel could have been taken to have prevented this attack?

General ROGERS. In retrospect, we failed to stop this kind of attack, and what can you do to prevent that kind of attack? Well, you could have zigzags, you could have antivehicle ditches, you could have antitank ditches which were not constructed based upon the judgment exercised by the commander on the ground that, with the intelligence information he had, he did not believe that was necessary.

But as a Monday morning quarterback looking back on it, there are things that we might have done if our intelligence had led us to believe that that was what was necessary to do.

Senator THURMOND. General Kelley, do the Marine Corps units maintain standing operating procedures?

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Should these standing operating procedures contain a medical annex?

General KELLEY. They do.

Senator THURMOND. Should the medical annex contain an analysis or a description of available medical support?

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Well, why were not the Israeli medical facilities included in the Marine Corps planning? As I understand it, they were only 12 minutes away, whereas Germany, where you took the marines, is several hours away.

General KELLEY. I was not involved in that, sir.

General ROGERS. Nor was I, Senator, but it is my responsibility and not General Kelley's. The Israelis offered to assist. The commander on the ground was told that that assistance was available and for him to use it if he needed it. He felt that he did not need it, so he did not use it.

Senator THURMOND. So it was within his discretion?

General ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. The committee will suspend for about 5 minutes to permit members to go to the floor to vote. Then we will resume.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

Senator Stennis is recognized.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I really want to congratulate each of you and thank you for your testimony. I have learned more from you about the atmosphere, of the mission you marines have been on, and more about the practical side of the so-called mission. You have also given me a better understanding of the atmosphere and the attitude of the people around there. Your testimony, I think, has been very valuable in that way.

I am not thinking in terms of being run out of there, pushed out or running out on anyone else who we have gone in there with. But, frankly, it looks to me like the chances of doing the kind of good we want to do is more remote than I had realized before, and I have never been an enthusiast about this.

You said, as I understood you over in the other room, that at first the Lebanese were more interested in your being there, more friendly, more sociable, and more in earnest about associating with the marines, but that this gradually dimmed and dwindled. Did you then say some hostility developed before this incident happened? What did you say about the attitude of the people there? I will address this question to either of you.

General KELLEY. I said there was a discernible deterioration in the friendliness, particularly after the Israelis left and we had the confessional conflict. I think that is a notable event. But, as I said in my statement, Senator, it sort of ebbed and flowed over a period of a year.

Senator STENNIS. Has there been an increase in their desire or their feeling that they need you or someone there to help them—the people, I mean.

General KELLEY. Well, Lord, I would hope so. That country has had so much suffering since 1976.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I do not want to try to put you on the spot in passing on them, but I think if you do not have an attitude on the part of the people there or an atmosphere of gratitude and willingness to do their part, then I do not think you have a chance to really do any good. What we have been trying to get at here is, what the mission was and how practical that mission was.

I know everyone had good motives, but even before this happened I was waning and losing faith in real accomplishments. What is the marines chance now? What good can they do? We are not there for war—not yet, anyway. We are not fighting anyone there, but they are fighting us and we have suffered a great deal.

People call Members of the Senate; they want to know why we are there, what we propose to do, and what the trouble is. So you are serving us, the people, when you help us understand these things better. You really do not have the rules of engagement, for instance, that the marines ordinarily have.

Have they had any special training in carrying out a mission like this. Do you have these men trained just to be there and boost the good will of the natives and so forth? Is that a part of their mission as marines?

General **Kelley**. Well, I would like to be selfish enough, sir, to say, with due respect to my colleague, General Rogers—because I do have a profound respect for the U.S. Army—that historically, in my perception, marines have been great ambassadors for the United States of America and throughout the world.

General **Rogers**. I agree.

Senator **Stennis**. I was not trying to put any onus of any wrongdoing or anything like that on them. It is not one of their primary missions, is it?

General **Kelley**. Well, our mission, the marine mission, as you well know, sir, is the conduct of amphibious operations. That, by its very nature, is an offensive combat mission. But I know you will recall when it was written into the law "to perform such other duties as the President may direct." So I would like to believe that the Marine Corps is a very flexible instrument of national policy.

Senator **Stennis**. Well, I do not know of anything wrong that they have done in this way at all. But the question is the atmosphere, the surrounding areas, and the other countries nearby that are not friendly.

I just feel like it is almost an impossible situation to begin with and now this incident has greatly lessened the chances of playing a constructive role that we otherwise would be capable of. You explained fully earlier this afternoon just what did happen, and what the situation was concerning the anticipation of and the remoteness of an attack such as this.

I suppose it should not even be asked. But, do you have plans, if you continue your mission there, for beefing up and strengthening the security? I know you plan to do something.

General **Rogers**. Senator, there are a number of things that are under way at the present time, as the Commandant mentioned. Some that he did not mention have been forwarded here to Washington for approval. Just let me make a couple of points.

One, with respect to what does it mean to the Lebanese to have the United States there as a part of the multinational force, let me just quote you one sentence from President Gemayel that was made in the presence of my deputy commander. He said the meaning of the peacekeeping forces is that it gives the opportunity for Lebanon to create a free society representative of the Lebanese and for the Lebanese.

Now the mission that we have been assigned was not a mission of our choosing. It was a mission assigned "to establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibility in the Beirut area" and, when directed, USCINCEUR—I—was "to introduce U.S. Forces as a part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure certain positions along a designated sector."

Now that sector was not chosen by us. The commander on the ground, my commander on the ground, initially did not choose that sector. Where the U.S. contingent is located determined in consultation among the governments who are providing forces for the multinational force. So if we had chosen a place, the marines would not have chosen where they are.

That is just a statement of fact. It is not a complaint because of the way the system has worked. So both the mission and the location have been contingent upon other decisions not made by those of us who wear the uniform.

Let me add one further point because it has to do with securing the MNF, not just the U.S. contingent but the other contingents. I just want to point out that under the exchange of letters between the governments which are the legal basis for the multinational contingents being in Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF] charged with providing security of the multinational force. That is their requirement and that was agreed, Senator Nunn.

Now what we must insure is that to the best of their ability the LAF carry out that responsibility that has been charged to them. I can say to you that steps are underway to continue to insure that they do that.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I was asking what you were going to do. I was not thinking in terms of what they are going to do, but my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. I have supported the President on having our troops in Lebanon, but based on the testimony we have received now from 2 p.m., and it is now 6 p.m., I am left with some very grave concerns. I think both of you have quite candidly put the Congress on notice that we and indeed all America can expect further casualties.

The statement used by General Kelley was we can anticipate further acts of violence and terrorism. In response to other questions you were candid in saying we cannot protect in every respect our people from those acts of terrorism.

By law each of you has a direct access to the President, or through a chain of command. At what point are you going to make an evaluation of the military risk so that the President in turn can evaluate the political and diplomatic mission the marines are serving there, and others, against the further casualties that you are now informing us will likely take place?

Say in the next 30 days, what are the risks of further casualties?

General ROGERS. I think General Kelley has put it quite well when he says there is no way that we can guarantee that there will not be further terrorist attacks on our troops. There is no way that we can guarantee, should the ceasefire be broken or end with failure at the talks in Geneva, that some of our forces will not be hit by artillery fire and by other weapons.

We cannot make that guarantee. As long as you have armed forces and as long as you have troops in a situation such as this, whether we like it or not, they are subject to being struck. We do not like it, but there is no way that we can prevent that.

Senator WARNER. I fully recognize you cannot give a guarantee, but can you inform the Congress? We have a responsibility with the President having our troops there. Can you give us some evaluation of what those risks will be in the next 30 days and the likelihood of further casualties?

General ROGERS. I would not want to conjecture in that area, Senator—would you?

General **Kelley**. No. I cannot at this time, Senator Warner. I think the question is a very valid question. I think we all agonize over it from day to day.

Senator **Warner**. Well, let me turn to the other subject at hand, namely that of the precautions that were taken against the various types of terrorist attack. General Rogers, do you share General Kelley's professional opinion that no officer could reasonably have or prudently have anticipated this type of attack? You are the commander who is directly responsible.

General **Rogers**. The manner in which General Kelley and the context in which he put that, namely based upon the intelligence information that he had, there was no intelligence information of this type of an attack which, as General Kelley said, was unique. But in the end we failed in preventing this kind of attack. And those of us in the chain of command must share that responsibility.

Senator **Warner**. Well, now, according to my research some 20 general and flag officers have visited the military positions ashore since the accident, the tragic accident, at the American embassy. To the best of your knowledge, were any of those general and flag officers experts in the area of terrorism and did any of them report to you, General Rogers, about their findings? Did any of them express a concern about the adequacy or inadequacy of the preventive measures?

General **Rogers**. Well, I can say to you, Senator Warner, that there has been continual concern expressed by those of us who wear the uniform, one, about the mission that has been assigned, and, second, about the area in which we must carry out that mission. None of us, I can assure you, likes either one, so when they would return—and I had in that group of 20 that you have listed, I think there are——

Senator **Warner**. Let me stop you. Did you ever visit, General Rogers?

General **Rogers**. I have not, and for reasons which I think are good and sufficient. When I visit any place I am perceived as being the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, as a NATO commander, which is my principal duty. So when I visit those nations outside the NATO area it causes difficulty on two scores: One, the receiving nation and, two, the NATO nations who are not anxious to have the SACEUR being seen in various places outside the area of NATO. I think that is very understandable.

But I do have a deputy commander in chief who runs my other headquarters at Stuttgart since I am in Belgium, and both of those deputies have visited.

Senator **Warner**. Prior to the incident?

General **Rogers**. General Smith visited prior to the incident. General Lawson did not, but in the chain of command is the Sixth Fleet Commander and both of those have visited before.

Senator **Warner**. Well, the point I am trying to get at is that it flows from you to Admiral Small, CINCNAVEUR, to another Admiral, Sixth Fleet, to a Navy Captain, and then, finally, to a Marine Colonel.

General **Rogers**. That is correct.

Senator **Warner**. The question is: Looking at the vast resources of our military establishment I know there are individuals who are trained in anti-terrorist activities. Were any of these brought in for the purpose of giving you advice in this area?

General ROGERS. Not to my knowledge. I would like to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.] Advice was not sought because the MAU is a combat structured unit with command and control, staffing and resources necessary to accomplish security tasks.

On 20 November 1982 COMSIXTHFLEET did make inquiries concerning training resources available to augment Marine-Lebanese antiterrorist training programs. It was determined that predeployment antiterrorist training for deploying Marine units coupled with in-country training was adequate to deal with the threat existing at that time. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time is up.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want you to know that this Senator and, I am sure, this committee has confidence in your ability. We appreciate very much the information that you have given us in both open and closed testimony today, although I must say, as many of my colleagues have said already, that it looks to me like we are in a total "no-win" situation in Beirut today.

Just for the record, since it seems to be commonplace, I want to say that I supported the President from the first day in the invasion of Grenada, and I opposed the President from the first day on sending troops into Lebanon.

General Kelley, in your opinion, in all of the glorious history of the U.S. Marines, have they ever been assigned a more difficult mission than the one in which they are now involved?

General KELLEY. Well, I have not been around all 208 years.

Senator EXON. But you know the history.

General KELLEY. It is a difficult mission, but let me give you a reaction—and I admit that it is an emotional reaction. One of the things that I experienced on my trip to Beirut was the hard-bitten sergeant major pleading with me with tears coming down his eyes, "Please do not pull us out. We think the country has a chance."

Senator EXON. Well, now, General, let me interrupt you. I hope that I can get a response to my question. I am not dealing in emotionalism. I am not dealing in what the troops feel about it. I asked you what your opinion was. If you do not care to give me an answer, I will go on to the next question.

General KELLEY. I would be loathe to say it is the most difficult mission we ever had, sir.

Senator EXON. All right. In both the open and closed testimony you have indicated, to me at least, that we are in a no-win situation and are likely to take substantially more casualties in the future under our present mission. How would you suggest we might change that mission or make the chances of some degree of success more possible?

General KELLEY. Oh, I will correct the record. If I ever said no-win situation, sir, then I withdraw that completely. I do not recall ever saying that.

Senator EXON. That was my phraseology.

General **Kelley**. Thank you, sir, but for the record it is not mine. I say we have a tough time, but I also have to say that somewhere, someplace, we have to take a stand. We did not pull all the diplomatic missions out from embassies all over the world because we had a bombing in the Beirut Embassy, nor do I think the United States of America, the greatest country in the free world, should back off from some damned terrorists.

The issue is to let us go after the terrorist, find out who he is; let us not pull out and be intimidated by this guy—and I feel very strongly about that, Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Then what you are saying, it seems to me, is somewhat in contradication to the testimony that you have given in both the closed and open sessions.

General **Kelley**. Oh, no, sir, not at all.

Senator **Exon**. In predicting the dire consequences that might befall us over there.

General **Kelley**. There is no contradiction with what I said. I merely gave a warning that the American people under the threat of this kind of terrorism should not anticipate that we are not going to have future casualties. We are. The gut issue is do we take a stand or don't we.

Senator **Exon**. General Rogers, you have spoken about the mission on several occasions. May I ask you was the chain of command consulted? Were you consulted or, to your knowledge, were members of the Joint Chiefs consulted with regard to the obligation that we were assuming when we went into Lebanon?

General **Rogers**. Yes. I had my opportunity to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense on this subject. I had an opportunity to present my views prior to the time of the decision for the Marines to go in and the mission that was assigned.

Senator **Exon**. Without putting you on the spot, could you amplify on that and give us your reasons, which I take it were that this would be a very difficult mission for us to accomplish?

General **Rogers**. I think I would just as soon leave it just as it is.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, General.

Let me return to you, General Kelley, for just a moment. Have you talked with the President since you returned from your recent mission?

General **Kelley**. No, sir, I have not.

Senator **Exon**. You have not discussed your mission with him?

General **Kelley**. No, sir.

Senator **Exon**. Will you have an opportunity to do that in the near future?

General **Kelley**. I am anticipating this will happen, yes, sir. I have discussed elements with his National Security Advisor.

Senator **Exon**. Can you tell us what your recommendation was to the President's National Security Advisor or what you will be telling him about our mission there, if you are called upon to meet with the President?

General **Kelley**. I will when the man who sent me out there is briefed on it, sir—the President of the United States—but I will not now.

Senator Exon. Would you be good enough to recite for the committee when the President directed you to go to Beirut, according to the newspapers, to check on security? Was that on Sunday or was that on Monday?

General Kelley. Sir, that was late Sunday evening.

Senator Exon. Late Sunday evening?

General Kelley. Yes, sir.

Senator Exon. The President called you?

General Kelley. No, sir. I attended the National Security Council meetings both in the morning and the afternoon.

Senator Exon. And it came up at that meeting, is that right?

General Kelley. Yes, sir, at the end of the second meeting.

Senator Exon. Thank you very much. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower. Senator Cohen?

Senator Cohen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Kelley, you have been called upon to perform a very difficult task here this afternoon—the difficult task of trying either to explain or justify what has taken place. I think that is unfortunate because new meaning has been given to the words "at dawn we slept." The fact that no one anticipated a terrorist attack of this magnitude and precision, I think, is going to ring somewhat hollow to the parents of dead marines because there has been ample precedent for the loss of life in the region by car bombs, as you indicated.

I do not know that it would take a visionary to foresee that a truck bomb might be used to take down an even more formidable structure. Now, I do not know if we were negligent. I do not know if we should have reasonably foreseen what did take place, but I have been reading in the paper that somebody is calling—some high-level officials have been calling—for courts-martial. I would just like to say that if this were purely a military decision, then I think, perhaps, talk of courts-martial might be proper and possibly imperative, because there is a blood cry in the air and a call for some career beheading of those responsible for this tragedy.

A lot of people on Capitol Hill, I suspect down on Pennsylvania Avenue as well, are out looking for scapegoats to satisfy this beating of the drums. But this, as Senator Nunn mentioned, was not a purely military decision. It was a political decision, and if we are going to demand professional beheadings, then we had better order up several truckloads of baskets.

The marines, in my judgment, have been ordered into a militarily untenable position. They have been ordered to serve in a capacity that is contrary, in my judgment, to their basic training and talents. They are not friendly airport policemen. They are, as you said, an offensive assault unit, and they ought to be used as such.

They have been ordered not to appear to be siding with the Israelis, not to appear to be too aggressive or, in this case, to defensive, not to risk the possibility of harming or shooting an Arab civilian, not to act as if they are operating in a wartime environment. Indeed, as you have testified, the rules of engagement are peacetime rules of engagement.

The fact is the marines are in a war-torn country and they are in a terrorist zone, yet they are operating under peacetime rules of engagement. So, given these mandates and these restrictions, these drastic restrictions upon their mission and training, I think it is little wonder that a peacetime mindset affected or indeed infected our military judgment.

I would simply like to say for myself that we ought either to change the position of the marines or change their mission. They are not meant to serve as targets for terrorists or bombing practice.

So, General Kelley, I would ask you that unless there is a fundamental shift in this position or mission, then I would have serious problems about continuing to lend support to that operation. The fundamental question is whether our stated mission can be carried out with a reasonable degree of safety, and that is what we are all here trying to determine.

There is, in my judgment, a disturbing reality that we have to face, and that is the vulnerability of our position was exposed either from within or from overhead. I think you have indicated it took something of this magnitude with precision. Now, it is very difficult for me to understand how this could have been carried out without some sort of either internal intelligence or overhead surveillance.

The other thing that I would like to say is the only thing worse than a threat to retaliate against those who are responsible is an empty threat to retaliate. I surely hope that you are correct that those, if they can be identified, will be treated accordingly. If we let this go unanswered, I think you are only faced with what you recognize you are faced with, and that is more and more of the same.

The final point I would like to make is this: This is a question that I would like to ask General Kelley. Have the British and Italians taken any measures which you think are worthy of either emulation or imitation at this point? Have they done some things that perhaps we should do now?

General KELLEY. I would say in all honesty, knowing General Angioni's position, that he is far more vulnerable than any of us, and the British are there in a 100-man contingent in a relatively undefended single building. So the answer is I would not want to be put into a position of comparing the adequacy of security of forces. On the other hand, I think when you look at it in a relative sense, ours was far tighter than anybody's.

Senator COHEN. Well, I just want the record to reflect that you, I think, have been one of the individuals, and Bob Barrow before you, who have been largely responsible for building up the morale and the capability of the Marine Corps to what it is today.

I think, frankly, you have been put into a situation which makes it very difficult to carry out the mission that has been assigned to you. So, I would like to separate myself from those who are rushing to point fingers at this particular point.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Whatever one's view of the adequacy of the security of that airport for our marines—and I happen to be one who thinks it was clearly inadequate in light of then-known circumstances—I think every American shares the view of tremendous pride in the marines and their professionalism, of their devotion to duty and to country.

I do not think there has ever been greater evidence of that and what we have seen in Lebanon under extremely difficult circumstances with a mission that has been, from the beginning, unclear to most of us and, I am afraid, to many of the marines themselves.

I would like first to get to some facts about this incident which I do not think are yet on the record. At least as far as I know, we have not heard how many sentry posts there were in front of the building. Can you tell us how many sentry posts there were, how many sentry posts were manned that morning and with how many marines were there—I do not need the chart, just the number of posts. I do not have that much time, but just want to know the number of posts, the number which were manned and with how many marines.

General KELLEY. To make it accurate, can we give it to you for the record?

Senator LEVIN. Well, can we not just get an answer quickly? There were three posts, as I understand it, in front of that building. Is that true?

General MEAD. Three in front and six behind and on the side, so there were nine posts.

Senator LEVIN. So in front of the building there were three posts. How many of those three posts were manned that morning?

General MEAD. Three.

Senator LEVIN. All three were manned. Were there machineguns in those posts?

General MEAD. There were not.

Chairman TOWER. General Mead, would you please come to the table?

General MEAD. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. How many of those posts fired on that vehicle, do we know?

General MEAD. We do not know that, sir.

Senator LEVIN. General, you said that only extraordinary security could have met the massive and unanticipated threat and that a massive concrete wall would have been needed to stop the vehicle that was coming at that speed.

General KELLEY. Right.

Senator LEVIN. Would a deep ditch, an antitank ditch, for instance, have accomplished that?

General KELLEY. A deep ditch cut across a commercial parking lot in an international airport would have stopped it, but I would have to qualify that. You are not talking about a ditch out in a field in a tactical disposition. This is an international airport that serves 3 million people.

Senator LEVIN. I understand. And in that parking lot we had some barbed wire; did we not?

General KELLEY. We had entanglements sufficient to stop the threat—a car.

Senator LEVIN. And those entanglements, those barbed wire entanglements, were right in that airport parking lot serving that many people?

General KELLEY. Yes, sir, but they were actually in the parking lot as a protective measure. You do not cut a big hole, a tank ditch, across a parking lot. Stringing barbed wire is a little different story, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. I understand. These were rolls of wire, as I understand.

General KELLEY. Concertina and double apron, I am told.

Senator LEVIN. Would a ditch immediately inside that barbed wire have stopped that vehicle?

General KELLEY. If you wanted to go cutting huge ditches across the Lebanese Government's parking lot, yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Did we put rolls of barbed wire across that parking lot?

General KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Now you indicated that it was not our responsibility to secure the airport.

General KELLEY. That is right, sir.

Senator LEVIN. The President said in his speech the other night what exactly is the operational mission of the marines. Our marines are not just sitting in an aiport. Part of their task is to guard the airport.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn has already asked that question.

Senator LEVIN. Oh, I know, and I heard the question and the answer, but I do not think the answer adequately answers the question. The question is that you believe it is consistent for you to say that it is not our responsibility to secure the airport when the President is saying that it is exactly our task to guard the airport.

General KELLEY. To say one of our tasks is to guard the airport is not inconsistent as far as I am concerned. The Lebanese have the responsibility, the overall responsibility, for securing the Beirut International Airport. We assist in the performance of that task, but it is not our responsibility.

Senator LEVIN. So you would say there is not even some inconsistency between saying that it is not our responsibility to secure the airport and saying that our task is to guard that airport?

General KELLEY. Well, let me say, Senator, if you want to find inconsistency you will find it. If you do not want to find inconsistency, you will not find it either.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe there is some inconsistency?

General KELLEY. No, I do not, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Was it our task to guard that airport?

General KELLEY. It was our task to guard portions of that airport.

Senator LEVIN. But it was not our responsibility to secure it?

General KELLEY. That is right, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Now, we have heard some testimony or we have heard some allegations and testimony from General Rogers about the nonuse of Israeli hospitals; and there has been a good deal of material written and spoken about that issue. General, your answer is that the medical people felt that they did not need them or they would have used them.

Had planning been done to use those hospital facilities in advance, do you know?

General **Rogers**. Not that I am aware of. It may have been. I will correct it for the record if it had been, Senator. What I was referring to, Senator, was that I was here in Washington at the time, and in conversation with the person who has that authority I was told that the Israelis had offered the use of hospital facilities. I was told that, as far as the Government was concerned, if the commander on the ground decided he needed to use them, he should use them.

That decision, I understand, was taken by the CTF-61 commander.

Chairman **Tower**. If you would yield, Senator, we have Captain Mantel of the Navy Medical Corps here, and I think he can respond to that question better than anyone. Would you mind coming to the table, Captain?

Senator **Levin**. Well, I just want to ask, do you know whether there was any advance planning with the Israelis? You understand there was, or was not, or you do not know?

General **Rogers**. I answered that I do not believe there was, and if there was it was not to my knowledge. But if there were, I will correct the record.

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.] Contingency planning by the Marine MNF was evidenced by the fact that they had 150 acute care beds on the *Iwo Jima*, with four operating rooms (two for preop and two for surgery), augmented with a surgical platoon (Mobile Medical Augmentation Readiness Team (MMART)); and hospitals in and around Beirut. No official mention to USEUCOM regarding use of Israeli Medical Facilities had occurred until the offer made through the DAO, AMEMBASSY, Tel Aviv, on 23 October 1983.

Senator **Levin**. Captain, do you know if there was any advance planning made with the Israelis to use their hospitals 15 minutes away instead of sending our troops to hospitals perhaps an hour away, to British hospitals on Cyprus or in Germany to our own hospitals?

Captain **Mantel**. No, sir. I cannot answer that question directly. I do know that the plans were made. I talked to the Commodore, Captain France, just the other day. I returned last night from Beirut and asked him that question specifically. He felt on the advice of the senior medical officer present afloat with him that they had an adequate capability to take care of the casualties there.

Senator **Levin**. Do you know whether or not we could have gotten to Israel's hospitals quicker if, in fact, the planning had been done in advance?

Captain **Mantel**. The answer to that, from the knowledge that I have on how long it would have taken to fly the casualties directly from the beach to Israel was longer than it took to get the casualties from the beach to the *Iwo Jima*, which has a fully equipped operating suite and staff.

Senator **Levin**. How about to Cyprus and Germany?

Captain **Mantel**. The flight to Cyprus was also, from what I understand, less than the time it would have taken to have gotten to Israel.

Senator **Levin**. And to Germany?

Captain Mantel. No, sir. To Germany it takes a medevac flight of about 4 to 4½ hours, but it was only after the casualties had received adequate care aboard the *Iwo Jima* and were stabilized.

Senator Levin. Thank you. I have one last question before I try to catch the vote.

General Kelley, we heard from General Rogers that he, as I remember his testimony, did not know of any advice that we had received from anti-terrorism experts or whether we had solicited it. I may not be stating your answer correctly, General. Forgive my memory if it is wrong.

General Kelley, do you know whether or not we had consulted with any anti-terrorism experts prior to this incident?

General Kelley. I do not know. I do not know personally.

Senator Levin. You do not know of any advice that was given?

General Kelley. It could well have happened, but I do not know that from personal experience.

Senator Levin. All right. Do either of you know of any recommendations to improve security of that facility that had been made prior to this bombing which were not accepted?

General Kelley. No. The commander on the scene took the best intelligence that was available, built his defensive security apparatus, but I do not know if he, Senator, did not implement his own recommendations.

Senator Levin. Do you know whether he received any recommendations which he rejected?

General Kelley. I have never heard of any.

Senator Levin. General Rogers?

General Rogers. I know of none.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tower. Let me just pursue this on the medevac. Actually, our practice would have been, would it not, to have gotten them to *Iwo Jima,* to stabilize the patients and then move them to other hospitals? Would we have not followed the same procedure even if we utilized the hospitals in Israel? For example, ultimately, we would have flown them to American hospitals?

Captain Mantel. Yes, sir.

Chairman Tower. But they actually could receive more immediate treatment by being flown to the *Iwo Jima,* than by being flown to Israel?

Captain Mantel. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Tower. Captain, as far as you know, the commodore was apprised of the availability of the Israeli hospitals but made the decision not to utilize that availability?

Captain Mantel. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Tower. So, it actually was a decision made by the senior medical officer and it was not a political decision?

Captain Mantel. No, sir. He took the advice of the surgeon who was advising him on the casualty care aboard the *Iwo Jima.*

Chairman Tower. Thank you very much.

Senator Humphrey?

Senator Humphrey. Following on your questions, Mr. Chairman, as you know I was present during the treatment of the wounded aboard the *Iwo Jima,* and that care was really quite good. There was no panic or confusion. However, I think it is worth pointing out that by the time those evacuated to Rhein-Main received hospital care, some 12 or 13 hours had passed since they were initially wounded.

To be sure, they had been treated well and stabilized and relieved of their pain for the most part, but it still seems to me most unwise that we did not have contingency plans to medevac to Israel, which could have saved not only the flight to Frankfurt but also the 4 or 5 hours waiting for the aircraft to come in in the first place.

I just wanted to make that point of view and I hope it is a lesson that was learned well.

General Kelley, I think it is imperative that we do all that we can to improve the security of our troops. You have given us no hope that we can have any reasonable assurance that a similar attack cannot succeed. Is that the impression you meant to convey?

General KELLEY. Let me clarify any misperceptions you may have had from comments that I have made, Senator. This is not a no-hope situation. What I am merely saying is that there are terrorists out there who are building new and better ways to kill people and no matter what we do we are going to have vulnerability. So I am not going to sit here with television cameras and tell the American people that we are not going to have future casualties.

But we are taking all reasonable and prudent means to obviate the possibility of this kind of thing happening again. But do not hold me to an absolute—an aircraft loaded with explosives, for example, in a kamikaze attack might accomplish a similar mission—and say I did not tell you so.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I am not holding you to that, but I am asking you to assure us that with respect to known threats—and now we know this is a known threat—can this be repeated? That is what we want to know.

General KELLEY. Let me say, Senator, that every reasonable and prudent precaution is being taken by the people on the scene to include bringing in the terrorist experts, now that we have a new and massive, different kind of threat, to counter that threat. Can the President of the United States not be shot?

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me ask you this: Would an anti-tank ditch, had there been one along that particular route on that side of the building, have deterred or stopped the attack?

General KELLEY. Had I or anybody had the wisdom to build a sufficiently deep and wide anti-tank ditch across a public parking lot in a commercial airport, it would have stopped the vehicle.

Senator HUMPHREY. It would have stopped the vehicle. Well, if that kind of precaution can stop this kind of attack, then why don't we do it to prevent that kind of attack?

General KELLEY. Sir, would a reasonable and prudent man cut a big tank ditch across a parking lot, a commercial parking lot in a host country with no threat? He does not even have a threat.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, no, General, you misunderstand. I am not suggesting that you could have forecast that, but now that it has happened I am saying why don't we do that?

General KELLEY. Now that it is done, I am certain that the government of Lebanon will take extraordinary measures to assist us——

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine, but what about us?

General KELLEY [continuing]. To assist us in our defense. I am saying they would assist us by allowing us to do things that would be necessary, that are extraordinary, for we are in an extraordinary era of terrorism. This is not the old guy with a satchel charge that is going after the individual. This is a mass murderer who killed 239 people.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, and we want to be sure it does not happen again. Now you said earlier that anti-tank ditches were not considered—well, what was the word you used—not considered practical. They were considered impractical.

If they were considered impractical, I presume that somebody proposed them. Did somebody propose them and were they turned down?

General KELLEY. No. Any time you are in a tactical situation you go through a litany, if you will, a checklist of things in order to cope with the threat. The threat was a car threat, not a truck threat. Nowhere can you or anyone else show me any kind of intelligence that shows that what happened was going to happen.

So you do not need a ditch for a car. You can put in other obstacles and we did that, and they would have stopped a car. So all the prudent actions were taken to stop a car bomb threat.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, inasmuch as you cannot give us much confidence that this incident will not be repeated, on the basis of what we have done so far what else can we do to protect ourselves?

General KELLEY. Well, now, wait a minute, sir. You said I cannot give you much confidence. I gave you confidence, but I cannot say it will not happen again. I have a high degree of confidence that it will not, but I am not going to promise you that it will not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, maybe I just happen to like anti-tank barriers because, well, for any reason.

General KELLEY. But you do not put them over in Washington National Airport, Senator. But you still have terrorists who could cause massive casualties over at this airport.

Senator HUMPHREY. All I want to do is protect our Marines. Why do we not learn from our mistakes and protect these areas?

General KELLEY. Because the threat that we considered was not there, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. But it is now.

General KELLEY. It is now and we are doing things now, extraordinary things.

Senator HUMPHREY. But not including anti-tank barriers and things that stop heavy vehicles?

General ROGERS. Yes, including anti-tank ditches, Senator. I read from the report from General Lawson, who is speaking about one position which near the Lebanese University has blocked all roads into its position, is allowing only U.S. MNF vehicles access, earth barriers across or anti-vehicle ditches—read that anti-vehicle/anti-tank; it depends on what they are trying to stop—are being dug across areas that present a likely avenue of approach to the position.

Senator HUMPHREY. Outstanding.

General ROGERS. So those kinds of steps are being taken at the present time.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine, but only at the University. Is that the point?

General ROGERS. That is the point on which he was commenting, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that being done for our main compound?

General ROGERS. I do not have any reference to the main compound.

Senator HUMPHREY. But you still have not answered my question.

General ROGERS. Well, let me just read to you those things, some of the things, that are going on.

Senator HUMPHREY. I believe we have had this list.

General ROGERS. Well, you recall that I referred to it in the closed meeting, and I also pointed out that some of them are recommendations that have been forwarded to higher authority for approval. This one has not.

The access road to the international airport has been reduced to one lane of inbound traffic. The Lebanese Armed Forces have established a checkpoint in the vicinity of the airport and are allowing only emergency and military traffic into the airport.

The LAF is providing additional security to the north of the airport complex. Additionally, we are discussing with the Lebanese to reduce the airport road from four to two lanes, and to intensify the vehicle searches at their checkpoints on the airport road.

Senator HUMPHREY. General Rogers, please let me interrupt you because I only have a few minutes and I know that list is lengthy, but it did not have on it, according to my understanding, antitank/antiheavy vehicle precautions. I am glad that we are doing that in the vicinity of the university. I hope we will do that in our main compound where we have a much greater concentration of personnel if I correctly understand the situation.

Now let me go to another matter, please. This matter of the salient or the island or the pocket—whatever it is—of the university. Are we not extraordinarily exposed there and is it necessary that we be exposed in this university to add to our presence? It seems to me if you take those troops from there and put them back in the main compound we will have just as much presence but with considerably less exposure to those numbers.

General ROGERS. I will respond to that, Senator. I could not agree with you more, and that is exactly what we are trying to do in coordination with the other contingents of the multinational force and the Lebanese Armed Forces. We must do that in coordination with them. They understand the need to do that.

I would even go further. I would hope we could put the administrative and support forces afloat and still have sufficient forces in the area assigned for the accomplishment of the mission which we have been assigned—that is, a "presence" to assist the Lebanese Government.

Senator HUMPHREY. Fine. I have one last point, and we are nearly out of time. We now have the principal airport access roads reduced to one lane in each direction, I presume, with Lebanese forces manning a checkpoint. Does that mean that all vehicles entering the airport are now searched? What does it mean? Are there alternative entrances?

General ROGERS. All I can tell you is what I read you, Senator. I was not on the ground to discuss it with them and this is the report that I had from the Deputy CINCEUR. I do not know if you have anything further or not.

General KELLEY. There are no alternative entrances, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley, General Rogers, I want to thank you both for coming here today. I know this has been a very grueling, emotional, and painful experience for you, General Kelley. I think we can empathize with you on that.

I hope you appreciate that we have a responsibility to the American people to get at the facts to the extent that we can. We are responsible for the authorization and appropriation of moneys for the military forces. Therefore, we must inquire into these matters and will continue to inquire into them until we are satisfied that we have all of the information that might be available to us.

I think your testimony has been enormously important to us. I think you have been very candid with us and very professional. We have asked you for your professional military judgment and I am satisfied that you have given it to us. I hope the measures we are taking will reduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence of something of this kind.

I would hope, General Rogers, given the fact that we have been struck by terrorists in Europe, that this unfortunate and tragic event in Beirut has caused us to reflect on the kinds of security measures we have in Europe where we might be vulnerable to terrorist activity, so we can to the extent possible, provide better security for American military wherever they may be located any place in the world. As I see it we may be just as vulnerable in Europe and the capitals of Europe as we are in Lebanon.

We have had people killed and kidnapped in Europe. Explosive devices have been detonated on our military bases or the ones that we occupy. So, I hope that out of this tragic experience, we have all learned a lesson that we will be quick to apply to our future actions.

Senator Nunn has submitted additional questions to be answered for the hearing record.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

MILITARY SITUATION IN LEBANON

Senator NUNN. Please supply the Armed Services Committee with all pertinent letters, records and memoranda, including memoranda of conversations, reports, notes, cables, and communications to which you were part that are in any way pertinent to the security of the U.S. Force in Lebanon on or prior to October 23, 1983.

General KELLEY. In the interest of accuracy and since the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not included in the operational chain of command, I wish to defer a response to that question to the appropriate commanders in that operational chain of command.

Senator NUNN. Please include in the above all communications of any kind to which you were privy within the military chain of command, within the Department of Defense, within State Department channels (including the Embassy in Beirut), and between any of the above.

General **Kelley**. In the interest of accuracy and since the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not included in the operational chain of command, I wish to defer a response to that question to the appropriate commanders in that operational chain of command.

Senator **Nunn**. Was there any discussion in the above records or in unrecorded verbal meetings about the possibility of a car bomb attack on the Marine Force and/or its headquarters building similar to the attack of the U.S. Embassy? Please supply pertinent records or summaries of meetings. If none are available, does this mean that the threat of a car bomb attack was overlooked?

General **Kelley**. In the interest of accuracy and since the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not included in the operational chain of command, I wish to defer a response to that question to the appropriate commanders in that operational chain of command.

Senator **Nunn**. Was there any special intelligence information which should have been available to appropriate authorities that some radical groups were instructed to undertake "extraordinary attacks" against the Marines? Was this information made available? What was done to enforce security after receipt of it?

General **Kelley**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Nunn**. Did either the State Department or any intelligence agency communicate any other warning, explicit or implicit, to U.S. military officials in the Pentagon or in Beirut concerning the possibility of unusual threats to the Marine Force or the headquarters buildings?

General **Kelley**. [Deleted.]

Senator **Nunn**. Why were no anti-vehicular barriers or zig-zag approach paths put in place around the headquarters building in Beirut? Was any consideration given to building such?

General **Rogers**. There were anti-vehicular barriers in place around the Marine headquarters building. Let me detail the protective barriers as they would be viewed by terrorists. There were only two entrances to this area which could be used by wheeled vehicles. The gates to those two entrances were sandbagged bunkers supporting five-inch iron pipe gates which had to be lifted to provide access to the area. The bunkers and pipes also forced vehicle movement into a single approach land. Additionally, a 24-inch diameter concrete pipe blocked the approach from the gates to the BLT HQ. the gates were also protected by supporting sandbag bunkers set back from the gate and on line with the approach to MAU/BLT bldgs. Observation bunkers made of sandbags and manned by two armed sentries during hours of darkness and one during the day, were positioned to provide surveillance of the area. Also in place at this outer perimeter was a six-foot high barrier of triple-rolled concertina wire, supported by five-foot steel engineer stakes. This wire was supported by additional single strand barbed wired tangle foot anchored with two-foot engineer stakes. The inner perimeter consisted of a seven-foot high vertical iron bar fence imbedded in a two-foot concrete wall. The combined barriers of a seven-foot iron bar fence embedded in two-foot concrete wall—surrounded by triple rolled concertina wire supported by five-foot steel stakes, with tangle foot barbed wire supported by two-foot high steel stakes—all under the protection of sentry firing positions, were considered sufficient to stop or at least slow a vehicle so that it could be taken under fire. An interview with the Marine NCO who frequently was Sergeant of the Guard, thoroughly familiar with security measures and Sergeant of the Guard on post at the time of the incident, indicated that until the truck penetrated the gate, he was convinced that a wheeled vehicle could not get through the barriers. Prior to 23 Oct., he and the Marines on the scene firmly believed that their security measures were more than adequate.

Senator **Nunn**. Why were no anti-vehicular barriers or zig-zag approach paths put in place around the headquarters building in Beirut? Was any consideration given to building such?

General **Kelley**. There were a number of anti-vehicular barriers in place around the headquarters building at the time of the bombing. Barbed wire entanglements were emplaced throughout. Concertina wire was strung in the civilian parking lot in front of the headquarters. A metal sewer pipe barrier was also placed in front of the building. These barriers were considered adequate, in view of the threat existing at the time—a car bomb. Zig-zig approaches, anti-tank ditches and minefields were contemplated, but considered unnecessary and impractical in view of the threat existing at the time and the commercial nature of the airport.

Senator **Nunn**. Why were Navy Seabees not brought in to design and install protective barriers around the Marine headquarters in Beirut?

General **Kelley**. The Marine Amphibious Unit itself had the capability to design and install additional protective barriers around the headquarters, to include zig-zig approaches, anti-tank ditches, and minefields. However, these additional measures, although contemplated, were considered unnecessary and impractical in view of the threat existing at the time—a carbomb—and the commercial nature of the airport.

Senator **Nunn**. Were any decisions made, political or military, that hindered the ability of the Marines to protect themselves at the airport complex? Why did the Marines stop patrolling the Old Sidon Road southwest of the airport? What impact did this have on security? Were machine guns and anti-tank weapons deployed and loaded at the site of the attack? If not, why not? What were the orders to sentries and guards pertaining to loading of weapons, stopping and searching vehicles, rules of engagement, and the like? Did sentries have to receive permission to fire at a vehicle that ignored efforts to halt it?

General **Rogers**. No political or military decisions hindered the ability of the Marines to protect themselves.

Initially the USMNF reduced its presence along the Old Sidon Road (east and southeast of the airport) to decrease the tension between the USMNF and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). The IDF forces in the area were under constant attack and in danger of becoming embroiled in conflict. Following withdrawal of the IDF, local militias established cantonments along the road and prevented free movement. Cessation of patrols in all areas and removal of isolated outposts enhanced security of the USMNF by removing these elements from direct confrontation with the militias.

Machine guns and anti-tank weapons were available and could have been placed covering the area of penetration. It was the judgement of the Commander that this was not the most likely avenue of approach and that these weapons were better positioned elsewhere.

Since these were not front line positions, sentries would not have had magazines inserted in their weapons except during the highest alert condition, or if warranted by a specific threat. The rules applying to stopping and searching vehicles did not pertain to these particular posts, because they did not exert primary control over entrance to the MAU area. Given time to react, the rules of engagement would have permitted sentries to fire once the vehicle had reached the fence. They did not need anyone's permission to do so.

Senator **Nunn**. Were any decisions made, political or military, that hindered the ability of the Marines to protect themselves at the airport complex? Why did the Marines stop patrolling the Old Sidon Road southwest of the airport? What impact did this have on security? Were machine guns and anti-tank weapons deployed and loaded at the site of the attack? If not, why not? What were the orders to sentries and guards pertaining to loading of weapons, stopping and searching vehicles, rules of engagement, and the like? Did sentries have to receive permission to fire at a vehicle that ignored efforts to halt it?

General **Kelley**. No decisions, either political or military, hindered the ability of the Marines to protect themselves. The MAU commander made all decisions concerning the protection of Marines after a careful consideration of the assigned mission and the existing threat.

I defer to the appropriate operational commander for answers to your questions on the patrolling of the Old Sidon Road.

Machineguns and anti-tank weapons were available at the headquarters but were not employed and loaded at the Marine checkpoints on the perimeter. This decision was made by the MAU Commander because the threat at that time did not warrant the employment of these weapons.

The USMNF rules of engagement follow: [Deleted].

The MAU commander further defined these rules of engagement and issued the following special orders to all Marines:

1. When on post, mobile or foot patrol, keep loaded magazine in weapon, bolt closed, weapon on safe, no round in chamber.
2. Do not chamber a round unless told to do so by a commissioned officer unless you must act in immediate self-defense where deadly force is authorized.
3. Keep ammunition for crew served weapons readily available but not loaded. Keep the weapon on safe.
4. Call local forces to assist in self-defense effort. Notify headquarters as soon as possible.
5. Use only minimum degree of force necessary to accomplish the mission.
6. Stop the use of force when it is no longer needed to accomplish the mission.
7. If you receive effective hostile fire, direct your return fire at the source. If possible, use friendly snipers.

8. Respect civilian property: Do not attack it unless it is absolutely necessary to protect friendly forces.

9. Protect innocent civilians from harm.

10. Respect and protect recognized medical agencies, such as the Red Cross.

The LAF has overall responsibility for stopping and searching vehicles but we do stop and search vehicles that enter the Marine compound.

Sentries did not have to receive permission to fire at a vehicle that ignored efforts to halt it if it appeared hostile.

CURRENT SECURITY

Senator NUNN. General Kelley, in your recent visit, did you observe any other dangerous concentrations of Marines—i.e., where they are grouped together and vulnerable to attack, especially terrorist attacks? For example, how many Marines are at the Beirut University complex, and how vulnerable are they to a terrorist attack of some kind?

General KELLEY. The only other sizable concentration of Marines was at the University complex and all 207 of them were moved back aboard ship on 8 November.

Senator NUNN. General Kelley, what is being done now to better defend Marine positions? For instance, are Navy "Seabees" going to be deployed in Beirut to build artificial obstacles such as zig-zig barriers to prevent direct, high speed approaches to fixed positions such as buildings? Are the Marines doing this work themselves? Isn't building obstacles a standard procedure contained in your field manuals?

General KELLEY. The following steps are being taken to better defend Marine positions:

LAF APC's have been positioned at the BIA terminal and at the traffic circle in front of the airport.

Vehicle access to command posts is now restricted to emergency and military vehicles.

Civilian pedestrian access to the command posts has been restricted to one location.

MAU units have been placed in an indefinite "Condition 1" (highest level) alert status.

All entrances to the command posts have been blocked and reinforced.

All rifle companies have reinforced the perimeter fence lines adjacent to their positions.

An additional .50 caliber machine gun has been positioned to cover avenues of approach into the command post.

Additional guard posts have been established throughout the MAU area, and an additional rifle company was sent from Camp Lejeune to provide security during the period of the recovery operations.

Mobile reconnaissance patrols with anti-tank weapons have been established within the BIA perimeter.

BLT 2/6 command element arrived at Beirut on 25 October to replace BLT 1/8 command elements.

Definitive action is underway to strengthen the 24th MAU positions and to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks by insulating and barricading command and control and support areas.

The MAU itself has the capability to build artificial obstacles such as zig-zig barriers. Therefore Seabees support is unnecessary. Building obstacles is a standard procedure for Marines in combat. However, the Marines in Lebanon were not and are not combatants. The obstacles employed prior to the bombing were considered to be adequate, in view of the threat at the time—a car-bomb—and the commercial nature of the airport. Although the Marines in Lebanon are still not combatants, the threat has changed and therefore their choice of obstacles and other security measures have changed accordingly.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, do you think the chain of command operated effectively in Lebanon? For example, who above the level of the non-flag officers on the ground in Beirut felt responsible for security? Would the situation have been any different if Lebanon had been a declared "combat zone" from the beginning?

General ROGERS. Throughout the time of the USMNF commitment, the European Theater Chain of Command has provided direction, guidance, and advice, encouraging free exchange of information to ensure the USMNF Commander was given the necessary tools to accomplish his mission in a complex and fluid situation.

Every commander in the chain of command is responsible for the security of his troops. These commanders in the European Command theater include those subordinate to CTF62, CTF61, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, and USCINCEUR.

[Deleted.]

Senator **Tower**. Gentlemen, thank you for coming today. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 7:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

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